Samuel Baltz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Samuel Baltz has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Charles Stewart Iii
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, Cambridge, USA
4 shared publications - Joseph Loffredo
Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2 shared publications - Alejandro Flores
University of Maryland, College Park, MD
1 shared publication Aleksandra Conevska
Harvard University, Department of Government, Cambridge, USA
1 shared publicationAlexander Agadjanian
University of California, Berkeley, Department of Political Science, Berkeley, USA
1 shared publicationAllen Hicken
University of Michigan Department of Political Science, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 May 2025
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 122 (20)
Audits of the 2020 American election show an accurate vote count
After many elections, the accuracy of the vote count is assessed by retabulating a small percentage of ballots. These audits form one of the richest bodies of evidence regarding electoral legitimacy, which is particularly important in democracies where the accuracy of elections has been prominently questioned. In decentralized democracies such as the United States, however, there is tremendous variation in the conduct and reporting of audits, which are never compiled into one place to facilitate precise analysis of their results. Here, we introduce a nation-scale audit result dataset, which we use to estimate the error rate in vote counting during the 2020 U.S. election. The dataset includes all available postelection tabulation audits, spanning 856 regional governments across 27 states, with 71,702,471 individual votes and a further 1,210,528 ballots, including about 6.2% of all votes cast for Donald Trump and 6.9% of those cast for Joe Biden. We find that election audits shifted the net presidential vote count by only about 0.007%, with similarly minuscule errors across all major types of electoral contests. The construction of a nation-scale election audit dataset represents a novel approach to benchmarking electoral legitimacy and provides particularly direct and comprehensive evidence that Americans’ votes were counted correctly in 2020.
- 13 May 2025
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 122 (20)
Open AccessAudits of the 2020 American election show an accurate vote count
After many elections, the accuracy of the vote count is assessed by retabulating a small percentage of ballots. These audits form one of the richest bodies of evidence regarding electoral legitimacy, which is particularly important in democracies where the accuracy of elections has been prominently questioned. In decentralized democracies such as the United States, however, there is tremendous variation in the conduct and reporting of audits, which are never compiled into one place to facilitate precise analysis of their results. Here, we introduce a nation-scale audit result dataset, which we use to estimate the error rate in vote counting during the 2020 U.S. election. The dataset includes all available postelection tabulation audits, spanning 856 regional governments across 27 states, with 71,702,471 individual votes and a further 1,210,528 ballots, including about 6.2% of all votes cast for Donald Trump and 6.9% of those cast for Joe Biden. We find that election audits shifted the net presidential vote count by only about 0.007%, with similarly minuscule errors across all major types of electoral contests. The construction of a nation-scale election audit dataset represents a novel approach to benchmarking electoral legitimacy and provides particularly direct and comprehensive evidence that Americans’ votes were counted correctly in 2020.
- 27 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 33 (4) , 447-455
The Probability of Casting a Pivotal Vote in an Instant Runoff Voting Election
If instant runoff voting (IRV) mitigates strategic voting, is that because the rules of the system mechanically reduce strategic opportunities, or because of other more indirect effects? In single-vote plurality elections, a voter can be pivotal if adding one vote to a candidate would cause that candidate to win. In IRV, it is more complicated to identify when one voter can be pivotal. This letter derives all the ways that a single ballot can change the result of an IRV election, for any number of candidates and voters. I obtain an expression for the probability of casting a pivotal vote in IRV by phrasing the probability that any pivotal event occurs as a function of all the rankings cast by other voters. This expression facilitates modeling vote choice in IRV, and enables the estimation of voters’ strategic opportunities in IRV contests between any number of candidates. I present some illustrative simulations estimating pivotal probabilities in both IRV and Single-Member District Plurality for stylized electorates with identical preference structures. These simulations produce similar estimated pivotal probabilities in the two systems, suggesting that these systems may provide similar opportunities to strategically cast a decisive vote.
- 27 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 33 (4) , 447-455
The Probability of Casting a Pivotal Vote in an Instant Runoff Voting Election
If instant runoff voting (IRV) mitigates strategic voting, is that because the rules of the system mechanically reduce strategic opportunities, or because of other more indirect effects? In single-vote plurality elections, a voter can be pivotal if adding one vote to a candidate would cause that candidate to win. In IRV, it is more complicated to identify when one voter can be pivotal. This letter derives all the ways that a single ballot can change the result of an IRV election, for any number of candidates and voters. I obtain an expression for the probability of casting a pivotal vote in IRV by phrasing the probability that any pivotal event occurs as a function of all the rankings cast by other voters. This expression facilitates modeling vote choice in IRV, and enables the estimation of voters’ strategic opportunities in IRV contests between any number of candidates. I present some illustrative simulations estimating pivotal probabilities in both IRV and Single-Member District Plurality for stylized electorates with identical preference structures. These simulations produce similar estimated pivotal probabilities in the two systems, suggesting that these systems may provide similar opportunities to strategically cast a decisive vote.
