Nicole Immorlica
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Nicole Immorlica has a total of 58 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Brendan Lucier
Microsoft Research
5 shared publications - Brendan Lucier
Microsoft Research, Cambridge, MA, USA
5 shared publications - Aleksandrs Slivkins
Microsoft Research, New York, NY, USA
3 shared publications Brendan Lucier
2 shared publications- David Rothschild
Microsoft Research, New York, NY, USA
2 shared publications - Emmanouil Pountourakis
Microsoft Research New England USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 28 September 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
In Which Matching Markets Do Costly Compatibility Inspections Lead to a Deadlock?
When Learning About a Match Stalls the Market In many matching markets, participants must investigate whether a match is feasible. When inspection is costly, participants may delay investigating a potential match until both sides have effectively committed. Such caution can cause each side to wait for others to act, creating an “information deadlock.” In their article, “In Which Matching Markets Do Costly Compatibility Inspections Lead to a Deadlock?” Immorlica, Kanoria, and Lu study this problem in random two-sided markets. They characterize how deadlock depends on the market balance, market connectivity, and the chance that inspections succeed. Using statistical physics tools, their analysis identifies phase transitions between deadlock-free and deadlocked markets. The findings offer design guidance: More choice is not always better; match rates are highest at the deadlock phase boundary; and parallel inspections and clearer participant differentiation can reduce the extent to which waiting chains stall the market.
- 28 September 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
In Which Matching Markets Do Costly Compatibility Inspections Lead to a Deadlock?
When Learning About a Match Stalls the Market In many matching markets, participants must investigate whether a match is feasible. When inspection is costly, participants may delay investigating a potential match until both sides have effectively committed. Such caution can cause each side to wait for others to act, creating an “information deadlock.” In their article, “In Which Matching Markets Do Costly Compatibility Inspections Lead to a Deadlock?” Immorlica, Kanoria, and Lu study this problem in random two-sided markets. They characterize how deadlock depends on the market balance, market connectivity, and the chance that inspections succeed. Using statistical physics tools, their analysis identifies phase transitions between deadlock-free and deadlocked markets. The findings offer design guidance: More choice is not always better; match rates are highest at the deadlock phase boundary; and parallel inspections and clearer participant differentiation can reduce the extent to which waiting chains stall the market.
- Open Access
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 250
Approximately efficient resource allocation: A theoretical and experimental evaluation
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 250
Open AccessApproximately efficient resource allocation: A theoretical and experimental evaluation
- Open Access
- 31 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-5
The Evolution of Digital Search: From Blue Links to Delegated Decision-Making
- 31 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-5
Open AccessThe Evolution of Digital Search: From Blue Links to Delegated Decision-Making
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 28 January 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Communications of the ACM
The Agentic Economy
The architecture of agentic communication will determine the extent to which generative AI democratizes access to economic opportunity.
- 28 January 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Communications of the ACM
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessThe Agentic Economy
The architecture of agentic communication will determine the extent to which generative AI democratizes access to economic opportunity.
- Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 975
Eliciting Informed Preferences
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 975
Open AccessEliciting Informed Preferences
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 852
Certification Design for a Competitive Market
We consider a market for products with varying but hidden levels of quality. A third-party certifier can provide informative signals about the quality of products and can charge for this service. Sellers choose both the quality of the product they produce and a certification. The products are then sold in a competitive market. Under a single-crossing condition, we show that the levels of certification chosen by sellers are uniquely determined at equilibrium. The certifier's problem is equivalent to a screening problem with non-linear valuations. Certification objectives to maximize gains from trade, quantity traded, and certification revenue are in general incompatible. We prove that optimal menus for these and other objectives satisfy a monotonicity property, and we provide a FPTAS for their computation. We also show that a full, two-sided mechanism can improve over certification only through the possibility of subsidizing certificates. We discuss how to interpret our results in the motivating example of markets for carbon offsets and removal activities. Full paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.13449
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 852
Open AccessCertification Design for a Competitive Market
We consider a market for products with varying but hidden levels of quality. A third-party certifier can provide informative signals about the quality of products and can charge for this service. Sellers choose both the quality of the product they produce and a certification. The products are then sold in a competitive market. Under a single-crossing condition, we show that the levels of certification chosen by sellers are uniquely determined at equilibrium. The certifier's problem is equivalent to a screening problem with non-linear valuations. Certification objectives to maximize gains from trade, quantity traded, and certification revenue are in general incompatible. We prove that optimal menus for these and other objectives satisfy a monotonicity property, and we provide a FPTAS for their computation. We also show that a full, two-sided mechanism can improve over certification only through the possibility of subsidizing certificates. We discuss how to interpret our results in the motivating example of markets for carbon offsets and removal activities. Full paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.13449
- Open Access
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 36-45
Clickbait vs. Quality: How Engagement-Based Optimization Shapes the Content Landscape in Online Platforms
Online content platforms commonly use engagement-based optimization when making recommendations. This encourages content creators to invest in quality, but also rewards gaming tricks such as clickbait. To understand the total impact on the content landscape, we study a game between content creators competing on the basis of engagement metrics and analyze the equilibrium decisions about investment in quality and gaming. First, we show the content created at equilibrium exhibits a positive correlation between quality and gaming, and we empirically validate this finding on a Twitter dataset. Using the equilibrium structure of the content landscape, we then examine the downstream performance of engagement-based optimization along two axes. Perhaps counterintuitively, the average quality of content consumed by users can decrease at equilibrium as gaming tricks become more costly for content creators to employ. Moreover, engagement-based optimization can perform worse in terms of user utility than a baseline with random recommendations. Altogether, our results highlight the need to consider content creator incentives when evaluating a platform's choice of optimization metric.
