TZTianfang Zhang

Tianfang Zhang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Tianfang Zhang has a total of 37 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Exploring Cross-Environment modeling and Robustness in Palm-based User Authentication using mmWave Testbed

    by Yucheng Xie, Xiaonan Guo, Yan Wang, Jerry Cheng, Tianfang Zhang, Yingying Chen, Yuan Ge, Yi Wei

  • Open Access

    Passive Vital Sign Monitoring via Facial Vibrations Extracted from AR/VR Vibration Sensing Based Testbed

    by Tianfang Zhang, Cong Shi, Payton Walker, Zhengkun Ye, Yan Wang, Nitesh Saxena, Yingying Chen

  • Open Access

    Harnessing Vital Sign Vibration Harmonics for Effortless and Inbuilt XR User Authentication

    by Tianfang Zhang, Qiufan Ji, Mojibur Rahman Redoy Akanda, Zhengkun Ye, Ahmed Tanvir Mahdad, Cong Shi, Yan Wang, Nitesh Saxena, Yingying Chen


  • Open Access

    SAFARI: Speech-Associated Facial Authentication for AR/VR Settings via Robust VIbration Signatures

    by Tianfang Zhang, Qiufan Ji, Zhengkun Ye, Mojibur Rahman Redoy Akanda, Ahmed Tanvir Mahdad, Cong Shi, Yan Wang, Nitesh Saxena, Yingying Chen

    In AR/VR devices, the voice interface, serving as one of the primary AR/VR control mechanisms, enables users to interact naturally using speeches (voice commands) for accessing data, controlling applications, and engaging in remote communication/meetings. Voice authentication can be adopted to protect against unauthorized speech inputs. However, existing voice authentication mechanisms are usually susceptible to voice spoofing attacks and are unreliable under the variations of phonetic content. In this work, we propose SAFARI, a spoofing-resistant and text-independent speech authentication system that can be seamlessly integrated into AR/VR voice interfaces. The key idea is to elicit phonetic-invariant biometrics from the facial muscle vibrations upon the headset. During speech production, a user's facial muscles are deformed for articulating phoneme sounds. The facial deformations associated with the phonemes are referred to as visemes. They carry rich biometrics of the wearer's muscles, tissue, and bones, which can propagate through the head and vibrate the headset. SAFARI aims to derive reliable facial biometrics from the viseme-associated facial vibrations captured by the AR/VR motion sensors. Particularly, it identifies the vibration data segments that contain rich viseme patterns (prominent visemes) less susceptible to phonetic variations. Based on the prominent visemes, SAFARI learns on the correlations among facial vibrations of different frequencies to extract biometric representations invariant to the phonetic context. The key advantages of SAFARI are that it is suitable for commodity AR/VR headsets (no additional sensors) and is resistant to voice spoofing attacks as the conductive property of the facial vibrations prevents biometric disclosure via the air media or the audio channel. To mitigate the impacts of body motions in AR/VR scenarios, we also design a generative diffusion model trained to reconstruct the viseme patterns from the data distorted by motion artifacts. We conduct extensive experiments with two representative AR/VR headsets and 35 users under various usage and attack settings. We demonstrate that SAFARI can achieve over 96% true positive rate on verifying legitimate users while successfully rejecting different kinds of spoofing attacks with over 97% true negative rates.


  • Clean and Compact: Efficient Data-Free Backdoor Defense with Model Compactness

    by Huy Phan, Jinqi Xiao, Yang Sui, Tianfang Zhang, Zijie Tang, Cong Shi, Yan Wang, Yingying Chen, Bo Yuan


  • Open Access

    Inaudible Backdoor Attack via Stealthy Frequency Trigger Injection in Audio Spectrogram

    by Tianfang Zhang, Huy Phan, Zijie Tang, Cong Shi, Yan Wang, Bo Yuan, Yingying Chen

