Aaron Faulkenberry
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Aaron Faulkenberry has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Angelos D. Keromytis
Georgia Institute of Technology
2 shared publications - Fabian Monrose
Georgia Institute of Technology
2 shared publications - Manos Antonakakis
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
2 shared publications - Zane Ma
Oregon State University, Corvallis, USA
2 shared publications - Athanasios Avgetidis
Georgia Institute of Technology, United States of America
1 shared publication - Charles Lever
Devo, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 222-235
Stale TLS Certificates: Investigating Precarious Third-Party Access to Valid TLS Keys
Certificate authorities enable TLS server authentication by generating certificates that attest to the mapping between a domain name and a cryptographic keypair, for up to 398 days. This static, name-to-key caching mechanism belies a complex reality: a tangle of dynamic infrastructure involving domains, servers, cryptographic keys, etc. When any of these operations changes, the authentication information in a certificate becomes stale and no longer accurately reflects reality. In this work, we examine the broader phenomenon of certificate invalidation events and discover three classes of security-relevant events that enable a third-party to impersonate a domain outside of their control. Longitudinal measurement of these precarious scenarios reveals that they affect over 15K new domains per day, on average. Unfortunately, modern certificate revocation provides little recourse, so we examine the potential impact of reducing certificate lifetimes (cache duration): shortening the current 398-day limit to 90 days yields a 75% decrease in precarious access to valid TLS keys.
- 24 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 222-235
Open AccessStale TLS Certificates: Investigating Precarious Third-Party Access to Valid TLS Keys
Certificate authorities enable TLS server authentication by generating certificates that attest to the mapping between a domain name and a cryptographic keypair, for up to 398 days. This static, name-to-key caching mechanism belies a complex reality: a tangle of dynamic infrastructure involving domains, servers, cryptographic keys, etc. When any of these operations changes, the authentication information in a certificate becomes stale and no longer accurately reflects reality. In this work, we examine the broader phenomenon of certificate invalidation events and discover three classes of security-relevant events that enable a third-party to impersonate a domain outside of their control. Longitudinal measurement of these precarious scenarios reveals that they affect over 15K new domains per day, on average. Unfortunately, modern certificate revocation provides little recourse, so we examine the potential impact of reducing certificate lifetimes (cache duration): shortening the current 398-day limit to 90 days yields a 75% decrease in precarious access to valid TLS keys.
- Open Access
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 240-250
View from Above: Exploring the Malware Ecosystem from the Upper DNS Hierarchy
This work explores authoritative DNS (AuthDNS) as a new measurement perspective for studying the large-scale epidemiology of the malware ecosystem—when and where infections occur, and what infrastructure spreads and controls malware. Utilizing an AuthDNS dataset from a top registrar, we observe malware heterogeneity (202 families), global infrastructure (399,830 IPs in 151 countries) and infection (40,937 querying Autonomous Systems (ASes)) visibility, as well as breadth of temporal coverage (2017–2021). This combination of factors enables an extensive analysis of the malware ecosystem that reinforces prior work on malware infrastructure and also contributes new perspectives on malware infection distribution and lifecycle. We find that malware families re-use infrastructure, especially in cloud hosting countries, but contrary to prior work, we do not detect targeting of clients by countries or industry sector. Furthermore, our 4-year lifecycle analysis of diverse malware families shows that infection analysis is temporally sensitive: over 90% of ASes first query a malicious domain after public detection, and a median of 38.6% ASes only query after domain expiration or takedown. To fit AuthDNS into the broader context of malware research, we conclude with a comparison of experimental vantage points on four qualitative aspects and discuss their advantages and limitations. Ultimately, we establish AuthDNS as a unique measurement perspective capable of measuring global malware infections.
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 240-250
Open AccessView from Above: Exploring the Malware Ecosystem from the Upper DNS Hierarchy
This work explores authoritative DNS (AuthDNS) as a new measurement perspective for studying the large-scale epidemiology of the malware ecosystem—when and where infections occur, and what infrastructure spreads and controls malware. Utilizing an AuthDNS dataset from a top registrar, we observe malware heterogeneity (202 families), global infrastructure (399,830 IPs in 151 countries) and infection (40,937 querying Autonomous Systems (ASes)) visibility, as well as breadth of temporal coverage (2017–2021). This combination of factors enables an extensive analysis of the malware ecosystem that reinforces prior work on malware infrastructure and also contributes new perspectives on malware infection distribution and lifecycle. We find that malware families re-use infrastructure, especially in cloud hosting countries, but contrary to prior work, we do not detect targeting of clients by countries or industry sector. Furthermore, our 4-year lifecycle analysis of diverse malware families shows that infection analysis is temporally sensitive: over 90% of ASes first query a malicious domain after public detection, and a median of 38.6% ASes only query after domain expiration or takedown. To fit AuthDNS into the broader context of malware research, we conclude with a comparison of experimental vantage points on four qualitative aspects and discuss their advantages and limitations. Ultimately, we establish AuthDNS as a unique measurement perspective capable of measuring global malware infections.