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 36-45
Open AccessClickbait vs. Quality: How Engagement-Based Optimization Shapes the Content Landscape in Online Platforms
Online content platforms commonly use engagement-based optimization when making recommendations. This encourages content creators to invest in quality, but also rewards gaming tricks such as clickbait. To understand the total impact on the content landscape, we study a game between content creators competing on the basis of engagement metrics and analyze the equilibrium decisions about investment in quality and gaming. First, we show the content created at equilibrium exhibits a positive correlation between quality and gaming, and we empirically validate this finding on a Twitter dataset. Using the equilibrium structure of the content landscape, we then examine the downstream performance of engagement-based optimization along two axes. Perhaps counterintuitively, the average quality of content consumed by users can decrease at equilibrium as gaming tricks become more costly for content creators to employ. Moreover, engagement-based optimization can perform worse in terms of user utility than a baseline with random recommendations. Altogether, our results highlight the need to consider content creator incentives when evaluating a platform's choice of optimization metric.
- Open Access
- 19 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
- Vol. 11 (3-4) , 1-29
Prophet Inequalities with Linear Correlations and Augmentations
In a classical online decision problem, a decision-maker who is trying to maximize her value inspects a sequence of arriving items to learn their values (drawn from known distributions) and decides when to stop the process by taking the current item. The goal is to prove a “prophet inequality”: that she can do approximately as well as a prophet with foreknowledge of all the values. In this work, we investigate this problem when the values are allowed to be correlated. Since nontrivial guarantees are impossible for arbitrary correlations, we consider a natural “linear” correlation structure introduced by Bateni et al. as a generalization of the common-base value model of Chawla et al. A key challenge is that threshold-based algorithms, which are commonly used for prophet inequalities, no longer guarantee good performance for linear correlations. We relate this roadblock to another “augmentations” challenge that might be of independent interest: many existing prophet inequality algorithms are not robust to slight increases in the values of the arriving items. We leverage this intuition to prove bounds (matching up to constant factors) that decay gracefully with the amount of correlation of the arriving items. We extend these results to the case of selecting multiple items by designing a new (1+ o (1))-approximation ratio algorithm that is robust to augmentations.
- 19 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
- Vol. 11 (3-4) , 1-29
Open AccessProphet Inequalities with Linear Correlations and Augmentations
In a classical online decision problem, a decision-maker who is trying to maximize her value inspects a sequence of arriving items to learn their values (drawn from known distributions) and decides when to stop the process by taking the current item. The goal is to prove a “prophet inequality”: that she can do approximately as well as a prophet with foreknowledge of all the values. In this work, we investigate this problem when the values are allowed to be correlated. Since nontrivial guarantees are impossible for arbitrary correlations, we consider a natural “linear” correlation structure introduced by Bateni et al. as a generalization of the common-base value model of Chawla et al. A key challenge is that threshold-based algorithms, which are commonly used for prophet inequalities, no longer guarantee good performance for linear correlations. We relate this roadblock to another “augmentations” challenge that might be of independent interest: many existing prophet inequality algorithms are not robust to slight increases in the values of the arriving items. We leverage this intuition to prove bounds (matching up to constant factors) that decay gracefully with the amount of correlation of the arriving items. We extend these results to the case of selecting multiple items by designing a new (1+ o (1))-approximation ratio algorithm that is robust to augmentations.
