Zachary Adolph Niese
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Zachary Adolph Niese has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Lisa K. Libby
The Ohio State University, Columbus, USA
2 shared publicationsMandy Hütter
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Germany
2 shared publications- Mandy Hütter
Department of Psychology, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen
2 shared publications Richard P. Eibach
University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
2 shared publications- Alison M Szymanski
Ohio State Univ, Dept Psychol, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
1 shared publication - Florian Scholten
Department of Psychology, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Schleichstr. 4, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Metacognition and Learning
- Vol. 21 (1) , 31
An afforded elaboration mechanism of judgment of learning reactivity
The mere act of providing a judgment of learning (JOL) influences subsequent memory performance. Such JOL reactivity depends on features of the learned material, as shown by numerous studies demonstrating that providing JOLs tends to enhance memory for related word pairs but not unrelated word pairs. Consequently, the mechanisms underlying existing accounts of positive reactivity predict the effect should generalize across semantically related word pairs broadly. In contrast, we propose that providing JOLs prompts elaboration, but JOL reactivity is conditional on the amount of test-relevant elaboration that cues afford. That is, positive reactivity for related word pairs is not due to their semantic relatedness per se, but rather, occurs because semantically related pairs tend to afford deeper elaboration. Across three preregistered experiments (N = 375), we test these competing mechanistic assumptions by examining whether positive reactivity arises for synonyms–a word pair type that is characterized by high semantic relatedness but only affords shallow elaboration on that relation due to high similarity. Despite being highly related, we find no JOL reactivity for synonym pairs, significantly differing from the positive reactivity observed for distinct-related word pairs. That is, JOL reactivity does not uniformly generalize across all semantically related word pairs. Further, supporting an afforded elaboration mechanism, we find that a novel, continuous metric of the amount of elaboration word pairs afford moderates JOL reactivity. These results emphasize the need for refinement of major accounts of JOL reactivity and offer a pathway for transferring positive JOL reactivity to real-world learning.
- 22 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Metacognition and Learning
- Vol. 21 (1) , 31
Open AccessAn afforded elaboration mechanism of judgment of learning reactivity
The mere act of providing a judgment of learning (JOL) influences subsequent memory performance. Such JOL reactivity depends on features of the learned material, as shown by numerous studies demonstrating that providing JOLs tends to enhance memory for related word pairs but not unrelated word pairs. Consequently, the mechanisms underlying existing accounts of positive reactivity predict the effect should generalize across semantically related word pairs broadly. In contrast, we propose that providing JOLs prompts elaboration, but JOL reactivity is conditional on the amount of test-relevant elaboration that cues afford. That is, positive reactivity for related word pairs is not due to their semantic relatedness per se, but rather, occurs because semantically related pairs tend to afford deeper elaboration. Across three preregistered experiments (N = 375), we test these competing mechanistic assumptions by examining whether positive reactivity arises for synonyms–a word pair type that is characterized by high semantic relatedness but only affords shallow elaboration on that relation due to high similarity. Despite being highly related, we find no JOL reactivity for synonym pairs, significantly differing from the positive reactivity observed for distinct-related word pairs. That is, JOL reactivity does not uniformly generalize across all semantically related word pairs. Further, supporting an afforded elaboration mechanism, we find that a novel, continuous metric of the amount of elaboration word pairs afford moderates JOL reactivity. These results emphasize the need for refinement of major accounts of JOL reactivity and offer a pathway for transferring positive JOL reactivity to real-world learning.
- 1 April 2026
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Vol. 52 (4) , 505-521
Choosing to avoid: The evaluative impact of autonomous selection of approach and avoidance behaviors.
