Qinsheng Hou
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Qinsheng Hou has a total of 42 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Lingyun Ying
QI-ANXIN Technology Research Institute, Beijing, China
5 shared publications - Wenrui Diao
School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University, Qingdao, China
5 shared publications - Shanqing Guo
Shandong University
4 shared publications - Haixin Duan
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
3 shared publications - Libo Chen
School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
3 shared publications - Yanhao Wang
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 6297-6311
Mini-Programs, Mega-Problems: Unveiling OAuth-based Authentication Misuses in Mini-Programs via Dynamic Analysis
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 6297-6311
Open AccessMini-Programs, Mega-Problems: Unveiling OAuth-based Authentication Misuses in Mini-Programs via Dynamic Analysis
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 411-430
DUFuzz: Define-Use Chain Guided Fuzzing for RESTful API Vulnerability Discovery
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 411-430
DUFuzz: Define-Use Chain Guided Fuzzing for RESTful API Vulnerability Discovery
- 6 November 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (2) , 2727-2744
PIEDChecker: Uncover Permissions-Independent Emulation-Detection Methods in Android System
For compatibility checks and preventing malicious cheating behaviors in Android systems, It is convenient for benign app developers to utilize emulation-detection technology. However, this technique has been abused by malicious app developers, which causes detection emulation and behavior change, known as anti-emulation behavior, to evade the dynamic analysis performed via the Android emulator. The Android permission mechanism can limit some anti-emulation behaviors, but attackers can still use permission-independent (PI) emulation-detection technology to achieve their goals. In this paper, we propose a static and dynamic combined detection framework named PIEDChecker to detect PI emulation-detection apps. This framework can statically identify PI emulation-detection code and dynamically verify PI anti-emulation behaviors. PIEDChecker's performance is validated by 382 manually created test apps and 344 apps with emulation-detection labels. Moreover, PIEDChecker has higher accuracy in detecting PI emulation-detection compared with the existing Android malware analysis platforms and academic methods. Moreover, it is found that there are 13,377 apps having PI emulation-detection behaviors within the tested 25,303 apps collected over the past five years. In particular, the detection features of the PI emulation-detection methods are summarized based on the evaluation result.
- 6 November 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (2) , 2727-2744
PIEDChecker: Uncover Permissions-Independent Emulation-Detection Methods in Android System
For compatibility checks and preventing malicious cheating behaviors in Android systems, It is convenient for benign app developers to utilize emulation-detection technology. However, this technique has been abused by malicious app developers, which causes detection emulation and behavior change, known as anti-emulation behavior, to evade the dynamic analysis performed via the Android emulator. The Android permission mechanism can limit some anti-emulation behaviors, but attackers can still use permission-independent (PI) emulation-detection technology to achieve their goals. In this paper, we propose a static and dynamic combined detection framework named PIEDChecker to detect PI emulation-detection apps. This framework can statically identify PI emulation-detection code and dynamically verify PI anti-emulation behaviors. PIEDChecker's performance is validated by 382 manually created test apps and 344 apps with emulation-detection labels. Moreover, PIEDChecker has higher accuracy in detecting PI emulation-detection compared with the existing Android malware analysis platforms and academic methods. Moreover, it is found that there are 13,377 apps having PI emulation-detection behaviors within the tested 25,303 apps collected over the past five years. In particular, the detection features of the PI emulation-detection methods are summarized based on the evaluation result.
