Simone Tagliapietra
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Simone Tagliapietra has a total of 49 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ben McWilliams
Bruegel
9 shared publications Georg Zachmann
5 shared publications- Guntram B. Wolff
Bruegel, Brussels, Belgium
5 shared publications Marie Jugé
5 shared publications- Alexander Roth
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
3 shared publications - Benjamin Bjerkan-Wade3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The role of existing specialisation in European clean-tech competitiveness
The European Union is gradually becoming less competitive in green value chains, implying that it is becoming less well-positioned to generate economic growth from these industries. We show this using measures of EU specialisation in green exports, relative to the rest of the world. Behind this aggregate trend, there is wide variation across countries and technologies. Belgium, for example, has a good industrial base in batteries and wind power, while Italy, Germany and Poland are relatively more specialised than other countries in heat pumps. We compare countries in terms of green export diversity, specialisation and relatedness, revealing distinct technological strengths. Most trade data is available only at the national level. To investigate regional patterns, we use a database covering more than €200 billion of announced site-specific European clean-tech manufacturing investment. This reveals similarly strong geographic specialisation across green value chains. Together, the Growth Lab Greenplexity and Bruegel European Clean Tech Tracker databases highlight the importance of geography for industrial policy. Green value chains are fiercely competitive, and regions differ in the industrial capabilities they can draw on. When deploying public support to develop domestic green value chains, European policymakers should target investment in particular industries towards regions where the existing industrial ecosystems offer the best fit.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The role of existing specialisation in European clean-tech competitiveness
The European Union is gradually becoming less competitive in green value chains, implying that it is becoming less well-positioned to generate economic growth from these industries. We show this using measures of EU specialisation in green exports, relative to the rest of the world. Behind this aggregate trend, there is wide variation across countries and technologies. Belgium, for example, has a good industrial base in batteries and wind power, while Italy, Germany and Poland are relatively more specialised than other countries in heat pumps. We compare countries in terms of green export diversity, specialisation and relatedness, revealing distinct technological strengths. Most trade data is available only at the national level. To investigate regional patterns, we use a database covering more than €200 billion of announced site-specific European clean-tech manufacturing investment. This reveals similarly strong geographic specialisation across green value chains. Together, the Growth Lab Greenplexity and Bruegel European Clean Tech Tracker databases highlight the importance of geography for industrial policy. Green value chains are fiercely competitive, and regions differ in the industrial capabilities they can draw on. When deploying public support to develop domestic green value chains, European policymakers should target investment in particular industries towards regions where the existing industrial ecosystems offer the best fit.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The European Union’s automotive sector needs a plan, not undue protection
European automotive policy should prioritise affordable competitiveness over protectionism, using resilience criteria and temporary safeguards
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The European Union’s automotive sector needs a plan, not undue protection
European automotive policy should prioritise affordable competitiveness over protectionism, using resilience criteria and temporary safeguards
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Europe must prepare for a possible oil supply crunch
With falling commercial and emergency oil reserves, Europe’s oil price shock could soon become a volume crisis – a scenario for which it must prepare
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Europe must prepare for a possible oil supply crunch
With falling commercial and emergency oil reserves, Europe’s oil price shock could soon become a volume crisis – a scenario for which it must prepare
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The flaws in the European Union’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act and how to fix them
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The flaws in the European Union’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act and how to fix them
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Understanding the global clean tech manufacturing slowdown
Investment in clean technology manufacturing facilities is falling worldwide. After peaking at $70 billion in 2023, quarterly manufacturing investment more than halved to $35 billion by end-2025. This is despite global demand for clean technologies growing rapidly. Since 2020, solar installations have more than tripled in China (+250 percent), while more than doubling in the United States and European Union (+132 percent and +125 percent, respectively). Also since 2020, electric vehicle (EV) sales in China have grown nearly tenfold, in the US fourfold and in the EU threefold. These three economies host 86 percent of total clean-technology manufacturing investment since 2018. In the context of growing demand, why is global clean-tech manufacturing investment slowing? We examine the three largest clean-tech sectors: solar, batteries and EVs. The headline fall largely reflects an oversupplied market, especially falling Chinese investment in solar photovoltaic manufacturing – in this respect the decline is not a cause for concern. However, the drop in battery manufacturing investment that has followed abrupt US policy changes is worrying. Amid the slowdown, European investment remains largely stable.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Understanding the global clean tech manufacturing slowdown