Much of everyday learning affords us autonomy over the information we learn about, but evaluative learning research often strips participants of this autonomy. The present research assesses the effects of autonomy in the form of sampling decisions in the traditionally passive approach-avoidance (AA) training. In three experiments, participants completed an AA task, in which half of the participants were given genuine autonomy over how frequently they interacted with each stimulus, and the other half were yoked to engage in the AA behaviors of a high-autonomy participant. In all conditions, we found that people positively shifted their evaluations toward approached stimuli and negatively shifted their evaluations toward avoided stimuli. We also found that people used their sampling decisions to inform their attitudes about stimuli. In Experiment 1, sampling decisions were explicitly linked to the AA behaviors, and an increased number of interactions strengthened the AA effect among high-autonomy participants. In Experiment 2, participants first sampled stimuli and then approached or avoided them; here, an increased number of interactions predicted a positive shift in evaluation among high-autonomy participants, regardless of AA behaviors. Experiment 3 replicated both patterns of effects by randomly assigning high-autonomy participants to a version of the task that framed sampling decisions as AA at the time of sampling (as in Experiment 1) or separated sampling and AA into two steps (as in Experiment 2). Thus, we demonstrate that sampling decisions can positively impact evaluations, but the effect is sensitive to how those decisions are framed at the time of sampling. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 April 2026
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Vol. 52 (4) , 505-521
Choosing to avoid: The evaluative impact of autonomous selection of approach and avoidance behaviors.
Much of everyday learning affords us autonomy over the information we learn about, but evaluative learning research often strips participants of this autonomy. The present research assesses the effects of autonomy in the form of sampling decisions in the traditionally passive approach-avoidance (AA) training. In three experiments, participants completed an AA task, in which half of the participants were given genuine autonomy over how frequently they interacted with each stimulus, and the other half were yoked to engage in the AA behaviors of a high-autonomy participant. In all conditions, we found that people positively shifted their evaluations toward approached stimuli and negatively shifted their evaluations toward avoided stimuli. We also found that people used their sampling decisions to inform their attitudes about stimuli. In Experiment 1, sampling decisions were explicitly linked to the AA behaviors, and an increased number of interactions strengthened the AA effect among high-autonomy participants. In Experiment 2, participants first sampled stimuli and then approached or avoided them; here, an increased number of interactions predicted a positive shift in evaluation among high-autonomy participants, regardless of AA behaviors. Experiment 3 replicated both patterns of effects by randomly assigning high-autonomy participants to a version of the task that framed sampling decisions as AA at the time of sampling (as in Experiment 1) or separated sampling and AA into two steps (as in Experiment 2). Thus, we demonstrate that sampling decisions can positively impact evaluations, but the effect is sensitive to how those decisions are framed at the time of sampling. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 6 December 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry
- Vol. 91, 102084
Obsessive-compulsive tendencies predict reduced access to affective reactions to auditory stimuli
- 6 December 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry
- Vol. 91, 102084
Open AccessObsessive-compulsive tendencies predict reduced access to affective reactions to auditory stimuli
- 1 November 2025
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 129 (5) , 773-787
He sees the forest, I see the trees: Narrative perspective shifts how abstractly people construe a text.
Humans tell stories to share information, evoke emotions, and change opinions. An inherent dimension of these stories is the narrative perspective from which they are told: Sometimes stories are told from a person's first-person narrative perspective (e.g., using I/me pronouns), whereas other times, they are told about the person using a third-person narrative perspective (e.g., using he/him, she/her, etc., pronouns). The current work tests the hypothesis that the first-person (vs. third-person) narrative perspective causes people to construe information more concretely (vs. abstractly), with downstream effects on how readers interpret and are influenced by a text. Experiments 1a/1b support this claim by showing that participants construe others' actions more concretely (vs. abstractly) when those actions are written from the first-person (vs. third-person) narrative perspective. Experiments 2a/2b build on this finding to show that people prefer concrete (vs. abstract) summary descriptions of short narrative stories that are written from the first-person (vs. third-person) narrative perspective. Experiment 3 tests the implications of this effect for persuasion, showing people were more motivated to donate blood when first-person (vs. third-person) donation testimonials were paired with concrete (vs. abstract) arguments for donating. Finally, Experiment 4 shows that narrative perspective influences identification with a character depending on the relatability of the character's experience. First-person (vs. third-person) narratives increase identification with characters, unless their experiences are too difficult to relate to. These findings provide insight into how narrative perspective influences people's understanding of a written text, as well as its subsequent influence on attitudes and behaviors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 November 2025
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 129 (5) , 773-787
He sees the forest, I see the trees: Narrative perspective shifts how abstractly people construe a text.
