Bezalel Peleg
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Bezalel Peleg has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hans Peters
Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
13 shared publications - Hans Peters
University of Maastricht
3 shared publications - Peter Sudhölter
Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
3 shared publications - Ton Storcken
Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, Maastricht, The Netherlands
2 shared publications - Ariel D. Procaccia
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
1 shared publication - Eyal Winter
Management School Department of Economics Lancaster University The Hebrew University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey
We survey the results on representations of committees and constitutions by game forms that possess some kind of equilibrium strategies for each profile of preferences of the players. The survey is restricted to discrete models, that is, we deal with finitely many players and alternatives. No prior knowledge of social choice is assumed: As far as definitions are concerned, the paper is self-contained. Section 2 supplies the necessary general tools for the rest of the paper. Each definition is followed by a simple (but nontrivial) example. In Section 3 we give a complete account of representations of committees (proper and monotonic simple games), by exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions. We start with Peleg’s representations of weak games, and then provide a complete and detailed account of Holzman’s solution of the representation problem for simple games without veto players. In Section 4 we deal with representations of constitutions by game forms. Following Gärdenfors we model a constitution by a monotonic and superadditive effectivity function. We fully characterize the representations for three kinds of equilibrium: Nash equilibrium; acceptable equilibrium (Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium); and strong Nash equilibrium. We conclude in Section 5 with a report on two recent works on representations of constitutions under incomplete information.
Open AccessRepresentations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey
We survey the results on representations of committees and constitutions by game forms that possess some kind of equilibrium strategies for each profile of preferences of the players. The survey is restricted to discrete models, that is, we deal with finitely many players and alternatives. No prior knowledge of social choice is assumed: As far as definitions are concerned, the paper is self-contained. Section 2 supplies the necessary general tools for the rest of the paper. Each definition is followed by a simple (but nontrivial) example. In Section 3 we give a complete account of representations of committees (proper and monotonic simple games), by exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions. We start with Peleg’s representations of weak games, and then provide a complete and detailed account of Holzman’s solution of the representation problem for simple games without veto players. In Section 4 we deal with representations of constitutions by game forms. Following Gärdenfors we model a constitution by a monotonic and superadditive effectivity function. We fully characterize the representations for three kinds of equilibrium: Nash equilibrium; acceptable equilibrium (Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium); and strong Nash equilibrium. We conclude in Section 5 with a report on two recent works on representations of constitutions under incomplete information.
- 1 May 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 103, 254-261
Choosing k from m : Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
- 1 May 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 103, 254-261
Choosing k from m : Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 71 (1) , 43-50
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 71 (1) , 43-50
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 57 (2) , 279-302
Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 57 (2) , 279-302
Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
- 10 April 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 39 (1) , 91-125
Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury
- 10 April 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 39 (1) , 91-125
Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury
- Open Access
- 24 February 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 3 (1-2) , 143-156
On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of two-person NTU games
- 24 February 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 3 (1-2) , 143-156
Open AccessOn the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of two-person NTU games
- 6 July 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 105-112
Feasible elimination procedures
- 6 July 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 97-103
Introduction to Part II
- 6 July 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 81-94
On the continuity of representations of constitutions
- 6 July 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 81-94
On the continuity of representations of constitutions
- 6 July 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 67-79
Nash consistent representation through lottery models
- 6 July 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 67-79
Nash consistent representation through lottery models