ZPZiyue Pan

Ziyue Pan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Ziyue Pan has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Beyond Control: Exploring Novel File System Objects for Data-Only Attacks on Linux Systems

    by Jinmeng Zhou, Ziyue Pan, Jiayi Hu, Jiaxun Zhu, Wenbo Shen, Rui Chang, Guoren Li, Zhiyun Qian

    The widespread deployment of control-flow integrity has shifted attackers' focus to non-control data attacks. In OS kernel exploits, attackers can gain root access or escalate privileges by corrupting critical non-control objects without hijacking the control flow. However, searching for exploitable non-control data in the OS kernel is challenging because of the data's semantic complexity and lack of universal patterns. This work represents the first study to semi-automatically discover and evaluate exploitable non-control data within the Linux kernel's file system, with minimal domain knowledge. Utilizing a custom analysis and testing framework, we identify promising candidate objects both statically and dynamically. We categorize these objects into types suitable for various exploit strategies, including a systematic strategy to overcome defenses that isolate many of these objects. These objects can be exploitable without requiring KASLR, thus making the exploits simpler and more reliable. We evaluate the exploitability of the file system objects using 18 real-world CVEs with various exploit strategies. We further develop 10 end-to-end exploits against the kernel with all state-of-the-art mitigations enabled.


  • Open Access

    Type-Alias Analysis: Enabling LLVM IR with Accurate Types

    by Jinmeng Zhou, Ziyue Pan, Wenbo Shen, Xingkai Wang, Kangjie Lu, Zhiyun Qian

    LLVM Intermediate Representation (IR) underpins the LLVM compiler infrastructure, offering a strong type system and a static single-assignment (SSA) form that are well-suited for program analysis. However, its single-type design assigns exactly one type to each IR variable, even when the variable may legitimately correspond to multiple types. The recent introduction of opaque pointers exacerbates this limitation: all pointers in the IR are uniformly represented with a generic pointer type (ptr) that erases concrete pointee type information, making many type-based analyses ineffective. To address the limitations of single-type design, we introduce type-alias analysis, a multiple-type design that maintains type-alias sets for IR variables and infers types across IR instructions. We have developed TypeCopilot, a prototype that recovers concrete pointee types for opaque-pointer-enabled LLVM IR generated from C programs. TypeCopilot achieves 98.57% accuracy with 94.98% coverage, allowing existing analysis tools to retain their effectiveness despite the adoption of opaque pointers. To foster further research and security applications, we have open-sourced TypeCopilot, providing the community with a practical foundation for precise, type-aware security analyses on modern LLVM IR.


  • Ambush From All Sides: Understanding Security Threats in Open-Source Software CI/CD Pipelines

    by Ziyue Pan, Wenbo Shen, Xingkai Wang, Yutian Yang, Rui Chang, Yao Liu, Chengwei Liu, Yang Liu, Kui Ren

    The continuous integration and continuous deployment (CI/CD) pipeline has been widely used and is becoming popular on Internet hosting platforms, such as GitHub. While being popular, however, current CI/CD pipelines suffer from malicious code and severe vulnerabilities. Even worse, it is often under-protected as people have not been fully aware of its attack surfaces and the corresponding impacts. Therefore, in this paper, we conduct a large-scale measurement and a systematic analysis to reveal the attack surfaces of the CI/CD pipeline and quantify their security impacts. Specifically, for the measurement, we collect a data set of 320,000+ CI/CD pipeline-configured GitHub repositories and build an analysis tool to parse the CI/CD pipelines and extract security-critical usages. Our measurement reveals that the script runtimes are prone to code hiding while the script usage update is not in time, giving attackers chances to hide malicious code and exploit existing vulnerabilities. Moreover, even the scripts from verified creators may contain severe vulnerabilities. Besides current CI/CD ecosystem heavily relies on several core scripts, which may lead to a single point of failure. While the CI/CD pipelines contain sensitive information/operations, making them the attacker's favorite targets. Inspired by the measurement findings, we abstract the threat model and the attack approach toward CI/CD pipelines, followed by a systematic analysis of attack surfaces, attack strategies, and the corresponding impacts. We further launch case studies on five attacks in real-world CI/CD environments to validate the revealed attack surfaces. Finally, we give suggestions on mitigating attacks on CI/CD scripts, including securing CI/CD configurations, securing CI/CD scripts, and improving CI/CD infrastructure.