Humans tell stories to share information, evoke emotions, and change opinions. An inherent dimension of these stories is the narrative perspective from which they are told: Sometimes stories are told from a person's first-person narrative perspective (e.g., using I/me pronouns), whereas other times, they are told about the person using a third-person narrative perspective (e.g., using he/him, she/her, etc., pronouns). The current work tests the hypothesis that the first-person (vs. third-person) narrative perspective causes people to construe information more concretely (vs. abstractly), with downstream effects on how readers interpret and are influenced by a text. Experiments 1a/1b support this claim by showing that participants construe others' actions more concretely (vs. abstractly) when those actions are written from the first-person (vs. third-person) narrative perspective. Experiments 2a/2b build on this finding to show that people prefer concrete (vs. abstract) summary descriptions of short narrative stories that are written from the first-person (vs. third-person) narrative perspective. Experiment 3 tests the implications of this effect for persuasion, showing people were more motivated to donate blood when first-person (vs. third-person) donation testimonials were paired with concrete (vs. abstract) arguments for donating. Finally, Experiment 4 shows that narrative perspective influences identification with a character depending on the relatability of the character's experience. First-person (vs. third-person) narratives increase identification with characters, unless their experiences are too difficult to relate to. These findings provide insight into how narrative perspective influences people's understanding of a written text, as well as its subsequent influence on attitudes and behaviors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 17 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Cognitive Therapy and Research
- Vol. 50 (1) , 119-131
Looking Within: Visual Imagery Perspective Shifts Reliance on Internal States Versus Proxies
Background: Using an observer’s third-person visual perspective (rather than one’s own first-person perspective) prompts people to understand imagined events more in relation to their conceptual beliefs, rather than their experiential reactions. Similar to the thinking style evoked by third-person imagery, people high in obsessive-compulsive (OC) tendencies exhibit attenuated access to their directly-experienced internal states, prompting reliance on proxies. Given these similarities, the current work tests the connection between imagery perspective, OC tendencies, and reliance on proxies for internal states. Methods: Study 1 measured participants’ ( N = 292) OC tendencies and tendency to seek proxies for internal states. Participants also visualized simple actions and reported whether their mental imagery was more from the first-person or third-person perspective. Study 2 manipulated visual perspective as participants ( N = 295) imagined hypothetical scenarios. Participants reported the extent to which they would act in accordance with their internal state in each scenario versus the extent to which they would seek out proxies to verify the internal state. Results: More third-person imagery use was correlated with OC tendencies and the tendency to seek proxies for internal states in Study 1. Experimentally manipulating first-person (vs. third-person) imagery increased reliance on internal states and decreased reliance on proxies in Study 2, regardless of OC tendencies. Conclusions: We found that first-person (vs. third-person) imagery causes more reliance on internal states and less reliance on proxies for those states. This suggests a direction for developing and testing theoretically-driven interventions using first-person imagery to increase reliance on internal states among people with OC tendencies.