- 6 October 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 51 (12) , 3467-3485
Enhancing Real-Time Operating System Security Analysis via Slice-Based Fuzzing
Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) has become the main category of embedded systems. It is widely used to support tasks requiring real-time response such as printers and switches. The security of RTOS has been long overlooked as it was running in special environments isolated from attackers. However, with the rapid development of IoT devices, tremendous RTOS devices are connected to the public network. Due to the lack of security mechanisms, these devices are extremely vulnerable to a wide spectrum of attacks. Even worse, the monolithic design of RTOS combines various tasks and services into a single binary, which hinders the current program testing and analysis techniques working on RTOS. In this paper, we propose SFUZZ++, a novel slice-based fuzzer designed to detect security vulnerabilities in RTOS. Leveraging the insight that RTOS tasks are typically independent, single-purpose, and deterministic, SFUZZ++ extracts task-specific code slices for targeted testing. Specifically, SFUZZ++ first identifies external input points that manage user input, with assistance from LLMs, and constructs call graphs from these points. Then, it leverages forward slicing to build the sensitive call graph and prune the paths independent of sink points (e.g., memcpy). Further, it detects and handles roadblocks within the coarse-grain scope that hinder effective fuzzing, such as call sites unrelated to the user input or conditional branches unrelated to sink points. At the same time, it attempts to restore the context of the slices to recreate the actual runtime state. And then, it conducts coverage-guided fuzzing on these code snippets. Finally, SFUZZ++ leverages forward and backward slicing to track and verify each path constraint and determine whether a bug discovered in the fuzzer is a real vulnerability. SFUZZ++ successfully discovered 82 zero-day bugs on 35 RTOS samples, and 78 of them have been assigned CVE or CNVD IDs. Our empirical evaluation shows that SFUZZ++ outperforms the state-of- the-art tools (e.g., UnicornAFL) on testing RTOS.
- 6 October 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 51 (12) , 3467-3485
Enhancing Real-Time Operating System Security Analysis via Slice-Based Fuzzing
Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) has become the main category of embedded systems. It is widely used to support tasks requiring real-time response such as printers and switches. The security of RTOS has been long overlooked as it was running in special environments isolated from attackers. However, with the rapid development of IoT devices, tremendous RTOS devices are connected to the public network. Due to the lack of security mechanisms, these devices are extremely vulnerable to a wide spectrum of attacks. Even worse, the monolithic design of RTOS combines various tasks and services into a single binary, which hinders the current program testing and analysis techniques working on RTOS. In this paper, we propose SFUZZ++, a novel slice-based fuzzer designed to detect security vulnerabilities in RTOS. Leveraging the insight that RTOS tasks are typically independent, single-purpose, and deterministic, SFUZZ++ extracts task-specific code slices for targeted testing. Specifically, SFUZZ++ first identifies external input points that manage user input, with assistance from LLMs, and constructs call graphs from these points. Then, it leverages forward slicing to build the sensitive call graph and prune the paths independent of sink points (e.g., memcpy). Further, it detects and handles roadblocks within the coarse-grain scope that hinder effective fuzzing, such as call sites unrelated to the user input or conditional branches unrelated to sink points. At the same time, it attempts to restore the context of the slices to recreate the actual runtime state. And then, it conducts coverage-guided fuzzing on these code snippets. Finally, SFUZZ++ leverages forward and backward slicing to track and verify each path constraint and determine whether a bug discovered in the fuzzer is a real vulnerability. SFUZZ++ successfully discovered 82 zero-day bugs on 35 RTOS samples, and 78 of them have been assigned CVE or CNVD IDs. Our empirical evaluation shows that SFUZZ++ outperforms the state-of- the-art tools (e.g., UnicornAFL) on testing RTOS.
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 525-539
MiniCAT: Understanding and Detecting Cross-Page Request Forgery Vulnerabilities in Mini-Programs
Mini-programs are lightweight apps running in super apps (such as WeChat, Baidu, Alipay, and TikTok), an emerging paradigm in the era of mobile computing. With the growing popularity of mini-programs, there is an increasing concern for their security and privacy. In essence, mini-programs are WebView-based apps. This means that they may be vulnerable to the same security risks associated with web apps. In this work, we discovered a new mini-program vulnerability called MiniCPRF (Cross-Page Request Forgery in Mini-Programs). The exploit of this vulnerability is easy, and the attack consequences are severe, leading to unauthorized operations, such as free shopping, and the exposure of confidential information, such as credit card numbers. The root causes of MiniCPRF can be attributed to multiple design flaws in both mini-programs and their super apps, including the insecure routing mechanism, lack of message integrity check, and plain-text storage. To evaluate the impacts of MiniCPRF, we designed an automated analysis framework called MiniCAT. It can automatically crawl mini-programs, perform static analysis on them, and generate detection reports. In large-scale real-world evaluations with MiniCAT, we identified that 32.0% (13,349/41,726) of analyzable mini-programs are potentially vulnerable to MiniCPRF, including some famous ones with millions of users, such as Sohu and Wenjuanxing. Following the responsible disclosure principle, we have reported verified vulnerable mini-programs to the corresponding vendors and developers, and three real-world cases have been confirmed by CNVD. Additionally, we suggest mitigation strategies to resolve the security issue related to MiniCPRF.
