PSPurui Su

Purui Su

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Purui Su has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    RusyFuzz: Unhandled Exception Guided Fuzzing for Rust OS Kernel

    by Yuwei Liu, Yanhao Wang, Minghua Wang, Lin Huang, Purui Su, Tao Wei

    Rust’s strong type system and ownership model eliminate many traditional memory safety issues in OS kernels. However, logic errors—such as unchecked indexing and failed unwrap operations—can still cause panic!s that crash the entire system. Existing kernel fuzzers, designed primarily for C-based kernels and reliant on KCOV, treat all crashes uniformly and fail to account for Rust-specific failure modes. We present RusyFuzz, the first fuzzing framework tailored to Rust OS kernels that explicitly targets panic-prone code paths using an unhandled-exception-guided strategy. RusyFuzz analyzes the compiler-inserted assertions within the Rust MIR, performs backward slicing to link these assertions to system call arguments, and uses constraint solving to synthesize inputs that trigger panics. In the absence of built-in coverage support, RusyFuzz employs a lightweight, log-based instrumentation method to enable coverage-guided fuzzing. We evaluate RusyFuzz on three emerging Rust-based kernels: Asterinas, Redox OS, and RuxOS. RusyFuzz discovers 70 previously unknown and developer-confirmed vulnerabilities. Compared to Trinity, it uncovers over twice as many bugs while improving line coverage by 14.4%. These results demonstrate that unhandled-exception-guided fuzzing is critical for uncovering logic bugs and enhancing the reliability of Rust OS kernels, providing the first systematic methodology for detecting such vulnerabilities.

  • Open Access

    P rome F uzz : A Knowledge-Driven Approach to Fuzzing Harness Generation with Large Language Models

    by Yuwei Liu, Junquan Deng, Xiangkun Jia, Yanhao Wang, Minghua Wang, Lin Huang, Tao Wei, Purui Su


  • Open Access

    OSmart: Whitebox Program Option Fuzzing

    by Kelin Wang, Mengda Chen, Liang He, Purui Su, Yan Cai, Jiongyi Chen, Bin Zhang, Chao Feng, Chaojing Tang

    Program options are ubiquitous and serve as a fundamental mechanism for configuring and customizing software behaviors. Given their widespread use, testing program options becomes essential to ensure that the software behaves as expected across various configurations. Existing option-aware fuzzers either mutate options as if they were standard program inputs or employ NLP techniques to deduce relationships among options from the documentation. However, there has not been a whitebox approach that generates option combinations by capturing the inherent execution logic of the program. This paper presents Osmart, a whitebox approach designed to systematically extract program options and effective option combinations that precisely encapsulate the intrinsic execution logic of the program, incorporating both data dependency and control dependency.OSmart successfully inferred 12,560 option combinations from 56 programs. Additionally, OSmart uncovered that more than 67% of evaluated programs have undocumented options. By integrated with AFL++, OSmart discovered 40.3% more paths, which led to the detection of 51 new bugs and the assignment of 18 CVE IDs. Finally, we also compared OSmart with four state-of-the-art option-aware fuzzers on a public benchmark and our tool achieved higher line coverage in 66.7% (20/30) of the evaluated programs.


  • Open Access

    DitDetector: Bimodal Learning based on Deceptive Image and Text for Macro Malware Detection

