Brendan Lucier
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Brendan Lucier has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Nicole Immorlica
Microsoft Research, Cambridge, MA, USA
5 shared publications - Aleksandrs Slivkins
Microsoft Research, New York, NY, USA
4 shared publications - David Rothschild
Microsoft Research, New York, NY, USA
2 shared publications - Markus Mobius
Microsoft Research, Cambridge, MA, USA
2 shared publications - Moshe Babaioff
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
2 shared publications - Andreas Haupt
Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-5
The Evolution of Digital Search: From Blue Links to Delegated Decision-Making
- 31 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-5
Open AccessThe Evolution of Digital Search: From Blue Links to Delegated Decision-Making
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 28 January 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Communications of the ACM
The Agentic Economy
The architecture of agentic communication will determine the extent to which generative AI democratizes access to economic opportunity.
- 28 January 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Communications of the ACM
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessThe Agentic Economy
The architecture of agentic communication will determine the extent to which generative AI democratizes access to economic opportunity.
- Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 477
Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 477
Open AccessApproximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers
- Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 975
Eliciting Informed Preferences
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 975
Open AccessEliciting Informed Preferences
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 465
Bundling in Oligopoly: Revenue Maximization with Single-Item Competitors
We consider a principal seller with m heterogeneous products to sell to an additive buyer over independent items. The principal can offer an arbitrary menu of product bundles, but faces competition from smaller and more agile single-item sellers. The single-item sellers choose their prices after the principal commits to a menu, potentially under-cutting the principal's offerings. We explore to what extent the principal can leverage the ability to bundle products together to extract revenue. Any choice of menu by the principal induces an oligopoly pricing game between the single-item sellers, which may have multiple equilibria. When there is only a single item this model reduces to Bertrand competition, for which the principal's revenue is 0 at any equilibrium, so we assume that no single item's value is too dominant. We establish an upper bound on the principal's optimal revenue at every equilibrium: the expected welfare after truncating each item's value to its revenue-maximizing price. Under a technical condition on the value distributions --- that the monopolist's revenue is sufficiently sensitive to price --- we show that the principal seller can simply price the grand-bundle and ensure (in any equilibrium) a constant approximation to this bound (and hence to the optimal revenue). We also show that for some value distributions violating our conditions, grand-bundle pricing does not yield a constant approximation to the optimal revenue in any equilibrium.
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 465
Open AccessBundling in Oligopoly: Revenue Maximization with Single-Item Competitors
We consider a principal seller with m heterogeneous products to sell to an additive buyer over independent items. The principal can offer an arbitrary menu of product bundles, but faces competition from smaller and more agile single-item sellers. The single-item sellers choose their prices after the principal commits to a menu, potentially under-cutting the principal's offerings. We explore to what extent the principal can leverage the ability to bundle products together to extract revenue. Any choice of menu by the principal induces an oligopoly pricing game between the single-item sellers, which may have multiple equilibria. When there is only a single item this model reduces to Bertrand competition, for which the principal's revenue is 0 at any equilibrium, so we assume that no single item's value is too dominant. We establish an upper bound on the principal's optimal revenue at every equilibrium: the expected welfare after truncating each item's value to its revenue-maximizing price. Under a technical condition on the value distributions --- that the monopolist's revenue is sufficiently sensitive to price --- we show that the principal seller can simply price the grand-bundle and ensure (in any equilibrium) a constant approximation to this bound (and hence to the optimal revenue). We also show that for some value distributions violating our conditions, grand-bundle pricing does not yield a constant approximation to the optimal revenue in any equilibrium.
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 852
Certification Design for a Competitive Market
We consider a market for products with varying but hidden levels of quality. A third-party certifier can provide informative signals about the quality of products and can charge for this service. Sellers choose both the quality of the product they produce and a certification. The products are then sold in a competitive market. Under a single-crossing condition, we show that the levels of certification chosen by sellers are uniquely determined at equilibrium. The certifier's problem is equivalent to a screening problem with non-linear valuations. Certification objectives to maximize gains from trade, quantity traded, and certification revenue are in general incompatible. We prove that optimal menus for these and other objectives satisfy a monotonicity property, and we provide a FPTAS for their computation. We also show that a full, two-sided mechanism can improve over certification only through the possibility of subsidizing certificates. We discuss how to interpret our results in the motivating example of markets for carbon offsets and removal activities. Full paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.13449
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 852
Open AccessCertification Design for a Competitive Market
We consider a market for products with varying but hidden levels of quality. A third-party certifier can provide informative signals about the quality of products and can charge for this service. Sellers choose both the quality of the product they produce and a certification. The products are then sold in a competitive market. Under a single-crossing condition, we show that the levels of certification chosen by sellers are uniquely determined at equilibrium. The certifier's problem is equivalent to a screening problem with non-linear valuations. Certification objectives to maximize gains from trade, quantity traded, and certification revenue are in general incompatible. We prove that optimal menus for these and other objectives satisfy a monotonicity property, and we provide a FPTAS for their computation. We also show that a full, two-sided mechanism can improve over certification only through the possibility of subsidizing certificates. We discuss how to interpret our results in the motivating example of markets for carbon offsets and removal activities. Full paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.13449
- Open Access
- 10 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 213-224
Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding World
We study a game played between advertisers in an online ad platform. The platform sells ad impressions by first-price auction and provides autobidding algorithms that optimize bids on each advertiser's behalf, subject to advertiser constraints such as budgets. Crucially, these constraints are strategically chosen by the advertisers. The chosen constraints define an "inner" budget-pacing game for the autobidders. Advertiser payoffs in the constraint-choosing "metagame" are determined by the equilibrium reached by the autobidders. Advertiser preferences can be more general than what is implied by their constraints: we assume only that they have weakly decreasing marginal value for clicks and weakly increasing marginal disutility for spending money. Nevertheless, we show that at any pure Nash equilibrium of the metagame, the resulting allocation obtains at least half of the liquid welfare of any allocation and this bound is tight. We also obtain a 4-approximation for any mixed Nash equilibrium or Bayes-Nash equilibria. These results rely on the power to declare budgets: if advertisers can specify only a (linear) value per click or an ROI target but not a budget constraint, the approximation factor at equilibrium can be as bad as linear in the number of advertisers.