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 525-539
Open AccessMiniCAT: Understanding and Detecting Cross-Page Request Forgery Vulnerabilities in Mini-Programs
Mini-programs are lightweight apps running in super apps (such as WeChat, Baidu, Alipay, and TikTok), an emerging paradigm in the era of mobile computing. With the growing popularity of mini-programs, there is an increasing concern for their security and privacy. In essence, mini-programs are WebView-based apps. This means that they may be vulnerable to the same security risks associated with web apps. In this work, we discovered a new mini-program vulnerability called MiniCPRF (Cross-Page Request Forgery in Mini-Programs). The exploit of this vulnerability is easy, and the attack consequences are severe, leading to unauthorized operations, such as free shopping, and the exposure of confidential information, such as credit card numbers. The root causes of MiniCPRF can be attributed to multiple design flaws in both mini-programs and their super apps, including the insecure routing mechanism, lack of message integrity check, and plain-text storage. To evaluate the impacts of MiniCPRF, we designed an automated analysis framework called MiniCAT. It can automatically crawl mini-programs, perform static analysis on them, and generate detection reports. In large-scale real-world evaluations with MiniCAT, we identified that 32.0% (13,349/41,726) of analyzable mini-programs are potentially vulnerable to MiniCPRF, including some famous ones with millions of users, such as Sohu and Wenjuanxing. Following the responsible disclosure principle, we have reported verified vulnerable mini-programs to the corresponding vendors and developers, and three real-world cases have been confirmed by CNVD. Additionally, we suggest mitigation strategies to resolve the security issue related to MiniCPRF.
- 28 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Software Engineering
- Vol. 30 (1) , 1-33
From guidelines to practice: assessing Android app developer compliance with google’s security recommendations
- 28 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Software Engineering
- Vol. 30 (1) , 1-33
From guidelines to practice: assessing Android app developer compliance with google’s security recommendations
- Open Access
- 27 October 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1919-1931
How Does Code Optimization Impact Third-party Library Detection for Android Applications?
Android applications (apps) widely use third-party libraries (TPLs) to reuse functionalities and simplify the development process. Unfortunately, these TPLs often suffer from vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit, leading to catastrophic consequences for app users. To mitigate this threat, researchers have developed tools to detect TPL versions in the app. If an app is found using a TPL vulnerable version, these tools will issue warnings. Although these tools claim to resist the effects of code obfuscation, our preliminary study indicates that code optimization is common during the app release process. A lack of consideration for the impact of code optimizations significantly reduces the effectiveness of existing tools. To fill this gap, this work systematically investigates how and to what extent different optimization strategies affect existing tools. Our findings have led to a new tool named LibHunter, designed to against major code optimization strategies (e.g., Inlining and CallSite Optimization) while also resisting code obfuscation and shrinking. Extensive evaluations on a dataset of apps with optimization, obfuscation, and shrinking enabled show LibHunter significantly outperforms existing tools. It achieves F1 value that surpass the best tools by 29.3% and 36.1% at the library and version levels, respectively. We also applied LibHunter to detect vulnerable TPLs in the top Google Play apps, which shows the scalability of our approach, as well as the potential of our approach to facilitate malware detection.
- 27 October 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1919-1931
Open AccessHow Does Code Optimization Impact Third-party Library Detection for Android Applications?
Android applications (apps) widely use third-party libraries (TPLs) to reuse functionalities and simplify the development process. Unfortunately, these TPLs often suffer from vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit, leading to catastrophic consequences for app users. To mitigate this threat, researchers have developed tools to detect TPL versions in the app. If an app is found using a TPL vulnerable version, these tools will issue warnings. Although these tools claim to resist the effects of code obfuscation, our preliminary study indicates that code optimization is common during the app release process. A lack of consideration for the impact of code optimizations significantly reduces the effectiveness of existing tools. To fill this gap, this work systematically investigates how and to what extent different optimization strategies affect existing tools. Our findings have led to a new tool named LibHunter, designed to against major code optimization strategies (e.g., Inlining and CallSite Optimization) while also resisting code obfuscation and shrinking. Extensive evaluations on a dataset of apps with optimization, obfuscation, and shrinking enabled show LibHunter significantly outperforms existing tools. It achieves F1 value that surpass the best tools by 29.3% and 36.1% at the library and version levels, respectively. We also applied LibHunter to detect vulnerable TPLs in the top Google Play apps, which shows the scalability of our approach, as well as the potential of our approach to facilitate malware detection.
