Feng Cao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Feng Cao has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hong Zou
The University of Hong Kong
1 shared publication Jian Sun
School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China
1 shared publicationQianqian Hu
Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
1 shared publication- Rongli Yuan
Renmin University of China Renmin Business School
1 shared publication Sifei Li
International Business School, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing, China
1 shared publication- Yuhai Xuan
The Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California 92697
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 25 November 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (2) , 874-909
Governance by One-Lot Shares
We use a novel experiment in China to examine the effects of having a quasi-official investor own a small number of shares on specific firm outcomes. We find that, relative to control firms, pilot firms experience an increase in dissenting votes from independent directors, a reduction in tunneling and earnings management activities, and an improvement in merger performance. Independent directors questioned by the quasi-official shareholder in activism events subsequently lose board seats in the director market. Overall, our results shed light on a new mechanism for enhancing the protection of minority shareholders.
- 25 November 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (2) , 874-909
Open AccessGovernance by One-Lot Shares
We use a novel experiment in China to examine the effects of having a quasi-official investor own a small number of shares on specific firm outcomes. We find that, relative to control firms, pilot firms experience an increase in dissenting votes from independent directors, a reduction in tunneling and earnings management activities, and an improvement in merger performance. Independent directors questioned by the quasi-official shareholder in activism events subsequently lose board seats in the director market. Overall, our results shed light on a new mechanism for enhancing the protection of minority shareholders.
- 8 September 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
- Vol. 57 (15) , 4398-4407
Executive Political Connections, Information Disclosure Incentives, and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from Chinese Non-State-Owned Enterprises
This paper examines whether and how executives’ political connections affect their incentives to withhold bad news, measured by the stock price crash risk. We find that political connections are negatively associated with the stock price crash risk. Moreover, we show that political connections reduce firms’ financial constraints and encourage firms to disclose more bad news to compete for government subsidies, which lowers managers’ incentives to hide bad news. We also find that the negative relationship between political connections and crash risk varies with external institutions. Our results are robust to numerous robustness tests.
- 8 September 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
- Vol. 57 (15) , 4398-4407
Executive Political Connections, Information Disclosure Incentives, and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from Chinese Non-State-Owned Enterprises
This paper examines whether and how executives’ political connections affect their incentives to withhold bad news, measured by the stock price crash risk. We find that political connections are negatively associated with the stock price crash risk. Moreover, we show that political connections reduce firms’ financial constraints and encourage firms to disclose more bad news to compete for government subsidies, which lowers managers’ incentives to hide bad news. We also find that the negative relationship between political connections and crash risk varies with external institutions. Our results are robust to numerous robustness tests.