    Deep learning-enabled Voice User Interfaces (VUIs) have surpassed human-level performance in acoustic perception tasks. However, the significant cost associated with training these models compels users to rely on third-party data or outsource training services. Such emerging trends have drawn substantial attention to training-phase attacks, particularly backdoor attacks. Such attacks implant hidden trigger patterns (e.g., tones, environmental sounds) into the model during training, thereby manipulating the model's predictions in the inference phase. However, existing backdoor attacks can be easily undermined in practice as the inserted triggers are audible. Users may notice such attacks when listening to the training data and remaining alert for suspicious sounds. In this work, we present a novel audio backdoor attack that exploits completely inaudible triggers in the frequency domain of the audio spectrograms. Specifically, we optimize the trigger to be a frequency-domain pattern with the energy below the noise floor (e.g., background and hardware noises) at any given frequency, thereby rendering the trigger inaudible. To realize such attacks, we design a strategy that automatically generates inaudible triggers in the spectrum supported by commodity playback devices (e.g., smartphones and laptops). We further develop optimization techniques to enhance the trigger's robustness against speech content and onset variations. Experiments on hotword and speaker recognition indicate that our attack can achieve attack success rates of more than 98.2% and 81.0% under digital and physical attack scenarios. The results also demonstrate the trigger's inaudibility with a Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) less than -3.54 dB against background noises. We further verify that our attack can successfully bypass state-of-the-art backdoor defense strategies based on learning and audio processing.


  • RF Domain Backdoor Attack on Signal Classification via Stealthy Trigger

    by Zijie Tang, Tianming Zhao, Tianfang Zhang, Huy Phan, Yan Wang, Cong Shi, Bo Yuan, Yingying Chen

    Deep learning (DL) has recently become a key technology supporting radio frequency (RF) signal classification applications. Given the heavy DL training requirement, adopting outsourced training is a practical option for RF application developers. However, the outsourcing process exposes a security vulnerability that enables a backdoor attack. While backdoor attacks have been explored in the vision domain, it is rarely explored in the RF domain. In this work, we present a stealthy backdoor attack that targets DL-based RF signal classification. To realize such an attack, we extensively explore the characteristics of the RF data in different applications, which include RF modulation classification and RF fingerprint-based device identification. Then, we design a training-based backdoor trigger generation approach with different optimization procedures for two backdoor attack scenarios (i.e., poison-label and clean-label). Extensive experiments on two RF signal classification datasets show that the attack success rate is over 99.2%, while its classification accuracy for the clean data remains high (i.e., less than a 0.6% drop compared to the clean model). The low NMSE (less than 0.091) indicates the stealthiness of the attack. Additionally, we demonstrate that our attack can bypass existing defense strategies, such as Neural Cleanse and STRIP.


  • Open Access

    FaceReader: Unobtrusively Mining Vital Signs and Vital Sign Embedded Sensitive Info via AR/VR Motion Sensors

    by Tianfang Zhang, Zhengkun Ye, Ahmed Tanvir Mahdad, Mojibur Rahman Redoy Akanda, Cong Shi, Yan Wang, Nitesh Saxena, Yingying Chen