- Open Access
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1561-1572
From Promises to Practice: Evaluating the Private Browsing Modes of Android Browser Apps
Private browsing is a common feature of web browsers on desktop platforms. This feature protects the privacy of users browsing the Internet and, therefore, is widely welcomed by users. In recent years, with the popularity of smartphones, the private browsing mode has been introduced into mobile browsers. However, its deployment on mobile platforms has not been well evaluated. To bridge the gap, in this work, we systemically studied the private browsing modes of Android browser apps. Specifically, we proposed six private rules for mobile browsers to follow by combining the mobile browsing features with the previous research on private browsing. Furthermore, we designed an automated analysis framework, BroDroid, to detect whether mobile browsers violate these rules. Also, with BroDroid, we evaluated 49 popular browser apps crawled from Google Play. Finally, BroDroid successfully identified 58 violations, some of which come from the promised capabilities of the browser. We reported our discovered issues to the corresponding developers, and four of them (Yandex Browser, Mint Browser, Web Explorer, and Net Fast Web Browser) have acknowledged our findings. Our observation may be the tip of the iceberg, and more efforts should be put into improving the privacy protections of mobile browsers.
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1561-1572
Open AccessFrom Promises to Practice: Evaluating the Private Browsing Modes of Android Browser Apps
Private browsing is a common feature of web browsers on desktop platforms. This feature protects the privacy of users browsing the Internet and, therefore, is widely welcomed by users. In recent years, with the popularity of smartphones, the private browsing mode has been introduced into mobile browsers. However, its deployment on mobile platforms has not been well evaluated. To bridge the gap, in this work, we systemically studied the private browsing modes of Android browser apps. Specifically, we proposed six private rules for mobile browsers to follow by combining the mobile browsing features with the previous research on private browsing. Furthermore, we designed an automated analysis framework, BroDroid, to detect whether mobile browsers violate these rules. Also, with BroDroid, we evaluated 49 popular browser apps crawled from Google Play. Finally, BroDroid successfully identified 58 violations, some of which come from the promised capabilities of the browser. We reported our discovered issues to the corresponding developers, and four of them (Yandex Browser, Mint Browser, Web Explorer, and Net Fast Web Browser) have acknowledged our findings. Our observation may be the tip of the iceberg, and more efforts should be put into improving the privacy protections of mobile browsers.
- 22 August 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 21 (4) , 2421-2433
SaTC: Shared-Keyword Aware Taint Checking for Detecting Bugs in Embedded Systems
IoT devices have brought invaluable convenience to our daily life. However, their pervasiveness also amplifies the impact of security vulnerabilities. Many widespread vulnerabilities of embedded systems reside in their vulnerable border services. Unfortunately, existing vulnerability detection methods can neither effectively nor efficiently analyze such border services: they either introduce heavy execution overheads or have many false positives and negatives. In this paper, we propose a novel static taint checking solution, SaTC, to effectively detect security vulnerabilities in border services provided by embedded devices. Our key insight is that string literals on border interfaces are commonly shared between front-end files and back-end binaries to encode user input. Thus, we extract common keywords from the front-end and use them to locate reference points in the back-end, which indicate the input entry. Then, we apply targeted data-flow analysis to detect dangerous uses of the untrusted user input accurately. We implemented a prototype of SaTC and evaluated it on 39 firmware samples from six popular vendors. SaTC discovered 36 unknown bugs, of which CVE/CNVD/PSV confirms 33. Compared to the state-of-the-art tool KARONTE, SaTC found significantly more bugs in the test set. It shows that SaTC is effective in discovering bugs in embedded systems.
