Chengzhu Sun
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Chengzhu Sun has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Francois Brochet
Boston University
2 shared publications Thomas Bourveau
Columbia University
2 shared publications- Yi Xiang
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
2 shared publications - Yongtae Kim
Santa Clara University
2 shared publications Cheng (Colin) Zeng
Hong Kong Polytechnic University
1 shared publication- Cheng Zeng
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Corporate Environmental Policies
We examine whether legal protection for civic participation affects corporate pollution. Polluters may deter public discipline through strategic lawsuits. Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statutes mitigate this threat by enabling prompt dismissal and recovery of legal costs. Using a difference-indifferences design, we find that enacting an anti-SLAPP statute in a state significantly reduces toxic emissions from that state by increasing local public pressure. The reduction is greater when the statutes provide stronger protection, when local stakeholders have stronger incentives and abilities to discipline polluters, and when local public pressure increases more after the enactment. Plants lower emissions by improving abatement rather than by reducing output or relocating emissions. Our paper underscores the role of legal protection in environmental governance and informs policy debates over anti-SLAPP legislation.
- 8 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Corporate Environmental Policies
We examine whether legal protection for civic participation affects corporate pollution. Polluters may deter public discipline through strategic lawsuits. Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statutes mitigate this threat by enabling prompt dismissal and recovery of legal costs. Using a difference-indifferences design, we find that enacting an anti-SLAPP statute in a state significantly reduces toxic emissions from that state by increasing local public pressure. The reduction is greater when the statutes provide stronger protection, when local stakeholders have stronger incentives and abilities to discipline polluters, and when local public pressure increases more after the enactment. Plants lower emissions by improving abatement rather than by reducing output or relocating emissions. Our paper underscores the role of legal protection in environmental governance and informs policy debates over anti-SLAPP legislation.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 April 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- p. 1-32
Cross-Border Impact of the ESG Disclosure Mandate: Evidence from Foreign Government Procurement Contracts
This study examines whether and how mandating environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure affects firms’ competitiveness for foreign government procurement contracts. Exploiting staggered enactment of ESG disclosure mandates across countries, we find that firms attain more and larger contracts from foreign governments after their home countries mandate ESG disclosure. We show that the ESG disclosure mandate affects the global allocation of government procurements through two channels: increased transparency of ESG information and enhanced ESG performance. The mandate’s effect is more pronounced when government customers are more conscious of ESG, when the procurement process has ESG-related requirements, when government customers have a larger pool of potential suppliers, when the mandate is more strictly enforced, and when bidders significantly improve their ESG transparency following the mandate. Overall, our findings provide novel insight into the cross-border impact of mandatory ESG disclosure. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: G14; G15; K22; M14; M41; M48.
- 1 April 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- p. 1-32
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessCross-Border Impact of the ESG Disclosure Mandate: Evidence from Foreign Government Procurement Contracts
This study examines whether and how mandating environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure affects firms’ competitiveness for foreign government procurement contracts. Exploiting staggered enactment of ESG disclosure mandates across countries, we find that firms attain more and larger contracts from foreign governments after their home countries mandate ESG disclosure. We show that the ESG disclosure mandate affects the global allocation of government procurements through two channels: increased transparency of ESG information and enhanced ESG performance. The mandate’s effect is more pronounced when government customers are more conscious of ESG, when the procurement process has ESG-related requirements, when government customers have a larger pool of potential suppliers, when the mandate is more strictly enforced, and when bidders significantly improve their ESG transparency following the mandate. Overall, our findings provide novel insight into the cross-border impact of mandatory ESG disclosure. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: G14; G15; K22; M14; M41; M48.
- Open Access
- 15 June 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (4) , 83-110
Say on Pay Laws and Insider Trading
We examine whether mandatory adoption of say on pay increases executives’ incentives to engage in insider trading to compensate for the negative impact of say on pay on the value of their explicit compensation packages. Our empirical design exploits the staggered adoption of say on pay laws across 14 countries over the 2000–2015 period. We find that mandatory adoption is associated with a material increase in insider trading profits, especially in firms where executive pay is most affected. The increase in insider trading profits is driven mostly by more frequent and larger profitable insider sales, consistent with executives’ desire to reduce their greater exposure to firm-specific risk while increasing their trading profits. Overall, our results highlight the importance of considering potential effects on insider trading incentives when designing compensation reforms and when assessing their effectiveness. Data Availability: All data used in the paper are available from cited public sources. JEL Classifications: G30; G34; G38; J33; K22; M12; M16.