- Open Access
- 28 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Data
- Vol. 11 (1) , 1-14
Cast vote records: A database of ballots from the 2020 U.S. Election
Ballots are the core records of elections. Electronic records of actual ballots cast (cast vote records) are available to the public in some jurisdictions. However, they have been released in a variety of formats and have not been independently evaluated. Here we introduce a database of cast vote records from the 2020 U.S. general election. We downloaded publicly available unstandardized cast vote records, standardized them into a multi-state database, and extensively compared their totals to certified election results. Our release includes vote records for President, Governor, U.S. Senate and House, and state upper and lower chambers, covering 42.7 million voters in 20 states who voted for more than 2,200 candidates. This database serves as a uniquely granular administrative dataset for studying voting behavior and election administration. Using this data, we show that in battleground states, 1.9 percent of solid Republicans (as defined by their congressional and state legislative voting) in our database split their ticket for Joe Biden, while 1.2 percent of solid Democrats split their ticket for Donald Trump.
- 28 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Data
- Vol. 11 (1) , 1-14
Open AccessCast vote records: A database of ballots from the 2020 U.S. Election
Ballots are the core records of elections. Electronic records of actual ballots cast (cast vote records) are available to the public in some jurisdictions. However, they have been released in a variety of formats and have not been independently evaluated. Here we introduce a database of cast vote records from the 2020 U.S. general election. We downloaded publicly available unstandardized cast vote records, standardized them into a multi-state database, and extensively compared their totals to certified election results. Our release includes vote records for President, Governor, U.S. Senate and House, and state upper and lower chambers, covering 42.7 million voters in 20 states who voted for more than 2,200 candidates. This database serves as a uniquely granular administrative dataset for studying voting behavior and election administration. Using this data, we show that in battleground states, 1.9 percent of solid Republicans (as defined by their congressional and state legislative voting) in our database split their ticket for Joe Biden, while 1.2 percent of solid Democrats split their ticket for Donald Trump.
- 11 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 88 (SI) , 585-607
Trust in the Count: Improving Voter Confidence with Post-election Audits
Post-election audits are thought to bolster voter confidence in elections, but it is unclear which aspects of audits drive public trust. Using preregistered vignette and conjoint survey experiments administered by YouGov on a sample of 2,000 American respondents, we find that how an audit is conducted is more important than what an audit finds. Structural features of audits, like who conducts it and how its results are announced, turn out to be more consequential to voter evaluations of election results than the actual discrepancy found. Moreover, while Democrats and Republicans have increasingly divided views of the state of democracy in the United States, they are similarly receptive to information presented about audits and largely agree that audits are effective tools for detecting errors in vote counting. Our findings thus reinforce the expectation that audits do increase voter trust and highlight that election administrators can strengthen voter confidence by making audits as transparent as possible.
- 11 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 88 (SI) , 585-607
Trust in the Count: Improving Voter Confidence with Post-election Audits
Post-election audits are thought to bolster voter confidence in elections, but it is unclear which aspects of audits drive public trust. Using preregistered vignette and conjoint survey experiments administered by YouGov on a sample of 2,000 American respondents, we find that how an audit is conducted is more important than what an audit finds. Structural features of audits, like who conducts it and how its results are announced, turn out to be more consequential to voter evaluations of election results than the actual discrepancy found. Moreover, while Democrats and Republicans have increasingly divided views of the state of democracy in the United States, they are similarly receptive to information presented about audits and largely agree that audits are effective tools for detecting errors in vote counting. Our findings thus reinforce the expectation that audits do increase voter trust and highlight that election administrators can strengthen voter confidence by making audits as transparent as possible.
- 6 May 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 32 (4) , 463-475
Votes Can Be Confidently Bought in Some Ranked Ballot Elections, and What to Do about It
We show that, in some ranked ballot elections, it may be possible to violate the secret vote. There are so many ways to rank even a handful of candidates that many possible rankings might not be cast by any voter. So, a vote buyer could pay someone to rank the candidates a certain way and then use the announced election results to verify that the voter followed through. We examine the feasibility of this attack both theoretically and empirically, focusing on instant runoff voting (IRV). Although many IRV elections have few enough candidates that this scheme is not feasible, we use data from San Francisco and a proposed election rule change in Oakland to show that some important IRV elections can have large numbers of unused rankings. There is no evidence that this vote-buying scheme has ever been used. However, its existence has implications for the administration and security of IRV elections. This scheme is more feasible when more candidates can be ranked in the election and when the election results report all the ways that candidates were ranked.
- 6 May 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 32 (4) , 463-475
Votes Can Be Confidently Bought in Some Ranked Ballot Elections, and What to Do about It
We show that, in some ranked ballot elections, it may be possible to violate the secret vote. There are so many ways to rank even a handful of candidates that many possible rankings might not be cast by any voter. So, a vote buyer could pay someone to rank the candidates a certain way and then use the announced election results to verify that the voter followed through. We examine the feasibility of this attack both theoretically and empirically, focusing on instant runoff voting (IRV). Although many IRV elections have few enough candidates that this scheme is not feasible, we use data from San Francisco and a proposed election rule change in Oakland to show that some important IRV elections can have large numbers of unused rankings. There is no evidence that this vote-buying scheme has ever been used. However, its existence has implications for the administration and security of IRV elections. This scheme is more feasible when more candidates can be ranked in the election and when the election results report all the ways that candidates were ranked.