- 22 August 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 21 (4) , 2421-2433
SaTC: Shared-Keyword Aware Taint Checking for Detecting Bugs in Embedded Systems
IoT devices have brought invaluable convenience to our daily life. However, their pervasiveness also amplifies the impact of security vulnerabilities. Many widespread vulnerabilities of embedded systems reside in their vulnerable border services. Unfortunately, existing vulnerability detection methods can neither effectively nor efficiently analyze such border services: they either introduce heavy execution overheads or have many false positives and negatives. In this paper, we propose a novel static taint checking solution, SaTC, to effectively detect security vulnerabilities in border services provided by embedded devices. Our key insight is that string literals on border interfaces are commonly shared between front-end files and back-end binaries to encode user input. Thus, we extract common keywords from the front-end and use them to locate reference points in the back-end, which indicate the input entry. Then, we apply targeted data-flow analysis to detect dangerous uses of the untrusted user input accurately. We implemented a prototype of SaTC and evaluated it on 39 firmware samples from six popular vendors. SaTC discovered 36 unknown bugs, of which CVE/CNVD/PSV confirms 33. Compared to the state-of-the-art tool KARONTE, SaTC found significantly more bugs in the test set. It shows that SaTC is effective in discovering bugs in embedded systems.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 49 (7) , 3901-3921
Can We Trust the Phone Vendors? Comprehensive Security Measurements on the Android Firmware Ecosystem
Android is the most popular smartphone platform with over 85% market share. Its success is built on openness, and phone vendors can utilize the Android source code to make customized products with unique software/hardware features. On the other hand, the fragmentation and customization of Android also bring many security risks that have attracted the attention of researchers. Many efforts were put in to investigate the security of customized Android firmware. However, most of the previous works focus on designing efficient analysis tools or analyzing particular aspects of the firmware. There still lacks a panoramic view of Android firmware ecosystem security and the corresponding understandings based on large-scale firmware datasets. In this work, we made a large-scale comprehensive measurement of the Android firmware ecosystem security. Our study is based on 8,325 firmware images from 153 vendors and 813 Android-related CVEs, which is the largest Android firmware dataset ever used for security measurements. In particular, our study followed a series of research questions, covering vulnerabilities, patches, security updates, and pre-installed apps. To automate the analysis process, we designed a framework, AndScanner+ , to complete firmware crawling, firmware parsing, patch analysis, and app analysis. Through massive data analysis and case explorations, several interesting findings are obtained. For example, the patch delay and missing issues are widespread in Android firmware images, say 31.4% and 5.6% of all images, respectively. The latest images of several phones still contain vulnerable pre-installed apps, and even the corresponding vulnerabilities have been publicly disclosed. In addition to data measurements, we also explore the causes behind these security threats through case studies and demonstrate that the discovered security threats can be converted into exploitable vulnerabilities. There are 46 new vulnerabilities found by AndScanner+ , 36 of which have been assigned CVE/CNVD IDs. This study provides much new knowledge of the Android firmware ecosystem with a deep understanding of software engineering security practices.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 49 (7) , 3901-3921
Can We Trust the Phone Vendors? Comprehensive Security Measurements on the Android Firmware Ecosystem
Android is the most popular smartphone platform with over 85% market share. Its success is built on openness, and phone vendors can utilize the Android source code to make customized products with unique software/hardware features. On the other hand, the fragmentation and customization of Android also bring many security risks that have attracted the attention of researchers. Many efforts were put in to investigate the security of customized Android firmware. However, most of the previous works focus on designing efficient analysis tools or analyzing particular aspects of the firmware. There still lacks a panoramic view of Android firmware ecosystem security and the corresponding understandings based on large-scale firmware datasets. In this work, we made a large-scale comprehensive measurement of the Android firmware ecosystem security. Our study is based on 8,325 firmware images from 153 vendors and 813 Android-related CVEs, which is the largest Android firmware dataset ever used for security measurements. In particular, our study followed a series of research questions, covering vulnerabilities, patches, security updates, and pre-installed apps. To automate the analysis process, we designed a framework, AndScanner+ , to complete firmware crawling, firmware parsing, patch analysis, and app analysis. Through massive data analysis and case explorations, several interesting findings are obtained. For example, the patch delay and missing issues are widespread in Android firmware images, say 31.4% and 5.6% of all images, respectively. The latest images of several phones still contain vulnerable pre-installed apps, and even the corresponding vulnerabilities have been publicly disclosed. In addition to data measurements, we also explore the causes behind these security threats through case studies and demonstrate that the discovered security threats can be converted into exploitable vulnerabilities. There are 46 new vulnerabilities found by AndScanner+ , 36 of which have been assigned CVE/CNVD IDs. This study provides much new knowledge of the Android firmware ecosystem with a deep understanding of software engineering security practices.