- 10 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 213-224
Open AccessStrategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding World
We study a game played between advertisers in an online ad platform. The platform sells ad impressions by first-price auction and provides autobidding algorithms that optimize bids on each advertiser's behalf, subject to advertiser constraints such as budgets. Crucially, these constraints are strategically chosen by the advertisers. The chosen constraints define an "inner" budget-pacing game for the autobidders. Advertiser payoffs in the constraint-choosing "metagame" are determined by the equilibrium reached by the autobidders. Advertiser preferences can be more general than what is implied by their constraints: we assume only that they have weakly decreasing marginal value for clicks and weakly increasing marginal disutility for spending money. Nevertheless, we show that at any pure Nash equilibrium of the metagame, the resulting allocation obtains at least half of the liquid welfare of any allocation and this bound is tight. We also obtain a 4-approximation for any mixed Nash equilibrium or Bayes-Nash equilibria. These results rely on the power to declare budgets: if advertisers can specify only a (linear) value per click or an ROI target but not a budget constraint, the approximation factor at equilibrium can be as bad as linear in the number of advertisers.
- Open Access
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 36-45
Clickbait vs. Quality: How Engagement-Based Optimization Shapes the Content Landscape in Online Platforms
Online content platforms commonly use engagement-based optimization when making recommendations. This encourages content creators to invest in quality, but also rewards gaming tricks such as clickbait. To understand the total impact on the content landscape, we study a game between content creators competing on the basis of engagement metrics and analyze the equilibrium decisions about investment in quality and gaming. First, we show the content created at equilibrium exhibits a positive correlation between quality and gaming, and we empirically validate this finding on a Twitter dataset. Using the equilibrium structure of the content landscape, we then examine the downstream performance of engagement-based optimization along two axes. Perhaps counterintuitively, the average quality of content consumed by users can decrease at equilibrium as gaming tricks become more costly for content creators to employ. Moreover, engagement-based optimization can perform worse in terms of user utility than a baseline with random recommendations. Altogether, our results highlight the need to consider content creator incentives when evaluating a platform's choice of optimization metric.
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 36-45
Open AccessClickbait vs. Quality: How Engagement-Based Optimization Shapes the Content Landscape in Online Platforms
Online content platforms commonly use engagement-based optimization when making recommendations. This encourages content creators to invest in quality, but also rewards gaming tricks such as clickbait. To understand the total impact on the content landscape, we study a game between content creators competing on the basis of engagement metrics and analyze the equilibrium decisions about investment in quality and gaming. First, we show the content created at equilibrium exhibits a positive correlation between quality and gaming, and we empirically validate this finding on a Twitter dataset. Using the equilibrium structure of the content landscape, we then examine the downstream performance of engagement-based optimization along two axes. Perhaps counterintuitively, the average quality of content consumed by users can decrease at equilibrium as gaming tricks become more costly for content creators to employ. Moreover, engagement-based optimization can perform worse in terms of user utility than a baseline with random recommendations. Altogether, our results highlight the need to consider content creator incentives when evaluating a platform's choice of optimization metric.
- Open Access
Truthful Online Scheduling of Cloud Workloads under Uncertainty
Cloud computing customers often submit repeating jobs and computation pipelines on \emph{approximately} regular schedules, with arrival and running times that exhibit variance. This pattern, typical of training tasks in machine learning, allows customers to partially predict future job requirements. We develop a model of cloud computing platforms that receive statements of work (SoWs) in an online fashion. The SoWs describe future jobs whose arrival times and durations are probabilistic, and whose utility to the submitting agents declines with completion time. The arrival and duration distributions, as well as the utility functions, are considered private customer information and are reported by strategic agents to a scheduler that is optimizing for social welfare. We design pricing, scheduling, and eviction mechanisms that incentivize truthful reporting of SoWs. An important challenge is maintaining incentives despite the possibility of the platform becoming saturated. We introduce a framework to reduce scheduling under uncertainty to a relaxed scheduling problem without uncertainty. Using this framework, we tackle both adversarial and stochastic submissions of statements of work, and obtain logarithmic and constant competitive mechanisms, respectively.
Open AccessTruthful Online Scheduling of Cloud Workloads under Uncertainty
Cloud computing customers often submit repeating jobs and computation pipelines on \emph{approximately} regular schedules, with arrival and running times that exhibit variance. This pattern, typical of training tasks in machine learning, allows customers to partially predict future job requirements. We develop a model of cloud computing platforms that receive statements of work (SoWs) in an online fashion. The SoWs describe future jobs whose arrival times and durations are probabilistic, and whose utility to the submitting agents declines with completion time. The arrival and duration distributions, as well as the utility functions, are considered private customer information and are reported by strategic agents to a scheduler that is optimizing for social welfare. We design pricing, scheduling, and eviction mechanisms that incentivize truthful reporting of SoWs. An important challenge is maintaining incentives despite the possibility of the platform becoming saturated. We introduce a framework to reduce scheduling under uncertainty to a relaxed scheduling problem without uncertainty. Using this framework, we tackle both adversarial and stochastic submissions of statements of work, and obtain logarithmic and constant competitive mechanisms, respectively.
- Open Access
- 17 June 2019
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 869-883
The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors
- 17 June 2019
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 869-883
Open AccessThe Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors