YXYuhai Xuan

Yuhai Xuan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Yuhai Xuan has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • The behavioral economics of mergers and acquisitions

    by Mingzhu Tai, Yuhai Xuan

    This chapter surveys how behavioral biases among investors, managers, and other market participants affect merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and outcomes. Research in this area has centered on two main strands: investor behavioral biases with related market frictions, and managerial traits, while the role of third-party actors such as financial intermediaries, analysts, and regulators has been less explored. The literature provides consistent evidence that these behavioral factors influence key aspects of the deal process, including bid initiation, payment choice, pricing, deal completion, and post-merger performance, through a variety of mechanisms. Taken together, this body of research demonstrates that behavioral influences are integral to understanding M&A outcomes. For future research, we highlight two promising directions: examining the role of social connectedness across deal participants and leveraging big data and advanced analytical methods to capture behavioral inputs at the micro level.

  • How Does Health Insurance Affect Firm Employment and Performance? Evidence from Obamacare

    by Heitor Almeida, Ruidi Huang, Ping Liu, Yuhai Xuan

    This article discusses how mandating employers to provide health insurance of a minimum quality and the associated increases in health insurance premia affect firm employment and performance. Using firm-level employee health insurance data around the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), we show that the PPACA is associated with a significant increase in health insurance premia for employees in company-sponsored health insurance plans. In response, employers with greater exposure to the PPACA reduce employee enrollments in their health insurance plans to a larger extent after the law’s enactment. Our analysis suggests that employers achieve this reduction in enrollment by shifting employment composition from full-time employees to part-time, temporary, or seasonal workers, who are not covered in employer-sponsored health insurance plans. Furthermore, we find no evidence of deterioration in performance at companies more exposed to the increase in health insurance premia. Overall, our findings illustrate how firms adapt to and mitigate cost increases associated with regulatory changes through strategic labor practices. This paper was accepted by Lin William Cong, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03761 .

  • Open Access

    Do Banks Overreact to Disaster Risk?

    by Qianqian Huang, Feng Jiang, Yuhai Xuan, Tao Yuan

    We examine how banks respond to natural disasters when borrowers are in proximity to affected areas. We find robust evidence that banks impose significantly higher loan spreads on firms in these areas following a disaster compared to other borrowers. This effect diminishes over time and is stronger for loans with concentrated syndicates, disasters with greater media coverage, and cases in which loan officers are geographically closer to disaster sites. The increased financing costs result in capital constraints for affected firms. Overall, our findings highlight a salience bias in banks’ evaluation of borrowers’ disaster risk, with adverse effects on borrowing firms.


  • Do Professional Rankings Affect Analyst Behavior? Evidence From a Regression Discontinuity Design

    by Michael J. Jung, Yiqing Lü, Hong Wu, Yuhai Xuan

    This study examines how winning a significant industry award affects the behavior of finance professionals. Focusing on sell-side equity analysts and utilizing a novel data set from Institutional Investor on analyst rankings, we employ a regression discontinuity design that compares the postaward research outputs and behavior of third-place, all-star analysts with those of first runner-up analysts who barely miss the distinction. Our results show that third-place all-star winners are more optimistic in their forecasts and recommendations compared with first runner-up analysts after winning the award, and market reactions to their forecast revisions are stronger. The third-place winners also receive higher priority during earnings conference calls and experience better career outcomes. Our evidence is consistent with award-winning analysts leveraging their increased reputation and market influence to generate more trading commissions and career benefits. The broader inference of our findings is that finance professionals who win a significant award are likely to become more, rather than less, strategic. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.04249 .

  • Top Cited Papers

    Politically Affiliated Analysts

    by Dongmin Kong, Chen Lin, Shasha Liu, Yuhai Xuan

    Government ownership of financial intermediaries is pervasive around the world. In this study, we examine the impact of common government ownership between the brokerage and listed firms on the information production role of brokerage firms. We show that affiliated analysts tend to issue more optimistic recommendations for stocks of firms controlled by the same government entity that controls their brokerage firms. This optimistic bias is particularly pronounced during periods of economic shocks. Our study demonstrates this by utilizing additional tariff impositions and tariff exemptions during the U.S.–China trade war as exogenous negative and positive shocks, respectively. Additionally, our study indicates that stocks recommended by politically affiliated analysts tend to underperform those recommended by independent analysts, implying that the optimism stems from conflicts of interest rather than superior information. Furthermore, our research highlights that sophisticated investors perceive the potential bias and incorporate it into their trading. Consistent with an exchange of favors story, politically affiliated brokerage firms receive a larger allocation during the issuance of local government debt, whereas governments subscribe for more shares during seasoned equity offerings by these affiliated brokerage firms. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance. Funding: The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 71972088, 72132002, and 71991473], the National Social Science Foundation of China [Grants 21ZDA010 and 22VRC145], and the Innovation and Talent Base for Digital Technology and Finance [Grant B21038]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00579 .


  • Open Access

    Governance by One-Lot Shares

    by Feng Cao, Yuhai Xuan, Rongli Yuan, Hong Zou

    We use a novel experiment in China to examine the effects of having a quasi-official investor own a small number of shares on specific firm outcomes. We find that, relative to control firms, pilot firms experience an increase in dissenting votes from independent directors, a reduction in tunneling and earnings management activities, and an improvement in merger performance. Independent directors questioned by the quasi-official shareholder in activism events subsequently lose board seats in the director market. Overall, our results shed light on a new mechanism for enhancing the protection of minority shareholders.


  • Open Access

    Lending Next to the Courthouse: Exposure to Adverse Events and Mortgage Lending Decisions

    by Da (Derek) Huo, Bo Sun, Mingzhu Tai, Yuhai Xuan

    Adverse market events can affect credit supply not only by hurting financial fundamentals but also by changing the risk-taking behaviors of individual decision-makers. We provide micro-level evidence of this individual decision-making channel in the U.S. mortgage market. We find that mortgage application rejection rates are more sensitive to foreclosure intensity when loan officers are more exposed to foreclosure news, despite the same housing market and bank fundamentals. Loans originated from the affected branches have lower ex post default rates, consistent with higher lending standards being applied. In the aggregate, this effect results in tighter credit supply during housing market downturns.


  • Open Access

    Director Job Security and Corporate Innovation

    by Po-Hsuan Hsu, Yiqing Lü, Hong Wu, Yuhai Xuan

    In this article, we show that firms can become conservative in innovation when their directors face job insecurity. We find that after the staggered enactment of majority voting legislation that strengthens shareholders’ power in director elections, firms produce fewer patents, particularly exploratory patents, and fewer forward citations. This effect is stronger for directors facing higher dismissal costs or threats and for firms with greater needs for board expertise and is mitigated by institutional investors’ expertise in innovation. Overall, our results suggest that heightened job insecurity induces director myopia, which leads to a reduction in investment in risky, long-term innovation projects.


  • Open Access

    Do Banks Overreact to Disaster Risk?

    by Qianqian Huang, Feng Jiang, Yuhai Xuan, Tao Yuan

    We examine how banks respond to large natural disasters when corporate borrowers are located in the neighborhood of the disaster area. We find robust evidence that banks charge significantly higher loan spreads for firms located in the neighborhood of the disaster area than for remote firms. The results are not driven by regional spillovers, limited credit supply, lender rent extraction motive, or rational learning. We also find that banks’ reaction is transitory, and is less pronounced for experienced banks. Overall, our empirical findings indicate that banks are subject to salience bias when assessing their clients’ natural disaster risk.