Fabian Monrose
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Fabian Monrose has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Manos Antonakakis
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
4 shared publications - Angelos D. Keromytis
Georgia Institute of Technology
3 shared publications - Kevin Valakuzhy
Georgia Institute of Technology
3 shared publications - Omar Alrawi
Georgia Institute of Technology
3 shared publications - Aaron Faulkenberry
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
2 shared publications - Boo Fullwood
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 58-67
Acoustic Microcues: Breath and Phoneme-Level Signals for Detecting Audio Deepfakes
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 58-67
Open AccessAcoustic Microcues: Breath and Phoneme-Level Signals for Detecting Audio Deepfakes
- 9 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 295-314
HeartBreaker: Practical Attacks for Recovering Cryptographic Keys Derived from Biosignals
- 9 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 295-314
HeartBreaker: Practical Attacks for Recovering Cryptographic Keys Derived from Biosignals
- 8 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 406-426
BRAID: Uncovering Malware Family Relationships in Data-Scarce Settings
- 8 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 406-426
BRAID: Uncovering Malware Family Relationships in Data-Scarce Settings
- Open Access
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 206-217
Seeing is Believing: Interpreting Behavioral Changes in Audio Deepfake Detectors Arising from Data Augmentation
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 206-217
Open AccessSeeing is Believing: Interpreting Behavioral Changes in Audio Deepfake Detectors Arising from Data Augmentation
- Open Access
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 36-40
Understanding LLMs Ability to Aid Malware Analysts in Bypassing Evasion Techniques
Over the past few years, the threat of malware has become increasingly evident, posing a significant risk to cybersecurity worldwide and driving extensive research efforts to prevent and mitigate these attacks. Despite numerous efforts to automate malware analysis, these systems are constantly thwarted by evasive techniques developed by malware authors. As a result, the analysis of sophisticated evasive malware falls into the hands of human malware analysts, who must undertake the time-consuming process of overcoming each evasive technique to uncover malware’s malicious behaviors. This highlights the need for approaches that aid malware analysts in this process. Although active measures, such as forced execution and symbolic analysis, can automatically circumvent some evasive checks, they suffer from limitations like path explosion and fail to provide useful insights that analysts can use in their workflow. To fill this gap, we investigate how large language models (LLMs) can address shortcomings of symbolic analysis through the first comparative analysis between the two in bypassing evasion techniques. Our study leads to three key findings: (i) we find that LLMs outperform symbolic analysis in bypassing evasive code, especially in the presence of common code patterns, such as loops, which have historically posed a challenge for symbolic analysis, (ii) we show that LLMs correctly identify methods of bypassing evasive techniques in real-world malware, and (iii) we highlight how even in LLMs failure modes, human malware analysts can benefit from the step-by-step reasoning provided by the model.
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 36-40
Open AccessUnderstanding LLMs Ability to Aid Malware Analysts in Bypassing Evasion Techniques
Over the past few years, the threat of malware has become increasingly evident, posing a significant risk to cybersecurity worldwide and driving extensive research efforts to prevent and mitigate these attacks. Despite numerous efforts to automate malware analysis, these systems are constantly thwarted by evasive techniques developed by malware authors. As a result, the analysis of sophisticated evasive malware falls into the hands of human malware analysts, who must undertake the time-consuming process of overcoming each evasive technique to uncover malware’s malicious behaviors. This highlights the need for approaches that aid malware analysts in this process. Although active measures, such as forced execution and symbolic analysis, can automatically circumvent some evasive checks, they suffer from limitations like path explosion and fail to provide useful insights that analysts can use in their workflow. To fill this gap, we investigate how large language models (LLMs) can address shortcomings of symbolic analysis through the first comparative analysis between the two in bypassing evasion techniques. Our study leads to three key findings: (i) we find that LLMs outperform symbolic analysis in bypassing evasive code, especially in the presence of common code patterns, such as loops, which have historically posed a challenge for symbolic analysis, (ii) we show that LLMs correctly identify methods of bypassing evasive techniques in real-world malware, and (iii) we highlight how even in LLMs failure modes, human malware analysts can benefit from the step-by-step reasoning provided by the model.
- Open Access
- 19 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 337-347
CrashTalk: Automated Generation of Precise, Human Readable, Descriptions of Software Security Bugs
Understanding the cause, consequences, and severity of a security bug are critical facets of the overall bug triaging and remediation process. Unfortunately, diagnosing failures is often a laborious process that requires developers to expend significant time and effort. While solutions have been proposed to help expedite the process of pinpointing the cause of a security bug, few proposals provide an explanation along with a diagnosis to make the bug discovery and triaging process less taxing. Moreover, even in cases where descriptions are provided, they are not guided by classification models that support precise descriptions of the flaw. We present an approach that uses static and dynamic analysis techniques to automatically infer the cause and consequences of a software crash and present diagnostic information following NIST's recently released Bugs Framework taxonomy. Specifically, starting from a crash, we generate a detailed and accessible English description of the failure along with its weakness types and severity, thereby easing the burden on developers and security analysts alike. To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we compare our ability to find fault locations and generate explanations compared to that of professional software developers by using a benchmark specifically designed to assist with realistic evaluation of tools in software engineering. In addition, using 33 real-world vulnerabilities we collected, we show that our approach correctly diagnoses over 94% of the failures and, in some cases, generates weakness types that are more specific than those that were originally assigned by the submitter or National Vulnerability Database analysts. We also generate initial vulnerability scores that can be used by project managers to assist with prioritizing bug fixes. On average, the overall process takes just over a minute, which is orders of magnitude faster than what professional developers can do.
