Ben McWilliams
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ben McWilliams has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Simone Tagliapietra
Bruegel, Brussels, Belgium
9 shared publications Georg Zachmann
Bruegel
5 shared publicationsMarie Jugé
5 shared publications- Benjamin Bjerkan-Wade4 shared publications
- Ugnė Keliauskaitė
Bruegel
4 shared publications - Alexander Roth
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 19 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Policy
- Vol. 212
A new European energy policy paradigm revealed by changes in hydrogen strategies
- 19 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Policy
- Vol. 212
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessA new European energy policy paradigm revealed by changes in hydrogen strategies
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Proposing heating efficiency standards for Europe
A new heating efficiency standard would be a sound basis for a future EU market mechanism to push heat pumps
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Proposing heating efficiency standards for Europe
A new heating efficiency standard would be a sound basis for a future EU market mechanism to push heat pumps
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The role of existing specialisation in European clean-tech competitiveness
The European Union is gradually becoming less competitive in green value chains, implying that it is becoming less well-positioned to generate economic growth from these industries. We show this using measures of EU specialisation in green exports, relative to the rest of the world. Behind this aggregate trend, there is wide variation across countries and technologies. Belgium, for example, has a good industrial base in batteries and wind power, while Italy, Germany and Poland are relatively more specialised than other countries in heat pumps. We compare countries in terms of green export diversity, specialisation and relatedness, revealing distinct technological strengths. Most trade data is available only at the national level. To investigate regional patterns, we use a database covering more than €200 billion of announced site-specific European clean-tech manufacturing investment. This reveals similarly strong geographic specialisation across green value chains. Together, the Growth Lab Greenplexity and Bruegel European Clean Tech Tracker databases highlight the importance of geography for industrial policy. Green value chains are fiercely competitive, and regions differ in the industrial capabilities they can draw on. When deploying public support to develop domestic green value chains, European policymakers should target investment in particular industries towards regions where the existing industrial ecosystems offer the best fit.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The role of existing specialisation in European clean-tech competitiveness
The European Union is gradually becoming less competitive in green value chains, implying that it is becoming less well-positioned to generate economic growth from these industries. We show this using measures of EU specialisation in green exports, relative to the rest of the world. Behind this aggregate trend, there is wide variation across countries and technologies. Belgium, for example, has a good industrial base in batteries and wind power, while Italy, Germany and Poland are relatively more specialised than other countries in heat pumps. We compare countries in terms of green export diversity, specialisation and relatedness, revealing distinct technological strengths. Most trade data is available only at the national level. To investigate regional patterns, we use a database covering more than €200 billion of announced site-specific European clean-tech manufacturing investment. This reveals similarly strong geographic specialisation across green value chains. Together, the Growth Lab Greenplexity and Bruegel European Clean Tech Tracker databases highlight the importance of geography for industrial policy. Green value chains are fiercely competitive, and regions differ in the industrial capabilities they can draw on. When deploying public support to develop domestic green value chains, European policymakers should target investment in particular industries towards regions where the existing industrial ecosystems offer the best fit.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The European Union’s automotive sector needs a plan, not undue protection
European automotive policy should prioritise affordable competitiveness over protectionism, using resilience criteria and temporary safeguards
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The European Union’s automotive sector needs a plan, not undue protection
European automotive policy should prioritise affordable competitiveness over protectionism, using resilience criteria and temporary safeguards
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The flaws in the European Union’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act and how to fix them
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The flaws in the European Union’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act and how to fix them
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Understanding the global clean tech manufacturing slowdown
Investment in clean technology manufacturing facilities is falling worldwide. After peaking at $70 billion in 2023, quarterly manufacturing investment more than halved to $35 billion by end-2025. This is despite global demand for clean technologies growing rapidly. Since 2020, solar installations have more than tripled in China (+250 percent), while more than doubling in the United States and European Union (+132 percent and +125 percent, respectively). Also since 2020, electric vehicle (EV) sales in China have grown nearly tenfold, in the US fourfold and in the EU threefold. These three economies host 86 percent of total clean-technology manufacturing investment since 2018. In the context of growing demand, why is global clean-tech manufacturing investment slowing? We examine the three largest clean-tech sectors: solar, batteries and EVs. The headline fall largely reflects an oversupplied market, especially falling Chinese investment in solar photovoltaic manufacturing – in this respect the decline is not a cause for concern. However, the drop in battery manufacturing investment that has followed abrupt US policy changes is worrying. Amid the slowdown, European investment remains largely stable.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Understanding the global clean tech manufacturing slowdown
Investment in clean technology manufacturing facilities is falling worldwide. After peaking at $70 billion in 2023, quarterly manufacturing investment more than halved to $35 billion by end-2025. This is despite global demand for clean technologies growing rapidly. Since 2020, solar installations have more than tripled in China (+250 percent), while more than doubling in the United States and European Union (+132 percent and +125 percent, respectively). Also since 2020, electric vehicle (EV) sales in China have grown nearly tenfold, in the US fourfold and in the EU threefold. These three economies host 86 percent of total clean-technology manufacturing investment since 2018. In the context of growing demand, why is global clean-tech manufacturing investment slowing? We examine the three largest clean-tech sectors: solar, batteries and EVs. The headline fall largely reflects an oversupplied market, especially falling Chinese investment in solar photovoltaic manufacturing – in this respect the decline is not a cause for concern. However, the drop in battery manufacturing investment that has followed abrupt US policy changes is worrying. Amid the slowdown, European investment remains largely stable.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
How Europe should respond to the Iran gas shock – and how it shouldn’t
The European Union should act now to head off growing impacts from the Iran conflict on gas prices and availability
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
How Europe should respond to the Iran gas shock – and how it shouldn’t
The European Union should act now to head off growing impacts from the Iran conflict on gas prices and availability
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Dependence on fossil fuels, not on the United States, is Europe’s worry
The US has replaced Russia to a great extent as an energy supplier to the European Union, but this has not so far created a new vulnerability.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Dependence on fossil fuels, not on the United States, is Europe’s worry
The US has replaced Russia to a great extent as an energy supplier to the European Union, but this has not so far created a new vulnerability.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Bruegel
ETS Tracker
This tracker maps the EU ETS through data on emissions, compliance, allowances, auction revenues, prices and installations
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Bruegel
ETS Tracker
This tracker maps the EU ETS through data on emissions, compliance, allowances, auction revenues, prices and installations
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Bruegel
2026 energy crisis European fiscal response tracker