Ingmar Schlecht
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ingmar Schlecht has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Karl-Martin Ehrhart
Institute of Economics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Karlsruhe, Germany
5 shared publications - Runxi Wang
Institute of Economics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Karlsruhe, Germany
4 shared publications Fabian Ocker
TenneT TSO GmbH, Bayreuth, Germany
2 shared publications- Jan Schmitz
Deputy Chief Economist DG TRADE European Commission, Brussels, Belgium
2 shared publications Lion Hirth
Neon Neue Energieökonomik GmbH, Berlin, Germany
2 shared publications- Lion Hirth
Hertie School, Centre for Sustainability, Berlin, Germany
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 October 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Energy Journal
- Vol. 47 (1) , 77-108
Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets
This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors’ costs and a finite set of providers. We find that inc-dec gaming is also a rational behavior in markets with high competition and with uncertainty about network constraints. Such behavior already occurs in our setup of two regions. Comparing market-based redispatch with three theoretical benchmarks highlights a lower efficiency level of market-based redispatch and inflated redispatch payments. Finally, we study seven variations of our basic model to assess whether different market fundamentals or market design changes mitigate inc-dec gaming. None of these variations eliminates inc-dec gaming entirely. JEL Classification: D43 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; D44 Auctions; L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; Q41 Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices; Q48 Energy: Government Policy
- 17 October 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Energy Journal
- Vol. 47 (1) , 77-108
Open AccessCongestion Management Games in Electricity Markets
This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors’ costs and a finite set of providers. We find that inc-dec gaming is also a rational behavior in markets with high competition and with uncertainty about network constraints. Such behavior already occurs in our setup of two regions. Comparing market-based redispatch with three theoretical benchmarks highlights a lower efficiency level of market-based redispatch and inflated redispatch payments. Finally, we study seven variations of our basic model to assess whether different market fundamentals or market design changes mitigate inc-dec gaming. None of these variations eliminates inc-dec gaming entirely. JEL Classification: D43 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; D44 Auctions; L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; Q41 Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices; Q48 Energy: Government Policy
- Open Access
- 20 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
- Vol. 25 (1) , 1-2
Correction to: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Interaction Between Embargoes, Price Caps and Tariffs in EU-Russia Gas Trade
- 20 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
- Vol. 25 (1) , 1-2
Open AccessCorrection to: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Interaction Between Embargoes, Price Caps and Tariffs in EU-Russia Gas Trade
- Open Access
- 5 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Economics
- Vol. 149
Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism
- 5 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Economics
- Vol. 149
Open AccessAnalysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism
- Open Access
- 22 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
- Vol. 24 (1) , 1-24
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Interaction Between Embargoes, Price Caps and Tariffs in EU-Russia Gas Trade
Geopolitical tensions have put the use of strategic trade policy instruments back on the agenda of policy makers. In this paper we investigate the interaction of the threat and use of three unilateral trade policy instruments: embargoes, import price caps and tariffs. In a game-theoretic framework with different scenarios and game variants, we show that the strategic use of the right combination of the respective trade policy instruments can be used to achieve more desirable outcomes for the players. In our setup, a credible threat of a tariff supports the successful implementation of an import price cap. While the results can be generalised, we show the concrete functioning of the interplay of these strategic trade policy instruments in a hypothetical game of resumption of natural gas sales from Russia to the EU. Following the application to this example, we derive policy suggestions to improve the EU’s position in the specific game.
- 22 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
- Vol. 24 (1) , 1-24
Open AccessA Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Interaction Between Embargoes, Price Caps and Tariffs in EU-Russia Gas Trade
Geopolitical tensions have put the use of strategic trade policy instruments back on the agenda of policy makers. In this paper we investigate the interaction of the threat and use of three unilateral trade policy instruments: embargoes, import price caps and tariffs. In a game-theoretic framework with different scenarios and game variants, we show that the strategic use of the right combination of the respective trade policy instruments can be used to achieve more desirable outcomes for the players. In our setup, a credible threat of a tariff supports the successful implementation of an import price cap. While the results can be generalised, we show the concrete functioning of the interplay of these strategic trade policy instruments in a hypothetical game of resumption of natural gas sales from Russia to the EU. Following the application to this example, we derive policy suggestions to improve the EU’s position in the specific game.
- Open Access
- 29 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Policy
- Vol. 195
Profile contracts for electricity retail customers
- 29 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Policy
- Vol. 195
Open AccessProfile contracts for electricity retail customers
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 13 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Policy
- Vol. 186
Financial contracts for differences: The problems with conventional CfDs in electricity markets and how forward contracts can help solve them
- 13 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Policy
- Vol. 186
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessFinancial contracts for differences: The problems with conventional CfDs in electricity markets and how forward contracts can help solve them
- 22 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 227
Comparison of price caps and tariffs to counter a foreign monopoly
- 22 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 227
Comparison of price caps and tariffs to counter a foreign monopoly