LYLingyun Ying

Lingyun Ying

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Lingyun Ying has a total of 78 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Thinking More, Harnessing Better: Automatic Harness Generation with Dataflow Aggregation and Workflow Decomposition

    by Xing Zhang, Zikang Huang, Gang Yang, CongChong Wang, Lu Liu, Bin Yin, Mingyi Wang, Ziquan Zhao, Min Li, Zhenyu Chen, et al.

  • Open Access

    Mini-Programs, Mega-Problems: Unveiling OAuth-based Authentication Misuses in Mini-Programs via Dynamic Analysis

    by Zidong Zhang, Zhentao Xie, Lingyun Ying, Qinsheng Hou, Yacong Gu, Wenrui Diao, Jianliang Wu

  • Open Access

    Single Medium, Multiple Perspectives: Exposing and Exploiting Semantic Gaps in AI Services' Media Preprocessing Pipelines

    by Yacong Gu, Xiangfan Wu, Lingyun Ying, Yingyuan Pu, Haipeng Qu, Jianjun Chen, Haixin Duan

  • Open Access

    Your Space is My Zone: Demystifying the Security Risks of AI-Powered Applications on Pre-Trained Model Hubs

    by Yacong Gu, Lingyun Ying, Zidong Zhang, Yingyuan Pu, Xiaoxue Huang, Jiawei Zhou, Wenjie Zhu, Donghong Sun, Haixin Duan

    AI-powered Applications (AI-Apps) on platforms such as Hugging Face give anyone online access to pre-trained models. They lower the barrier to adoption, but they also open an unexplored attack surface: AI-Apps are written by untrusted parties, isolated weakly, and frequently misconfigured. We present the first systematic security analysis of AI-Apps across three leading platforms. Mapping the AI-App lifecycle onto established risk taxonomies (e.g., OWASP) yields five threat categories and ten attack vectors, ranging from generic web flaws to platform-level design faults. Our analysis exposes broken access control, insecure resource reuse, insufficient input validation, and sensitive data exposure. Two vectors are architecture-induced: they survive best-practice development because their root cause lies in the platform rather than in any application. We also show how familiar issues, such as world-readable logs, are amplified in this ecosystem. To assess real-world impact, we built the analysis framework Insightor and ran it over more than 970,000 public AI-Apps. From its output we manually confirmed AI-Apps that leak developer credentials through world-readable logs, AI-Apps whose input handling permits arbitrary code execution, and 27 AI-Apps carrying deliberately planted malicious code. We responsibly disclosed all findings to the affected platforms and developers.

  • PIEDChecker: Uncover Permissions-Independent Emulation-Detection Methods in Android System

    by Ran Yan, Weina Niu, Qinsheng Hou, Xingyu Liu, Lingyun Ying, Xiaosong Zhang

    For compatibility checks and preventing malicious cheating behaviors in Android systems, It is convenient for benign app developers to utilize emulation-detection technology. However, this technique has been abused by malicious app developers, which causes detection emulation and behavior change, known as anti-emulation behavior, to evade the dynamic analysis performed via the Android emulator. The Android permission mechanism can limit some anti-emulation behaviors, but attackers can still use permission-independent (PI) emulation-detection technology to achieve their goals. In this paper, we propose a static and dynamic combined detection framework named PIEDChecker to detect PI emulation-detection apps. This framework can statically identify PI emulation-detection code and dynamically verify PI anti-emulation behaviors. PIEDChecker's performance is validated by 382 manually created test apps and 344 apps with emulation-detection labels. Moreover, PIEDChecker has higher accuracy in detecting PI emulation-detection compared with the existing Android malware analysis platforms and academic methods. Moreover, it is found that there are 13,377 apps having PI emulation-detection behaviors within the tested 25,303 apps collected over the past five years. In particular, the detection features of the PI emulation-detection methods are summarized based on the evaluation result.


  • Magnifier: Detecting Network Access via Lightweight Traffic-Based Fingerprints

    by Wenhao Li, Qiang Wang, Huaifeng Bao, Xiao-Yu Zhang, Lingyun Ying, Zhaoxuan Li, Huamin Jin, Shuai Wang

    Network access detection plays a crucial role in global network management, enabling efficient network monitoring and topology measurement by identifying unauthorized network access and gathering detailed information about mobile devices. Existing methods for endpoint-based detection primarily rely on deploying monitoring software to recognize network connections. However, the challenges associated with developing and maintaining such systems have limited their universality and coverage in practical deployments, especially given the cost implications of covering a wide array of devices with heterogeneous operating systems. To tackle the issues, we propose Magnifier for mobile device network access detection that, for the first time, passively infers access patterns from backbone traffic at the gateway level. Magnifier’s foundation is the creation of device-specific access patterns using the innovative Domain Name Forest (dnForest) fingerprints. We then employ a two-stage distillation algorithm to fine-tune the weights of individual Domain Name Trees (dnTree) within each dnForest, emphasizing the unique device fingerprints. With these meticulously crafted fingerprints, Magnifier efficiently infers network access from backbone traffic using a lightweight fingerprint matching algorithm. Our experimental results, conducted in real-world scenarios, demonstrate that Magnifier exhibits exceptional universality and coverage in both initial and repetitive network access detection in real-time. To facilitate further research, we have thoughtfully curated the NetCess2025 dataset, comprising network access data from 42 different models across 9 brands, covering the majority of mainstream mobile devices. We have also made both the Magnifier prototype and the NetCess2025 dataset publicly available.