- 19 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 337-347
Open AccessCrashTalk: Automated Generation of Precise, Human Readable, Descriptions of Software Security Bugs
Understanding the cause, consequences, and severity of a security bug are critical facets of the overall bug triaging and remediation process. Unfortunately, diagnosing failures is often a laborious process that requires developers to expend significant time and effort. While solutions have been proposed to help expedite the process of pinpointing the cause of a security bug, few proposals provide an explanation along with a diagnosis to make the bug discovery and triaging process less taxing. Moreover, even in cases where descriptions are provided, they are not guided by classification models that support precise descriptions of the flaw. We present an approach that uses static and dynamic analysis techniques to automatically infer the cause and consequences of a software crash and present diagnostic information following NIST's recently released Bugs Framework taxonomy. Specifically, starting from a crash, we generate a detailed and accessible English description of the failure along with its weakness types and severity, thereby easing the burden on developers and security analysts alike. To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we compare our ability to find fault locations and generate explanations compared to that of professional software developers by using a benchmark specifically designed to assist with realistic evaluation of tools in software engineering. In addition, using 33 real-world vulnerabilities we collected, we show that our approach correctly diagnoses over 94% of the failures and, in some cases, generates weakness types that are more specific than those that were originally assigned by the submitter or National Vulnerability Database analysts. We also generate initial vulnerability scores that can be used by project managers to assist with prioritizing bug fixes. On average, the overall process takes just over a minute, which is orders of magnitude faster than what professional developers can do.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2695-2709
Improving Security Tasks Using Compiler Provenance Information Recovered At the Binary-Level
The complex optimizations supported by modern compilers allow for compiler provenance recovery at many levels. For instance, it is possible to identify the compiler family and optimization level used when building a binary, as well as the individual compiler passes applied to functions within the binary. Yet, many downstream applications of compiler provenance remain unexplored. To bridge that gap, we train and evaluate a multi-label compiler provenance model on data collected from over 27,000 programs built using LLVM 14, and apply the model to a number of security-related tasks. Our approach considers 68 distinct compiler passes and achieves an average F-1 score of 84.4%. We first use the model to examine the magnitude of compiler-induced vulnerabilities, identifying 53 information leak bugs in 10 popular projects. We also show that several compiler optimization passes introduce a substantial amount of functional code reuse gadgets that negatively impact security. Beyond vulnerability detection, we evaluate other security applications, including using recovered provenance information to verify the correctness of Rich header data in Windows binaries (e.g., forensic analysis), as well as for binary decomposition tasks (e.g., third party library detection).
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2695-2709
Open AccessImproving Security Tasks Using Compiler Provenance Information Recovered At the Binary-Level
The complex optimizations supported by modern compilers allow for compiler provenance recovery at many levels. For instance, it is possible to identify the compiler family and optimization level used when building a binary, as well as the individual compiler passes applied to functions within the binary. Yet, many downstream applications of compiler provenance remain unexplored. To bridge that gap, we train and evaluate a multi-label compiler provenance model on data collected from over 27,000 programs built using LLVM 14, and apply the model to a number of security-related tasks. Our approach considers 68 distinct compiler passes and achieves an average F-1 score of 84.4%. We first use the model to examine the magnitude of compiler-induced vulnerabilities, identifying 53 information leak bugs in 10 popular projects. We also show that several compiler optimization passes introduce a substantial amount of functional code reuse gadgets that negatively impact security. Beyond vulnerability detection, we evaluate other security applications, including using recovered provenance information to verify the correctness of Rich header data in Windows binaries (e.g., forensic analysis), as well as for binary decomposition tasks (e.g., third party library detection).
- Open Access
- 24 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 222-235
Stale TLS Certificates: Investigating Precarious Third-Party Access to Valid TLS Keys
Certificate authorities enable TLS server authentication by generating certificates that attest to the mapping between a domain name and a cryptographic keypair, for up to 398 days. This static, name-to-key caching mechanism belies a complex reality: a tangle of dynamic infrastructure involving domains, servers, cryptographic keys, etc. When any of these operations changes, the authentication information in a certificate becomes stale and no longer accurately reflects reality. In this work, we examine the broader phenomenon of certificate invalidation events and discover three classes of security-relevant events that enable a third-party to impersonate a domain outside of their control. Longitudinal measurement of these precarious scenarios reveals that they affect over 15K new domains per day, on average. Unfortunately, modern certificate revocation provides little recourse, so we examine the potential impact of reducing certificate lifetimes (cache duration): shortening the current 398-day limit to 90 days yields a 75% decrease in precarious access to valid TLS keys.
- 24 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 222-235
Open AccessStale TLS Certificates: Investigating Precarious Third-Party Access to Valid TLS Keys
Certificate authorities enable TLS server authentication by generating certificates that attest to the mapping between a domain name and a cryptographic keypair, for up to 398 days. This static, name-to-key caching mechanism belies a complex reality: a tangle of dynamic infrastructure involving domains, servers, cryptographic keys, etc. When any of these operations changes, the authentication information in a certificate becomes stale and no longer accurately reflects reality. In this work, we examine the broader phenomenon of certificate invalidation events and discover three classes of security-relevant events that enable a third-party to impersonate a domain outside of their control. Longitudinal measurement of these precarious scenarios reveals that they affect over 15K new domains per day, on average. Unfortunately, modern certificate revocation provides little recourse, so we examine the potential impact of reducing certificate lifetimes (cache duration): shortening the current 398-day limit to 90 days yields a 75% decrease in precarious access to valid TLS keys.
- Open Access
- 29 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 278-284
More Carrot or Less Stick: Organically Improving Student Time Management With Practice Tasks and Gamified Assignments
- 29 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 278-284
Open AccessMore Carrot or Less Stick: Organically Improving Student Time Management With Practice Tasks and Gamified Assignments