- 15 June 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (4) , 83-110
Open AccessSay on Pay Laws and Insider Trading
We examine whether mandatory adoption of say on pay increases executives’ incentives to engage in insider trading to compensate for the negative impact of say on pay on the value of their explicit compensation packages. Our empirical design exploits the staggered adoption of say on pay laws across 14 countries over the 2000–2015 period. We find that mandatory adoption is associated with a material increase in insider trading profits, especially in firms where executive pay is most affected. The increase in insider trading profits is driven mostly by more frequent and larger profitable insider sales, consistent with executives’ desire to reduce their greater exposure to firm-specific risk while increasing their trading profits. Overall, our results highlight the importance of considering potential effects on insider trading incentives when designing compensation reforms and when assessing their effectiveness. Data Availability: All data used in the paper are available from cited public sources. JEL Classifications: G30; G34; G38; J33; K22; M12; M16.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Cross-border Impact of the ESG Disclosure Mandate: Evidence from Foreign Government Procurement Contracts
This study examines whether and how mandating environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure affects firms’ competitiveness for foreign government procurement contracts. Exploiting staggered enactment of ESG disclosure mandates across countries, we find that firms attain more and larger contracts from foreign governments after their home countries mandate ESG disclosure. We show that the ESG disclosure mandate affects the global allocation of government procurements through two channels: increased transparency of ESG information and enhanced ESG performance. The mandate’s effect is more pronounced when government customers are more conscious of ESG, when the procurement process has ESG-related requirements, when government customers have a larger pool of potential suppliers, when the mandate is more strictly enforced, and when bidders significantly improve their ESG transparency following the mandate. Overall, our findings provide novel insight into the cross-border impact of mandatory ESG disclosure.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCross-border Impact of the ESG Disclosure Mandate: Evidence from Foreign Government Procurement Contracts
This study examines whether and how mandating environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure affects firms’ competitiveness for foreign government procurement contracts. Exploiting staggered enactment of ESG disclosure mandates across countries, we find that firms attain more and larger contracts from foreign governments after their home countries mandate ESG disclosure. We show that the ESG disclosure mandate affects the global allocation of government procurements through two channels: increased transparency of ESG information and enhanced ESG performance. The mandate’s effect is more pronounced when government customers are more conscious of ESG, when the procurement process has ESG-related requirements, when government customers have a larger pool of potential suppliers, when the mandate is more strictly enforced, and when bidders significantly improve their ESG transparency following the mandate. Overall, our findings provide novel insight into the cross-border impact of mandatory ESG disclosure.
- Open Access
- 20 September 2023
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 40 (4) , 2616-2642
Mutual funds' reporting frequency and firms' responses to undervaluation: The role of share repurchases
We examine a regulatory change that increased the reporting frequency of mutual funds' portfolios. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that firms with greater ownership by mutual funds increase share repurchases following the regulatory change. We show that these share repurchases are a firm's rational response to undervaluation, which occurs because fund managers become shortsighted following the regulation and sell companies with good long‐term prospects. Collectively, our results shed light on an unintended consequence of more frequent reporting in a delegated asset management framework.
- 20 September 2023
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 40 (4) , 2616-2642
Open AccessMutual funds' reporting frequency and firms' responses to undervaluation: The role of share repurchases
We examine a regulatory change that increased the reporting frequency of mutual funds' portfolios. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that firms with greater ownership by mutual funds increase share repurchases following the regulatory change. We show that these share repurchases are a firm's rational response to undervaluation, which occurs because fund managers become shortsighted following the regulation and sell companies with good long‐term prospects. Collectively, our results shed light on an unintended consequence of more frequent reporting in a delegated asset management framework.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Real Effect of Local Media on Firms’ Environmental Responsibility: Evidence from Toxic Emissions
This paper examines the impact of local media coverage on firm’s environmental performance using the closures of local newspapers as staggered shocks to local media coverage. I find that firm plants located in areas with reduced local media coverage significantly increase toxic emissions to save production costs. The effect is stronger when the firm owning the plant directly sells goods to end consumers or mainly serves local customers, and when managers exhibit greater short-termism. This effect is weaker when firm plants are monitored by other pro-environmental activists. Collectively my findings suggest that local media play an important role in forcing firms to be environmentally responsible, partly by raising customers’ environmental awareness and by restricting managerial myopia.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Real Effect of Local Media on Firms’ Environmental Responsibility: Evidence from Toxic Emissions
This paper examines the impact of local media coverage on firm’s environmental performance using the closures of local newspapers as staggered shocks to local media coverage. I find that firm plants located in areas with reduced local media coverage significantly increase toxic emissions to save production costs. The effect is stronger when the firm owning the plant directly sells goods to end consumers or mainly serves local customers, and when managers exhibit greater short-termism. This effect is weaker when firm plants are monitored by other pro-environmental activists. Collectively my findings suggest that local media play an important role in forcing firms to be environmentally responsible, partly by raising customers’ environmental awareness and by restricting managerial myopia.
- Open Access
- 11 October 2021
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Say on Pay Laws and Insider Trading
We examine whether mandatory adoption of say on pay increases executives’ incentives to engage in insider trading to compensate for the negative impact of say on pay on the value of their explicit compensation packages. Our empirical design exploits the staggered adoption of say on pay laws across 14 countries over the 2000-2015 period. We find that mandatory adoption of say on pay is associated with a material increase in insider trading profits, especially in firms where executive pay is most affected by say on pay. The increase in insider trading profits is driven mostly by more frequent and larger profitable insider sales, consistent with executives’ desire to reduce their greater exposure to firm-specific risk while increasing their trading profits. Overall, our results highlight the importance of considering potential effects on insider trading incentives when designing compensation reforms and when assessing their effectiveness.
- 11 October 2021
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessSay on Pay Laws and Insider Trading
We examine whether mandatory adoption of say on pay increases executives’ incentives to engage in insider trading to compensate for the negative impact of say on pay on the value of their explicit compensation packages. Our empirical design exploits the staggered adoption of say on pay laws across 14 countries over the 2000-2015 period. We find that mandatory adoption of say on pay is associated with a material increase in insider trading profits, especially in firms where executive pay is most affected by say on pay. The increase in insider trading profits is driven mostly by more frequent and larger profitable insider sales, consistent with executives’ desire to reduce their greater exposure to firm-specific risk while increasing their trading profits. Overall, our results highlight the importance of considering potential effects on insider trading incentives when designing compensation reforms and when assessing their effectiveness.