  • Open Access

    Dr. Docker: A Large-Scale Security Measurement of Docker Image Ecosystem

    by Hequan Shi, Lingyun Ying, Libo Chen, Haixin Duan, Ming Liu, Zhi Xue


  • Open Access

    PowerPeeler: A Precise and General Dynamic Deobfuscation Method for PowerShell Scripts

    by Ruijie Li, Chenyang Zhang, Huajun Chai, Lingyun Ying, Haixin Duan, Jun Tao

    PowerShell is a powerful and versatile task automation tool. Unfortunately, it is also widely abused by cyber attackers. To bypass malware detection and hinder threat analysis, attackers often employ diverse techniques to obfuscate malicious PowerShell scripts. Existing deobfuscation tools suffer from the limitation of static analysis, which fails to simulate the real deobfuscation process accurately. Accurate, complete, and robust PowerShell script deobfuscation is still a challenging problem. In this paper, we propose PowerPeeler. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first dynamic PowerShell script deobfuscation approach at the instruction level. It utilizes expression-related Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) nodes to identify potential obfuscated script pieces. Then, PowerPeeler correlates the AST nodes with their corresponding instructions and monitors the script's entire execution process. Subsequently, PowerPeeler dynamically tracks the execution of these instructions and records their execution results. Finally, PowerPeeler stringifies these results to replace the corresponding obfuscated script pieces and reconstruct the deobfuscated script. To evaluate the effectiveness of PowerPeeler, we collect 1,736,669 real-world malicious PowerShell samples and distill two high-quality datasets with diversity obfuscation methods: D-Script with 4,264 obfuscated script files and D-Cmdline with 381 obfuscated samples using PowerShell command-line interface. We compare PowerPeeler with five state-of-the-art deobfuscation tools and GPT-4. The evaluation results demonstrate that PowerPeeler can effectively handle all well-known obfuscation methods. Additionally, the deobfuscation correctness rate of PowerPeeler reaches 95%, significantly surpassing that of other tools. PowerPeeler not only recovers the highest amount of sensitive data (e.g., IPs and URLs) but also maintains a semantic consistency over 97%, which is also the best. Moreover, PowerPeeler effectively obtains the largest quantity of valid deobfuscated results within a limited time frame (i.e., two minutes). Furthermore, PowerPeeler is extendable and can be used as a helpful tool for other cyber security solutions, such as malware analysis and threat intelligence generation.


  • Open Access

    MiniCAT: Understanding and Detecting Cross-Page Request Forgery Vulnerabilities in Mini-Programs

    by Zidong Zhang, Qinsheng Hou, Lingyun Ying, Wenrui Diao, Yacong Gu, Rui Li, Shanqing Guo, Haixin Duan

    Mini-programs are lightweight apps running in super apps (such as WeChat, Baidu, Alipay, and TikTok), an emerging paradigm in the era of mobile computing. With the growing popularity of mini-programs, there is an increasing concern for their security and privacy. In essence, mini-programs are WebView-based apps. This means that they may be vulnerable to the same security risks associated with web apps. In this work, we discovered a new mini-program vulnerability called MiniCPRF (Cross-Page Request Forgery in Mini-Programs). The exploit of this vulnerability is easy, and the attack consequences are severe, leading to unauthorized operations, such as free shopping, and the exposure of confidential information, such as credit card numbers. The root causes of MiniCPRF can be attributed to multiple design flaws in both mini-programs and their super apps, including the insecure routing mechanism, lack of message integrity check, and plain-text storage. To evaluate the impacts of MiniCPRF, we designed an automated analysis framework called MiniCAT. It can automatically crawl mini-programs, perform static analysis on them, and generate detection reports. In large-scale real-world evaluations with MiniCAT, we identified that 32.0% (13,349/41,726) of analyzable mini-programs are potentially vulnerable to MiniCPRF, including some famous ones with millions of users, such as Sohu and Wenjuanxing. Following the responsible disclosure principle, we have reported verified vulnerable mini-programs to the corresponding vendors and developers, and three real-world cases have been confirmed by CNVD. Additionally, we suggest mitigation strategies to resolve the security issue related to MiniCPRF.


  • Open Access

    Toward Understanding the Security of Plugins in Continuous Integration Services

    by Xiaofan Li, Yacong Gu, Chu Qiao, Zhenkai Zhang, Daiping Liu, Lingyun Ying, Haixin Duan, Xing Gao

    Mainstream Continuous Integration (CI) platforms have provided the plugin functionality to accelerate the development of CI pipelines. Unfortunately, CI plugins, which are essentially reusable code snippets, also expose new attack surfaces as plugins might be developed by less trusted users. In this paper, we present an in-depth study to understand potential security risks in existing CI plugins. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of plugin implementations on four mainstream CI platforms (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, CircleCI, and Azure Pipelines), and investigate several weak links in existing plugin distributions and isolation mechanisms. We investigate seven attack vectors that can enable attackers to hijack plugins and distribute malicious code without plugins users being aware, and further exploit hijacked plugins to manipulate the workflow execution. Additionally, we find that plugin dependency (a plugin references other plugins) might further amplify the attack impact of our disclosed attacks. To evaluate the potential impact, we conduct a large-scale measurement on GitHub and GitLab, covering a total of 1,328,912 repositories using the aforementioned CI platforms. Our measurement results show that a large number of repositories and existing plugins, including many widely used ones, are potentially vulnerable to the proposed attacks. We have duly reported the identified vulnerabilities and received positive responses.