- Open Access
Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation
We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private costs for participating in the mechanism. An agent's participation cost can also be interpreted as an outside option value that she must forego to participate. This substantially changes the revenue maximization problem, which becomes non-convex in the presence of participation costs. For multiple buyers, we show how to construct a $(2+\epsilon)$-approximately revenue-optimal mechanism in polynomial time. Our approach makes use of a many-buyers-to-single-buyer reduction, and in the single-buyer case our mechanism improves to an FPTAS. We also bound the menu size and the sample complexity for the optimal single-buyer mechanism. Moreover, we show that posting a single price in the single-buyer case is in fact optimal under the assumption that either (1) the participation cost is independent of the value, and the value distribution has decreasing marginal revenue or monotone hazard rate; or (2) the participation cost is a concave function of the value. When there are multiple buyers, we show that sequential posted pricing guarantees a large fraction of the optimal revenue under similar conditions.
Open AccessRevenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation
We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private costs for participating in the mechanism. An agent's participation cost can also be interpreted as an outside option value that she must forego to participate. This substantially changes the revenue maximization problem, which becomes non-convex in the presence of participation costs. For multiple buyers, we show how to construct a $(2+\epsilon)$-approximately revenue-optimal mechanism in polynomial time. Our approach makes use of a many-buyers-to-single-buyer reduction, and in the single-buyer case our mechanism improves to an FPTAS. We also bound the menu size and the sample complexity for the optimal single-buyer mechanism. Moreover, we show that posting a single price in the single-buyer case is in fact optimal under the assumption that either (1) the participation cost is independent of the value, and the value distribution has decreasing marginal revenue or monotone hazard rate; or (2) the participation cost is a concave function of the value. When there are multiple buyers, we show that sequential posted pricing guarantees a large fraction of the optimal revenue under similar conditions.
- Open Access
Social Learning under Platform Influence: Consensus and Persistent Disagreement
Individuals increasingly rely on social networking platforms to form opinions. However, these platforms typically aim to maximize engagement, which may not align with social good. In this paper, we introduce an opinion dynamics model where agents are connected in a social network, and update their opinions based on their neighbors' opinions and on the content shown to them by the platform. We focus on a stochastic block model with two blocks, where the initial opinions of the individuals in different blocks are different. We prove that for large and dense enough networks the trajectory of opinion dynamics in such networks can be approximated well by a simple two-agent system. The latter admits tractable analytical analysis, which we leverage to provide interesting insights into the platform's impact on the social learning outcome in our original two-block model. Specifically, by using our approximation result, we show that agents' opinions approximately converge to some limiting opinion, which is either: consensus, where all agents agree, or persistent disagreement, where agents' opinions differ. We find that when the platform is weak and there is a high number of connections between agents with different initial opinions, a consensus equilibrium is likely. In this case, even if a persistent disagreement equilibrium arises, the polarization in this equilibrium, i.e., the degree of disagreement, is low. When the platform is strong, a persistent disagreement equilibrium is likely and the equilibrium polarization is high. A moderate platform typically leads to a persistent disagreement equilibrium with moderate polarization. We analyze the effect of initial polarization on consensus and explore numerically various extensions including a three block stochastic model and a correlation between initial opinions and agents' connection probabilities.
Open AccessSocial Learning under Platform Influence: Consensus and Persistent Disagreement
Individuals increasingly rely on social networking platforms to form opinions. However, these platforms typically aim to maximize engagement, which may not align with social good. In this paper, we introduce an opinion dynamics model where agents are connected in a social network, and update their opinions based on their neighbors' opinions and on the content shown to them by the platform. We focus on a stochastic block model with two blocks, where the initial opinions of the individuals in different blocks are different. We prove that for large and dense enough networks the trajectory of opinion dynamics in such networks can be approximated well by a simple two-agent system. The latter admits tractable analytical analysis, which we leverage to provide interesting insights into the platform's impact on the social learning outcome in our original two-block model. Specifically, by using our approximation result, we show that agents' opinions approximately converge to some limiting opinion, which is either: consensus, where all agents agree, or persistent disagreement, where agents' opinions differ. We find that when the platform is weak and there is a high number of connections between agents with different initial opinions, a consensus equilibrium is likely. In this case, even if a persistent disagreement equilibrium arises, the polarization in this equilibrium, i.e., the degree of disagreement, is low. When the platform is strong, a persistent disagreement equilibrium is likely and the equilibrium polarization is high. A moderate platform typically leads to a persistent disagreement equilibrium with moderate polarization. We analyze the effect of initial polarization on consensus and explore numerically various extensions including a three block stochastic model and a correlation between initial opinions and agents' connection probabilities.