John G. Matsusaka
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
John G. Matsusaka has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Thomas W. Gilligan
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Constitutional Political Economy
- p. 1-36
The democratic institutions of the Roman Republic
The ancient Roman Republic was the longest-lived popularly governed state in human history yet is understudied in democracy research. This essay provides a systematic overview of the Republic’s political institutions and practices, assembling recent historical evidence in a form accessible to democracy scholars. I argue that, by the criteria used to classify classical Athens and the United States as democracies, the Roman Republic was also a democracy. To substantiate this claim, I combine qualitative analysis of its institutions and practices with quantitative evidence, calculating democracy index scores using the Polity5 rubric and the Economist Intelligence Unit rubric, both of which classify the Republic as a democracy. The essay highlights several unique features of the Republic’s institutions that may have contributed to its longevity, and its ability to flourish in the competitive ancient Mediterranean world.
- 22 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Constitutional Political Economy
- p. 1-36
Open AccessThe democratic institutions of the Roman Republic
The ancient Roman Republic was the longest-lived popularly governed state in human history yet is understudied in democracy research. This essay provides a systematic overview of the Republic’s political institutions and practices, assembling recent historical evidence in a form accessible to democracy scholars. I argue that, by the criteria used to classify classical Athens and the United States as democracies, the Roman Republic was also a democracy. To substantiate this claim, I combine qualitative analysis of its institutions and practices with quantitative evidence, calculating democracy index scores using the Polity5 rubric and the Economist Intelligence Unit rubric, both of which classify the Republic as a democracy. The essay highlights several unique features of the Republic’s institutions that may have contributed to its longevity, and its ability to flourish in the competitive ancient Mediterranean world.
- Open Access
- 5 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 208 (3-4) , 1-14
“Congruence” and “Responsiveness” in the study of representation
This paper compares two common methods used to measure representation in empirical research: “congruence,” whether a roll-call vote is aligned with constituent opinion; and “responsiveness,” the correlation between roll-call votes and constituent opinion. While sometimes viewed as different ways of capturing the same underlying concept of “representation,” theoretically the measures are not connected. This paper assesses to what extent responsiveness and congruence capture the same thing empirically. Using 4,192 roll-call votes on 33 state laws that were subsequently challenged in referendums, I calculate both congruence and responsiveness for the same set of votes. The main finding is that responsiveness is an unreliable predictor of congruence, and therefore cannot be taken as a proxy for congruence.
- 5 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 208 (3-4) , 1-14
Open Access“Congruence” and “Responsiveness” in the study of representation
This paper compares two common methods used to measure representation in empirical research: “congruence,” whether a roll-call vote is aligned with constituent opinion; and “responsiveness,” the correlation between roll-call votes and constituent opinion. While sometimes viewed as different ways of capturing the same underlying concept of “representation,” theoretically the measures are not connected. This paper assesses to what extent responsiveness and congruence capture the same thing empirically. Using 4,192 roll-call votes on 33 state laws that were subsequently challenged in referendums, I calculate both congruence and responsiveness for the same set of votes. The main finding is that responsiveness is an unreliable predictor of congruence, and therefore cannot be taken as a proxy for congruence.
- 7 July 2025
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy
- Vol. 6 (2) , 249-276
Direct Democracy Backsliding, 1955–2024
Direct democracy backsliding occurs when a government alters its laws to hinder the use of initiatives and referendums. This study develops a measure of direct democracy backsliding, collects the data to calculate it over the last 70 years, and documents several trends and patterns. The data reveal a continuous chipping away at direct democracy throughout the period; legislatures proposed on average 2.2 amendments restricting direct democracy every two-year electoral cycle, and four amendments restricting direct democracy for every one amendment expanding it. The amount of such activity in recent years is high but not at a peak for the period. The strongest predictor of anti-direct-democracy proposals is Republican control of the state legislature. I find little evidence that legislators sought to restrict direct democracy for strategic reasons, either to forestall future adverse policy outcomes, or in reaction to past adverse outcomes.
- 7 July 2025
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy
- Vol. 6 (2) , 249-276
Direct Democracy Backsliding, 1955–2024
Direct democracy backsliding occurs when a government alters its laws to hinder the use of initiatives and referendums. This study develops a measure of direct democracy backsliding, collects the data to calculate it over the last 70 years, and documents several trends and patterns. The data reveal a continuous chipping away at direct democracy throughout the period; legislatures proposed on average 2.2 amendments restricting direct democracy every two-year electoral cycle, and four amendments restricting direct democracy for every one amendment expanding it. The amount of such activity in recent years is high but not at a peak for the period. The strongest predictor of anti-direct-democracy proposals is Republican control of the state legislature. I find little evidence that legislators sought to restrict direct democracy for strategic reasons, either to forestall future adverse policy outcomes, or in reaction to past adverse outcomes.
- 22 November 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 174 (1-2) , 107-143
Public policy and the initiative and referendum: a survey with some new evidence
- 22 November 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 174 (1-2) , 107-143
Public policy and the initiative and referendum: a survey with some new evidence
- 16 June 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 167 (3-4) , 257-276
Ballot order effects in direct democracy elections
- 16 June 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 167 (3-4) , 257-276
Ballot order effects in direct democracy elections
- 17 October 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 160 (3-4) , 345-366
Disentangling the direct and indirect effects of the initiative process
- 17 October 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 160 (3-4) , 345-366
Disentangling the direct and indirect effects of the initiative process
- Top Cited Papers
- 11 August 2010
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 5 (2) , 133-167
Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach
The quality of government is often measured by the degree of congruence between policy choices and public opinion, but there is not an accepted method for calculating congruence. This paper offers a new approach to measuring policy-opinion congruence, and uses it to study 10 high-profile issues across the 50 states. For the issues examined, states chose the policy preferred by a majority of citizens (equivalent to the median voter outcome) 59 percent of the time — only 9 percent more than would have happened with random policymaking. Majoritarian/median outcomes were 18−19 percent more likely when direct democracy was available, and 11−13 percent more likely when judges were required to stand for reelection. The likelihood of a majoritarian/median outcome was not correlated with a variety of election laws, including campaign contribution limits, public funding of campaigns, and commission-based redistricting.
- 11 August 2010
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 5 (2) , 133-167
Top Cited PapersPopular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach
The quality of government is often measured by the degree of congruence between policy choices and public opinion, but there is not an accepted method for calculating congruence. This paper offers a new approach to measuring policy-opinion congruence, and uses it to study 10 high-profile issues across the 50 states. For the issues examined, states chose the policy preferred by a majority of citizens (equivalent to the median voter outcome) 59 percent of the time — only 9 percent more than would have happened with random policymaking. Majoritarian/median outcomes were 18−19 percent more likely when direct democracy was available, and 11−13 percent more likely when judges were required to stand for reelection. The likelihood of a majoritarian/median outcome was not correlated with a variety of election laws, including campaign contribution limits, public funding of campaigns, and commission-based redistricting.
- 26 September 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 129 (3-4) , 381-398
Public choice principles of redistricting
- 26 September 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 129 (3-4) , 381-398
Public choice principles of redistricting