    The market size of augmented reality and virtual reality (AR/VR) has been expanding rapidly in recent years, with the use of face-mounted headsets extending beyond gaming to various application sectors, such as education, healthcare, and the military. Despite the rapid growth, the understanding of information leakage through sensor-rich headsets remains in its infancy. Some of the headset's built-in sensors do not require users' permission to access, and any apps and websites can acquire their readings. While theseunrestricted sensors are generally considered free of privacy risks, we find that an adversary could uncover private information by scrutinizing sensor readings, making existing AR/VR apps and websites potential eavesdroppers. In this work, we investigate a novel, unobtrusive privacy attack called FaceReader, which reconstructs high-quality vital sign signals (breathing and heartbeat patterns) based on unrestricted AR/VR motion sensors. FaceReader is built on the key insight that the headset is closely mounted on the user's face, allowing the motion sensors to detect subtle facial vibrations produced by users' breathing and heartbeats. Based on the reconstructed vital signs, we further investigate three more advanced attacks, including gender recognition, user re-identification, and body fat ratio estimation. Such attacks pose severe privacy concerns, as an adversary may obtain users' sensitive demographic/physiological traits and potentially uncover their real-world identities. Compared to prior privacy attacks relying on speeches and activities, FaceReader targets spontaneous breathing and heartbeat activities that are naturally produced by the human body and are unobtrusive to victims. In particular, we design an adaptive filter to dynamically mitigate the impacts of body motions. We further employ advanced deep-learning techniques to reconstruct vital sign signals, achieving signal qualities comparable to those of dedicated medical instruments, as well as deriving sensitive gender, identity, and body fat information. We conduct extensive experiments involving 35 users on three types of mainstream AR/VR headsets across 3 months. The results reveal that FaceReader can reconstruct vital signs with low mean errors and accurately detect gender (over 93.33%). The attack can also link/re-identify users across different apps, websites, and longitudinal sessions with over 97.83% accuracy. Furthermore, we present the first successful attempt at revealing body fat information from motion sensor data, achieving a remarkably low estimation error of 4.43%.


  • Open Access

    Privacy Leakage via Speech-induced Vibrations on Room Objects through Remote Sensing based on Phased-MIMO

    by Cong Shi, Tianfang Zhang, Zhaoyi Xu, Shuping Li, Donglin Gao, Changming Li, Athina Petropulu, Chung-Tse Michael Wu, Yingying Chen

    Speech eavesdropping has long been an important threat to the privacy of individuals and enterprises. Recent research has shown the possibility of deriving private speech information from sound-induced vibrations. Acoustic signals transmitted through a solid medium or air may induce vibrations upon solid surfaces, which can be picked up by various sensors (e.g., motion sensors, high-speed cameras and lasers), without using a microphone. To date, these threats are limited to scenarios where the sensor is in contact with the vibration surface or at least in the visual line-of-sight. In this paper, we revisit this important line of research and show that a remote, long-distance, and even thru-the-wall speech eavesdropping attack is possible. We discover a new form of speech eavesdropping attack that remotely elicits speech from minute surface vibrations upon common room objects (e.g., paper bags, plastic storage bin) via mmWave sensing, signal processing, and advanced deep learning techniques. While mmWave signals have high sensitivity for vibrations, they have limited sensing distance and normally do not penetrate through walls. We overcome this key challenge through designing and implementing a high-resolution software-defined phased-MIMO radar that integrates transmit beamforming, virtual array, and receive beamforming. The proposed system enhances sensing directivity by focusing all the mmWave beams toward a target room object, allowing mmWave signals to pick up minute speech-induced vibrations from a long distance and even through walls. To realize the attack, we design an object identification technique that scans objects in a room and identifies a prominent object that is most sensitive to speech vibrations for vibration feature extraction. We successfully demonstrate speech privacy leakage using speech-induced vibrations via the development of a deep learning framework. Our framework can leverage domain adaptation techniques to infer speech content based only on the unlabeled vibration data of a victim. We validate the proof-of-concept attack on digit recognition through extensive experiments, involving 40 speakers, five common room objects, and attack scenarios with mmWave devices inside and outside the room. Our phased-MIMO-based attack can achieve success rates of 88% ~ 98% and 64% ~ 86% with and without using speech labels for training. The success rates are 81% ~ 94% and 58% ~ 74% for thru-the-wall attacks. Furthermore, we discuss possible defense methods to mitigate this unprecedented security threat.


  • Open Access

    Poster: Extracting Speech from Subtle Room Object Vibrations Using Remote mmWave Sensing

    by Cong Shi, Tianfang Zhang, Zhaoyi Xu, Shuping Li, Donglin Gao, Changming Li, Athina Petropulu, Chung-Tse Michael Wu, Yingying Chen