Investment in clean technology manufacturing facilities is falling worldwide. After peaking at $70 billion in 2023, quarterly manufacturing investment more than halved to $35 billion by end-2025. This is despite global demand for clean technologies growing rapidly. Since 2020, solar installations have more than tripled in China (+250 percent), while more than doubling in the United States and European Union (+132 percent and +125 percent, respectively). Also since 2020, electric vehicle (EV) sales in China have grown nearly tenfold, in the US fourfold and in the EU threefold. These three economies host 86 percent of total clean-technology manufacturing investment since 2018. In the context of growing demand, why is global clean-tech manufacturing investment slowing? We examine the three largest clean-tech sectors: solar, batteries and EVs. The headline fall largely reflects an oversupplied market, especially falling Chinese investment in solar photovoltaic manufacturing – in this respect the decline is not a cause for concern. However, the drop in battery manufacturing investment that has followed abrupt US policy changes is worrying. Amid the slowdown, European investment remains largely stable.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
How Europe should respond to the Iran gas shock – and how it shouldn’t
The European Union should act now to head off growing impacts from the Iran conflict on gas prices and availability
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
How Europe should respond to the Iran gas shock – and how it shouldn’t
The European Union should act now to head off growing impacts from the Iran conflict on gas prices and availability
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
- Vol. 2026 (1)
Better coordination for a more efficient European energy system
Three steps should be taken to improve the efficiency of the European Union’s energy system: 1) enhance transparency through data and modelling, 2) integrate network planning across borders, and 3) strengthen alignment of national policies and plans. As the EU transitions towards greater reliance on domestically produced electricity, the economic stakes of fragmentation rise. These three steps are essential to address the weak coordination and incoherence of national system-development plans and policies. Moving beyond opaque planning by national grid companies will enable investors to set realistic expectations. A shared understanding of the system’s state and policy vision de-risks planning, accelerates deployment, lowers capital costs and reduces the risk of premature or stranded investments. To resolve the current lack of data transparency, an EU Energy Data Hub should be established to aggregate, clean and publish timely energy data, replacing the current reliance on opaque, fragmented and often private sources. EU-level integrated network planning would tie long-term energy and climate goals to strategic energy system development. While countries would continue to decide on their own energy mixes, this approach would ensure transparency and justify projects based on European welfare rather than special interests. Political cooperation should be strengthened by transforming current National Energy and Climate Plans into documents that guide public policies and investment, requiring stronger dialogue between EU countries and fostering trust between neighbours. This requires consistency across EU countries in terms of data and methodologies. The credibility of these plans would be based on links to EU policies, such as state-aid approval or subsidies for infrastructure projects. These recommendations aim to leverage the internal energy market as a strategic tool and to prevent regression to national, protectionist policies. By coordinating policies and infrastructure, the EU can ensure competitiveness and resilience, while transitioning to a decarbonised economy.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
- Vol. 2026 (1)
Better coordination for a more efficient European energy system
Three steps should be taken to improve the efficiency of the European Union’s energy system: 1) enhance transparency through data and modelling, 2) integrate network planning across borders, and 3) strengthen alignment of national policies and plans. As the EU transitions towards greater reliance on domestically produced electricity, the economic stakes of fragmentation rise. These three steps are essential to address the weak coordination and incoherence of national system-development plans and policies. Moving beyond opaque planning by national grid companies will enable investors to set realistic expectations. A shared understanding of the system’s state and policy vision de-risks planning, accelerates deployment, lowers capital costs and reduces the risk of premature or stranded investments. To resolve the current lack of data transparency, an EU Energy Data Hub should be established to aggregate, clean and publish timely energy data, replacing the current reliance on opaque, fragmented and often private sources. EU-level integrated network planning would tie long-term energy and climate goals to strategic energy system development. While countries would continue to decide on their own energy mixes, this approach would ensure transparency and justify projects based on European welfare rather than special interests. Political cooperation should be strengthened by transforming current National Energy and Climate Plans into documents that guide public policies and investment, requiring stronger dialogue between EU countries and fostering trust between neighbours. This requires consistency across EU countries in terms of data and methodologies. The credibility of these plans would be based on links to EU policies, such as state-aid approval or subsidies for infrastructure projects. These recommendations aim to leverage the internal energy market as a strategic tool and to prevent regression to national, protectionist policies. By coordinating policies and infrastructure, the EU can ensure competitiveness and resilience, while transitioning to a decarbonised economy.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Europe’s emissions trading system is an ally, not an enemy, of industrial competitiveness
The 2026 review of the EU ETS must be anchored in facts and focus on the potential benefits of the system to EU competitiveness
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Europe’s emissions trading system is an ally, not an enemy, of industrial competitiveness
The 2026 review of the EU ETS must be anchored in facts and focus on the potential benefits of the system to EU competitiveness
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Bruegel
ETS Tracker
This tracker maps the EU ETS through data on emissions, compliance, allowances, auction revenues, prices and installations
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Bruegel
ETS Tracker
This tracker maps the EU ETS through data on emissions, compliance, allowances, auction revenues, prices and installations
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Bruegel
2026 energy crisis European fiscal response tracker