CZCheng Zeng

Cheng Zeng

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Cheng Zeng has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Inequality Grows in Silence: The Impact of Newspaper Closures on CEO-Worker Pay Disparity

    by Jie Chen, Yang Gao, Cheng Zeng

    Addressing income inequality is crucial for ensuring equitable and prosperous societies. This study examines the impact of the local press on intrafirm pay disparity. By using recently mandated disclosures of CEO-worker pay ratios and analyzing the staggered shutdown of local newspapers, we find that within-firm pay disparity increases by 8.2 percent following local newspaper closures. Further analysis suggests that this post-closure increase in pay disparity ratio is unlikely to be driven by either CEO compensation or worker pay alone or underlying economic conditions but instead reflects reduced concerns over reputational damage. Overall, our findings are consistent with local newspapers’ playing an important role in disseminating CEO-worker pay ratios and amplifying their reputational effects, thereby shaping and monitoring within-firm pay disparity. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: G38; J31; M12; L82.

  • Open Access

    Trick or Treat? The Impact of Employment Protection Laws (EPLs) on Employee Welfare

    by Prince Charles Adubofour, Qiang Wu, Cheng Zeng, Zhengyi Zhang

    How would employers treat their employees when terminating employment became more difficult? To investigate this question, we exploit changes in employment protection laws (EPLs) across 37 countries and examine the impact of these laws on employee welfare. We find that employee welfare improves following the implementation of more stringent EPLs, suggesting that enhanced stringency of employment protection incentivizes employers to pay closer attention to the welfare of their incumbent employees to elicit greater employee effort and commitment. Further tests show that EPLs improve employee compensation, encourage the provision of high-quality employment benefits, and reduce employee turnover. The positive effects of EPLs on employee welfare are more pronounced in labor-intensive industries and in developing economies. Finally, we show that improvements in employee welfare enhance both firm value and productivity.

  • Open Access

    Political Promotion of Predecessor CEOs and Financial Reporting Fraud: Evidence from China

    by Yi Zhang, Ning Gao, Cheng Zeng

    This paper investigates the impact of political promotions of predecessor CEOs on financial reporting fraud in Chinese state-owned enterprises. We hypothesize that such promotions discourage fraudulent behavior by serving as role models for successors, fostering indirect accountability through shared reputational stakes, and increasing external scrutiny due to the ongoing associations with politically elevated predecessors. Using a manually collected dataset of CEO promotion paths, we find that the political promotion of predecessor CEOs significantly reduces the likelihood of financial reporting fraud within firms. This effect is more pronounced when successor CEOs have stronger promotion prospects and when firms face heightened public scrutiny. Our findings offer novel insights into how predecessors' career outcomes can mitigate agency conflicts and reduce corporate fraud.

  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Cross-Border Impact of the ESG Disclosure Mandate: Evidence from Foreign Government Procurement Contracts

    by Yongtae Kim, Chengzhu Sun, Yi Xiang, Cheng Zeng

    This study examines whether and how mandating environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure affects firms’ competitiveness for foreign government procurement contracts. Exploiting staggered enactment of ESG disclosure mandates across countries, we find that firms attain more and larger contracts from foreign governments after their home countries mandate ESG disclosure. We show that the ESG disclosure mandate affects the global allocation of government procurements through two channels: increased transparency of ESG information and enhanced ESG performance. The mandate’s effect is more pronounced when government customers are more conscious of ESG, when the procurement process has ESG-related requirements, when government customers have a larger pool of potential suppliers, when the mandate is more strictly enforced, and when bidders significantly improve their ESG transparency following the mandate. Overall, our findings provide novel insight into the cross-border impact of mandatory ESG disclosure. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: G14; G15; K22; M14; M41; M48.


  • Open Access

    Trick or Treat? The Impact of Employment Protection Laws(EPLs) on Employee Welfare

    by Prince Charles Adubofour, Qiang Wu, Cheng Zeng, Zhengyi Zhang

    How would employers treat their employees if terminating employment became more difficult? To investigate this question, we exploit changes in employment protection laws (EPLs) across 37 countries and examine the impact of these laws on employee welfare. We find that employee welfare improves following the implementation of more stringent EPLs, suggesting that enhanced stringency of employment protection incentivizes employers to pay closer attention to the welfare of their incumbent employees to elicit greater employee effort and commitment. Further tests show that EPLs improve employee compensation, provide high-quality employment benefits, and reduce employee turnover. The positive effects of EPLs on employee welfare are more pronounced in labor-intensive and competitive industries, countries characterized by lower levels of unionization, and developing economies. Finally, we show that improvements in employee welfare enhance both firm value and productivity.

  • Open Access

    Government subsidies and income smoothing

    by Kostas Pappas, Martin Walker, Alice Liang Xu, Cheng (Colin) Zeng

    This study examines the relationship between government subsidies and income smoothing using a sample of US‐listed firms. We find that subsidized firms smooth their earnings more aggressively than their unsubsidized peers. This finding is consistent with the reasoning that subsidized firms bear higher political costs and have more incentives to smooth earnings to avoid public attention. In addition, smoothing by subsidized firms is more pronounced when the subsidies are granted through non‐tax‐related channels than through tax‐based channels, and the positive association between government subsidies and income smoothing is stronger for firms under higher public scrutiny and with less transparent information environments. Further analysis shows that smoothing by subsidized firms serves mainly to obfuscate earnings and that subsidized firms that smooth earnings tend to continue receiving subsidies in the future. Overall, our results help explain the role of government subsidies in shaping firms' accounting and disclosure choices.


  • Open Access

    Does Public Firms’ Mandatory IFRS Reporting Crowd Out Private Firms’ Capital Investment?

    by Jiancheng (Duncan) Liu, Wei Shi, Cheng Zeng, Guochang Zhang

    We investigate how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by publicly listed firms in the European Union affects peer private firms. We find that private firms’ capital investment decreases significantly after the IFRS mandate, relative to public firms. Private firms also display decreased investment when benchmarked against firms relatively insulated from the impact of the IFRS mandate, but the magnitude of the effect is smaller in this case. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory IFRS reporting (combined with other reforms), while increasing public firms’ financing and investment, crowds out funding for private firms. The effect is more pronounced for larger private firms and in industries where public peers have greater external financing needs. Our evidence suggests that financial reporting regulations cause shifts in resource allocation in an economy.