Runxi Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Runxi Wang has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Karl-Martin Ehrhart
Institute of Economics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Karlsruhe, Germany
7 shared publications - Ingmar Schlecht
ZHAW School of Management and Law, Winterthur, Switzerland
4 shared publications - Marion Ott
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
3 shared publications Fabian Ocker
2 shared publications- Jan Schmitz
Deputy Chief Economist DG TRADE European Commission, Brussels, Belgium
2 shared publications Anselm Eicke
Hertie School; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Economics
- Vol. 162
Designing renewable energy auctions for high realization probability — CfD and payment-only auctions
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Economics
- Vol. 162
Open AccessDesigning renewable energy auctions for high realization probability — CfD and payment-only auctions
- Open Access
- 20 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
- Vol. 25 (1) , 1-2
Correction to: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Interaction Between Embargoes, Price Caps and Tariffs in EU-Russia Gas Trade
- 20 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
- Vol. 25 (1) , 1-2
Open AccessCorrection to: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Interaction Between Embargoes, Price Caps and Tariffs in EU-Russia Gas Trade
- Open Access
- 5 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Economics
- Vol. 149
Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism
- 5 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Economics
- Vol. 149
Open AccessAnalysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism
- Open Access
- 22 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
- Vol. 24 (1) , 1-24
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Interaction Between Embargoes, Price Caps and Tariffs in EU-Russia Gas Trade
Geopolitical tensions have put the use of strategic trade policy instruments back on the agenda of policy makers. In this paper we investigate the interaction of the threat and use of three unilateral trade policy instruments: embargoes, import price caps and tariffs. In a game-theoretic framework with different scenarios and game variants, we show that the strategic use of the right combination of the respective trade policy instruments can be used to achieve more desirable outcomes for the players. In our setup, a credible threat of a tariff supports the successful implementation of an import price cap. While the results can be generalised, we show the concrete functioning of the interplay of these strategic trade policy instruments in a hypothetical game of resumption of natural gas sales from Russia to the EU. Following the application to this example, we derive policy suggestions to improve the EU’s position in the specific game.
- 22 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
- Vol. 24 (1) , 1-24
Open AccessA Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Interaction Between Embargoes, Price Caps and Tariffs in EU-Russia Gas Trade
Geopolitical tensions have put the use of strategic trade policy instruments back on the agenda of policy makers. In this paper we investigate the interaction of the threat and use of three unilateral trade policy instruments: embargoes, import price caps and tariffs. In a game-theoretic framework with different scenarios and game variants, we show that the strategic use of the right combination of the respective trade policy instruments can be used to achieve more desirable outcomes for the players. In our setup, a credible threat of a tariff supports the successful implementation of an import price cap. While the results can be generalised, we show the concrete functioning of the interplay of these strategic trade policy instruments in a hypothetical game of resumption of natural gas sales from Russia to the EU. Following the application to this example, we derive policy suggestions to improve the EU’s position in the specific game.
- 23 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Policy
- Vol. 186
Combinatorial auctions for renewable energy — potentials and challenges
- 23 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Policy
- Vol. 186
Combinatorial auctions for renewable energy — potentials and challenges
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Analysis of a Capacity-Based Redispatch Mechanism
This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called “inc-dec gaming” when including flexible consumers with a market-based approach. We conduct a game-theoretical analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism. Our analysis reveals that despite its intention, the capacity-based redispatch is prone to undesirable behavior of market participants. The reason is that the availability payment incentivizes participants to change their energy consumption (generation) behavior. However, this also applies to undesired participants who increase the redispatch requirement through participation. Under certain assumptions, the additional redispatch potential equals the additional redispatch demand it creates. Consequently, the mechanism does not resolve network constraints, while causing costs for the compensation payments. Furthermore, we study three alternative implementation options, none of which resolves the underlying problem. It follows from our analysis that a mechanism can only be promising if it is capable to distinguish between the potential participants to exclude the undesirable ones.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAnalysis of a Capacity-Based Redispatch Mechanism
This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called “inc-dec gaming” when including flexible consumers with a market-based approach. We conduct a game-theoretical analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism. Our analysis reveals that despite its intention, the capacity-based redispatch is prone to undesirable behavior of market participants. The reason is that the availability payment incentivizes participants to change their energy consumption (generation) behavior. However, this also applies to undesired participants who increase the redispatch requirement through participation. Under certain assumptions, the additional redispatch potential equals the additional redispatch demand it creates. Consequently, the mechanism does not resolve network constraints, while causing costs for the compensation payments. Furthermore, we study three alternative implementation options, none of which resolves the underlying problem. It follows from our analysis that a mechanism can only be promising if it is capable to distinguish between the potential participants to exclude the undesirable ones.
- 22 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 227
Comparison of price caps and tariffs to counter a foreign monopoly
- 22 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 227
Comparison of price caps and tariffs to counter a foreign monopoly