- 17 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Cognitive Therapy and Research
- Vol. 50 (1) , 119-131
Open AccessLooking Within: Visual Imagery Perspective Shifts Reliance on Internal States Versus Proxies
Background: Using an observer’s third-person visual perspective (rather than one’s own first-person perspective) prompts people to understand imagined events more in relation to their conceptual beliefs, rather than their experiential reactions. Similar to the thinking style evoked by third-person imagery, people high in obsessive-compulsive (OC) tendencies exhibit attenuated access to their directly-experienced internal states, prompting reliance on proxies. Given these similarities, the current work tests the connection between imagery perspective, OC tendencies, and reliance on proxies for internal states. Methods: Study 1 measured participants’ ( N = 292) OC tendencies and tendency to seek proxies for internal states. Participants also visualized simple actions and reported whether their mental imagery was more from the first-person or third-person perspective. Study 2 manipulated visual perspective as participants ( N = 295) imagined hypothetical scenarios. Participants reported the extent to which they would act in accordance with their internal state in each scenario versus the extent to which they would seek out proxies to verify the internal state. Results: More third-person imagery use was correlated with OC tendencies and the tendency to seek proxies for internal states in Study 1. Experimentally manipulating first-person (vs. third-person) imagery increased reliance on internal states and decreased reliance on proxies in Study 2, regardless of OC tendencies. Conclusions: We found that first-person (vs. third-person) imagery causes more reliance on internal states and less reliance on proxies for those states. This suggests a direction for developing and testing theoretically-driven interventions using first-person imagery to increase reliance on internal states among people with OC tendencies.
- Open Access
- 11 March 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Vol. 16 (6) , 697-705
Choosing What You Like or Liking What You Chose? Sampling’s Impact on Evaluation and the Role of Idiosyncratic Reactions to Valent Stimuli
Recent work incorporating autonomy into an evaluative conditioning procedure provided evidence of a sampling decision effect in which high-autonomy participants positively shifted their evaluations of frequently sampled conditioned stimuli (CSs), regardless of whether they were consistently paired with positive or negative unconditioned stimuli (USs). The current work modified this paradigm by also measuring participants’ evaluations of the sampled USs. Two experiments replicate the sampling decision effect for neutral CSs in a new variant of the paradigm while ruling out the alternative possibility that the effect is driven by idiosyncratic variance in participants’ reactions to the USs. In addition, Experiment 2 suggests that the sampling decision effect does not extend to the paired, valent stimuli. Together, these results further suggest that it is the act of sampling a stimulus more frequently that predicts a positive evaluative shift toward it.
- 11 March 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Vol. 16 (6) , 697-705
Open AccessChoosing What You Like or Liking What You Chose? Sampling’s Impact on Evaluation and the Role of Idiosyncratic Reactions to Valent Stimuli
Recent work incorporating autonomy into an evaluative conditioning procedure provided evidence of a sampling decision effect in which high-autonomy participants positively shifted their evaluations of frequently sampled conditioned stimuli (CSs), regardless of whether they were consistently paired with positive or negative unconditioned stimuli (USs). The current work modified this paradigm by also measuring participants’ evaluations of the sampled USs. Two experiments replicate the sampling decision effect for neutral CSs in a new variant of the paradigm while ruling out the alternative possibility that the effect is driven by idiosyncratic variance in participants’ reactions to the USs. In addition, Experiment 2 suggests that the sampling decision effect does not extend to the paired, valent stimuli. Together, these results further suggest that it is the act of sampling a stimulus more frequently that predicts a positive evaluative shift toward it.
- Open Access
- 27 April 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Vol. 15 (3) , 309-317
Picturing Your Life: The Role of Imagery Perspective in Personal Photos
When photographing moments in their lives, people can use a first-person (capturing the scene as they saw it) or third-person (capturing the scene with themselves in it) perspective. Past research suggests third-person (vs. first-person) images better depict the meaning (vs. physical experience) of events. The current work suggests the use and impact of perspective in personal photography follow this representational function. Across six studies ( N = 2,113), we find that the goal to capture meaning (vs. physical experience) causes people to be more likely to use third-person (vs. first-person) photos, that people are reminded more of the meaning (vs. physical experience) when viewing their own actual third-person (vs. first-person) photos, and that people like their photos better when the perspective matched (vs. mismatched) their goal for taking the photo. Discussion focuses on theoretical and practical implications of extending the representational function of imagery perspective to everyday uses of photographic imagery.