    by Jia Yan, Ming Wan, Xiangkun Jia, Lingyun Ying, Purui Su, Zhanyi Wang

    Macro malware has always been a severe threat to cyber security although the Microsoft Office suite applies the default macro-disabling policy. Among the defense solutions at different stages of the attack chain, document analysis is more targeted through detecting malicious documents with macro malware. It is effective, especially with machine learning methods, but still faces problems handling malware variants, supporting file formats, and attack countermeasures with advanced attack techniques (e.g., Excel 4.0 macro and remote template injection). In this paper, we find it promising to detect deceptive information embedded in documents which tricks users into enabling macros instead of detecting file metadata or extracted macro codes. Thus, we propose a novel solution for macro malware detection named DitDetector, which leverages bimodal learning based on deceptive images and text. Specifically, we extract preview images of documents based on an image export SDK of Oracle and extract textual information from preview images based on an open-source OCR engine. The bimodal model of DitDetector contains a visual encoder, a textual encoder, and a forward neural network, which learns based on the joint representation of the two encoders’ outputs. We evaluate DitDetector on three datasets, including an open-source malicious document dataset (i.e., MalDoc) and two collected real-world adversary datasets (i.e., a database of Excel macros and a database of remote template injection samples). Our experiments show that DitDetector outperforms four existing macro code-based machine learning methods and five reputable Anti-Virus engines. Especially in the real-world test of advanced macro malware, DitDetector gets the F1-score of 99.93% which is at least 3.16% higher than compared solutions.


  • Open Access

    HTFuzz: Heap Operation Sequence Sensitive Fuzzing

    by Yuanping Yu, Xiangkun Jia, Yuwei Liu, Yanhao Wang, Qian Sang, Chao Zhang, Purui Su

    Heap-based temporal vulnerabilities (i.e., use-after-free, double-free and null pointer dereference) are highly sensitive to heap operation (e.g., memory allocation, deallocation and access) sequences. To efficiently find such vulnerabilities, traditional code coverage-guided fuzzing solutions could be promoted by integrating heap operation sequence feedback. But current sequence sensitive solutions have limitations in practice. In this paper, we propose a novel fuzzing solution named HTFuzz, to find heap-based temporal vulnerabilities. At the core, we utilize fuzzing to increase the coverage of runtime heap operation sequences and the diversity of pointers accessed by these operations, where the former reflects the control-flow and the latter reflects the data-flow of heap operation sequences. With such increases, the fuzzer could find more heap-based temporal vulnerabilities. We have developed a prototype of HTFuzz and evaluated it on 14 real-world applications, and compared it with 11 state-of-the-art fuzzers. The results showed that, HTFuzz outperformed all the baselines and was statistically better on the number of heap-based temporal vulnerabilities discovered. In detail, HTFuzz found (1.82x, 2.62x, 2.66x, 2.02x, 2.21x, 2.06x, 1.47x, 2.98x, 1.98x) more heap operation sequences and (1.45x, 3.56x, 3.56x, 4.57x, 1.78x, 1.78x, 1.68x, 4.00x, 1.45x) more 0day heap-based temporal vulnerabilities than (AFL, AFL-sensitive-ma, AFL-sensitive-mw, Memlock, PathAFL, TortoiseFuzz, MOPT, Angora, Ankou), respectively. HTFuzz discovered 37 new vulnerabilities with 37 CVEs assigned, including 32 new heap-based temporal vulnerabilities and 5 of other types.


  • A Systematic Study of Android Non-SDK (Hidden) Service API Security

    by Yi He, Yacong Gu, Purui Su, Kun Sun, Yajin Zhou, Zhi Wang, Qi Li

    Android allows apps to communicate with its system services via system service helpers so that these apps can use various functions provided by the system services. Meanwhile, the system services rely on their service helpers to enforce security checks for protection. Unfortunately, the security checks in the service helpers may be bypassed via directly exploiting the non-SDK (hidden) APIs. In this paper, we systematically study the vulnerabilities due to the hidden API exploitation and analyze the effectiveness of Googles countermeasures. We aim to answer if there are still vulnerable hidden APIs that can be exploited in newest Android 12. We develop a static analysis tool called ServiceAudit to automatically mine the inconsistent security enforcement between service helper classes and the hidden service APIs. We apply ServiceAudit to Android 612. Our tool discovers 112 vulnerabilities in Android 6 with a higher precision than existing approaches. Moreover, in Android 11 and 12, we identify more than 25 hidden APIs with inconsistent protections; however, only one of the vulnerable APIs can lead to severe security problem in Android 11, and none of them work on Android 12.


  • Open Access

    Syntax and Behavior Semantics Analysis of Network Protocol of Malware

    by Ling-Yun Ying, Yi Yang, Deng-Guo Feng, Pu-Rui Su