- Open Access
The probability of casting a pivotal vote in an Instant Runoff Voting election
I derive the probability that a vote cast in an Instant Runoff Voting election will change the election winner. I phrase that probability in terms of the candidates' expected vote totals, and then I estimate its magnitude for different distributions of voter preferences. The result is very similar to the probability of casting a pivotal vote in a Single-Member District Plurality election, which suggests that Instant Runoff Voting does not actually increase or decrease voters' incentives to vote strategically. The derivation uncovers a counter-intuitive phenomenon that I call "indirect pivotality", in which a voter can cause one candidate to win by ranking some other candidate on their ballot.
Open AccessThe probability of casting a pivotal vote in an Instant Runoff Voting election
I derive the probability that a vote cast in an Instant Runoff Voting election will change the election winner. I phrase that probability in terms of the candidates' expected vote totals, and then I estimate its magnitude for different distributions of voter preferences. The result is very similar to the probability of casting a pivotal vote in a Single-Member District Plurality election, which suggests that Instant Runoff Voting does not actually increase or decrease voters' incentives to vote strategically. The derivation uncovers a counter-intuitive phenomenon that I call "indirect pivotality", in which a voter can cause one candidate to win by ranking some other candidate on their ballot.
- Open Access
- 3 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Data
- Vol. 9 (1) , 1-12
American election results at the precinct level
We describe the creation and quality assurance of a dataset containing nearly all available precinct-level election results from the 2016, 2018, and 2020 American elections. Precincts are the smallest level of election administration, and election results at this granularity are needed to address many important questions. However, election results are individually reported by each state with little standardization or data quality assurance. We have collected, cleaned, and standardized precinct-level election results from every available race above the very local level in almost every state across the last three national election years. Our data include nearly every candidate for president, US Congress, governor, or state legislator, and hundreds of thousands of precinct-level results for judicial races, other statewide races, and even local races and ballot initiatives. In this article we describe the process of finding this information and standardizing it. Then we aggregate the precinct-level results up to geographies that have official totals, and show that our totals never differ from the official nationwide data by more than 0.457%.
- 3 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Data
- Vol. 9 (1) , 1-12
Open AccessAmerican election results at the precinct level
We describe the creation and quality assurance of a dataset containing nearly all available precinct-level election results from the 2016, 2018, and 2020 American elections. Precincts are the smallest level of election administration, and election results at this granularity are needed to address many important questions. However, election results are individually reported by each state with little standardization or data quality assurance. We have collected, cleaned, and standardized precinct-level election results from every available race above the very local level in almost every state across the last three national election years. Our data include nearly every candidate for president, US Congress, governor, or state legislator, and hundreds of thousands of precinct-level results for judicial races, other statewide races, and even local races and ballot initiatives. In this article we describe the process of finding this information and standardizing it. Then we aggregate the precinct-level results up to geographies that have official totals, and show that our totals never differ from the official nationwide data by more than 0.457%.
- Open Access
- 31 March 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 55 (2) , 439-444
Reducing Bias in Wikipedia’s Coverage of Political Scientists
- 31 March 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 55 (2) , 439-444
Open AccessReducing Bias in Wikipedia’s Coverage of Political Scientists
- 24 January 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 29 (5) , 814-837
An unexpected consensus among diverse ways to measure democracy
We show that behind decades of disagreements over how to classify regime types, there is an unexpectedly strong consensus about which countries have been democratic in which years. We match many-valued classifications of democracies and autocracies to binary classifications, by finding the cutpoint that dichotomizes each many-valued measure so that it matches each binary measure as closely as possible. Despite the sharp differences between these datasets, we find identical or nearly identical optimal cutpoints for almost every major classification. This is evidence of a strong underlying agreement between the classifications. We show that the many-valued measures, when dichotomized in the optimal way, can replicate major results in the study of democracy. We also examine which sorts of countries are counted as democracies in this consensus, and we show that countries where national elections have never produced a turnover between parties are a particular focus of disagreement.
- 24 January 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 29 (5) , 814-837
An unexpected consensus among diverse ways to measure democracy
We show that behind decades of disagreements over how to classify regime types, there is an unexpectedly strong consensus about which countries have been democratic in which years. We match many-valued classifications of democracies and autocracies to binary classifications, by finding the cutpoint that dichotomizes each many-valued measure so that it matches each binary measure as closely as possible. Despite the sharp differences between these datasets, we find identical or nearly identical optimal cutpoints for almost every major classification. This is evidence of a strong underlying agreement between the classifications. We show that the many-valued measures, when dichotomized in the optimal way, can replicate major results in the study of democracy. We also examine which sorts of countries are counted as democracies in this consensus, and we show that countries where national elections have never produced a turnover between parties are a particular focus of disagreement.