- 27 April 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Vol. 15 (3) , 309-317
Open AccessPicturing Your Life: The Role of Imagery Perspective in Personal Photos
When photographing moments in their lives, people can use a first-person (capturing the scene as they saw it) or third-person (capturing the scene with themselves in it) perspective. Past research suggests third-person (vs. first-person) images better depict the meaning (vs. physical experience) of events. The current work suggests the use and impact of perspective in personal photography follow this representational function. Across six studies ( N = 2,113), we find that the goal to capture meaning (vs. physical experience) causes people to be more likely to use third-person (vs. first-person) photos, that people are reminded more of the meaning (vs. physical experience) when viewing their own actual third-person (vs. first-person) photos, and that people like their photos better when the perspective matched (vs. mismatched) their goal for taking the photo. Discussion focuses on theoretical and practical implications of extending the representational function of imagery perspective to everyday uses of photographic imagery.
- 1 November 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 151 (11) , 2771-2787
It’s good and it’s bad: Sampling processes can generate decision-framing effects.
Framing a choice in terms of gains versus losses can have a dramatic impact on peoples' decisions, sometimes completely reversing their choices. This decision-framing effect is often assumed to stem from individuals' inherent motivational biases to react more strongly to negative information. However, more recent work suggests these decision biases can also stem from biases in the information samples based on which people make their decisions. Here, we test how biases in the frequency of information people have about each decision option can produce decision-framing effects via a sampling process. Specifically, we hypothesize that a gain versus loss framing determines whether people probe their memories for positive or negative information about each decision option. This can lead to inaccuracy if there are biases in the amount of information people have about each option. That is, when people have more information about one option, it is possible that they retrieve both more positive and more negative information about it, creating a bias to select it as being both more and less likely to result in success, depending on decision framing. Three experiments show that people's decisions are more accurate with a gain (vs. loss) framing when a high (vs. low) frequency option has a higher proportion of success; but decisions are less accurate with a gain (vs. loss) framing when the high frequency option has a lower proportion of success. The current results suggest that decision-framing effects do not necessarily indicate a motivational bias. Instead, sampling processes may underlie decision-framing effects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 November 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 151 (11) , 2771-2787
It’s good and it’s bad: Sampling processes can generate decision-framing effects.
Framing a choice in terms of gains versus losses can have a dramatic impact on peoples' decisions, sometimes completely reversing their choices. This decision-framing effect is often assumed to stem from individuals' inherent motivational biases to react more strongly to negative information. However, more recent work suggests these decision biases can also stem from biases in the information samples based on which people make their decisions. Here, we test how biases in the frequency of information people have about each decision option can produce decision-framing effects via a sampling process. Specifically, we hypothesize that a gain versus loss framing determines whether people probe their memories for positive or negative information about each decision option. This can lead to inaccuracy if there are biases in the amount of information people have about each option. That is, when people have more information about one option, it is possible that they retrieve both more positive and more negative information about it, creating a bias to select it as being both more and less likely to result in success, depending on decision framing. Three experiments show that people's decisions are more accurate with a gain (vs. loss) framing when a high (vs. low) frequency option has a higher proportion of success; but decisions are less accurate with a gain (vs. loss) framing when the high frequency option has a lower proportion of success. The current results suggest that decision-framing effects do not necessarily indicate a motivational bias. Instead, sampling processes may underlie decision-framing effects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 August 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 151 (8) , 1972-1998
Bridging the gap between autonomous and predetermined paradigms: The role of sampling in evaluative learning.
Whereas most evaluative learning paradigms remove participants' autonomy over the information they receive, other research traditions have demonstrated that information sampling has an important role in learning. We investigated the impact of information sampling on a central evaluative learning paradigm: evaluative conditioning. We compared a traditional evaluative conditioning paradigm with a paradigm in which participants have autonomy over the stimulus pairings they receive. Participants in the high-autonomy condition showed a strong preference for positively paired CSs. Nevertheless, the strength of evaluative conditioning effects was independent of autonomy. Moreover, high-autonomy participants, but not their low-autonomy counterparts, demonstrated a relationship between sampling frequency and evaluations, in line with the interpretation that sampled stimuli become more positive, whereas ignored stimuli become more negative over the course of the learning phase. The present research provides a cornerstone for integrating several research traditions within and beyond the evaluative learning literature, providing a foundation for new insights and more comprehensive theories of evaluative learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 August 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 151 (8) , 1972-1998
Bridging the gap between autonomous and predetermined paradigms: The role of sampling in evaluative learning.
Whereas most evaluative learning paradigms remove participants' autonomy over the information they receive, other research traditions have demonstrated that information sampling has an important role in learning. We investigated the impact of information sampling on a central evaluative learning paradigm: evaluative conditioning. We compared a traditional evaluative conditioning paradigm with a paradigm in which participants have autonomy over the stimulus pairings they receive. Participants in the high-autonomy condition showed a strong preference for positively paired CSs. Nevertheless, the strength of evaluative conditioning effects was independent of autonomy. Moreover, high-autonomy participants, but not their low-autonomy counterparts, demonstrated a relationship between sampling frequency and evaluations, in line with the interpretation that sampled stimuli become more positive, whereas ignored stimuli become more negative over the course of the learning phase. The present research provides a cornerstone for integrating several research traditions within and beyond the evaluative learning literature, providing a foundation for new insights and more comprehensive theories of evaluative learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 September 2021
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 121 (3) , 447-473
When the going gets tough, the committed get going: Preexisting goal commitment determines the consequences of experiencing regulatory nonfit.
A body of empirical research shows that pursuing goals via means that do not fit (vs. do fit) one's regulatory mode creates resistance that disrupts motivation. However, other empirical research shows that resistance sometimes motivates people to work harder toward their goals, suggesting that regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) might be more motivating at times. The current research tests this possibility while also demonstrating how an integral dimension of a goal-a person's preexisting commitment to it-determines when regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) is more motivating. Three initial studies provide evidence that, among people low in preexisting commitment, regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) demotivates people: goal value and intentions to pursue the goal become lower with nonfit (vs. fit). However, among people high in preexisting commitment, regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) motivates people: goal value and intentions to pursue the goal become higher with nonfit (vs. fit). Three additional studies document an experimental causal chain providing evidence for underlying mechanisms: regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) creates an experience of resistance that people need to interpret, and preexisting commitment shifts whether people interpret resistance as a negative or positive motivational signal. Finally, two studies demonstrate how naturally occurring variance in preexisting goal commitment moderates the effect of experiencing regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) on people's subsequent goal-directed behavior. By identifying an integral dimension of goals that can reverse the motivational effects of regulatory nonfit, the present research connects with other work documenting the importance of mindsets about resistance, and suggests novel implications for motivating desired behaviors.
- 1 September 2021
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 121 (3) , 447-473
When the going gets tough, the committed get going: Preexisting goal commitment determines the consequences of experiencing regulatory nonfit.
A body of empirical research shows that pursuing goals via means that do not fit (vs. do fit) one's regulatory mode creates resistance that disrupts motivation. However, other empirical research shows that resistance sometimes motivates people to work harder toward their goals, suggesting that regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) might be more motivating at times. The current research tests this possibility while also demonstrating how an integral dimension of a goal-a person's preexisting commitment to it-determines when regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) is more motivating. Three initial studies provide evidence that, among people low in preexisting commitment, regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) demotivates people: goal value and intentions to pursue the goal become lower with nonfit (vs. fit). However, among people high in preexisting commitment, regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) motivates people: goal value and intentions to pursue the goal become higher with nonfit (vs. fit). Three additional studies document an experimental causal chain providing evidence for underlying mechanisms: regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) creates an experience of resistance that people need to interpret, and preexisting commitment shifts whether people interpret resistance as a negative or positive motivational signal. Finally, two studies demonstrate how naturally occurring variance in preexisting goal commitment moderates the effect of experiencing regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) on people's subsequent goal-directed behavior. By identifying an integral dimension of goals that can reverse the motivational effects of regulatory nonfit, the present research connects with other work documenting the importance of mindsets about resistance, and suggests novel implications for motivating desired behaviors.