LPLudovic Phalippou

Ludovic Phalippou

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Ludovic Phalippou has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Artificial Intelligence as a Source of Risk in Asset Management

    by Ludovic Phalippou

    Artificial Intelligence promises investors more information as it can read more documents and process more text than any professional. This paper argues the opposite might happen. Once AI outputs matter for investment decisions, the parties being measured learn what the machine rewards and write for it, trading a heterogeneous set of human readers for one predictable target. Automation strips away the dispersed, skeptical, though bounded, scrutiny that once made this harder to get away with, leaving investors with more data and less knowledge. We call this technological epistemic risk, related to but distinct from statistical model risk: the model is not wrong, but its deployment changes what it reads. The paper derives one practical rule: rank extracted signals by both how costly they are to fake and how well they have predicted outcomes, trusting only signals that score high on both.

  • Open Access

    Private Assets in 401(k) Plans: Fiduciary Standards, Performance Measurement, and Investor Protection

    by Ludovic Phalippou

    The U.S. Department of Labor has proposed a rule clarifying when ERISA fiduciaries may prudently include private-market products in participant-directed retirement plans (RIN 1210-AC38). This paper argues that the proposed safe harbor, while correct in principle, requires substantial revision before it can be considered credible. Asset neutrality should not mean metric neutrality, disclosure neutrality, or governance neutrality. The core argument is that private-market products currently use internal rate of return (IRR) as their dominant performance metric, even though IRR is not a measure of investor wealth compounding and cannot be compared to publicmarket time-weighted returns. This paper documents the economic absurdity of treating sinceinception IRRs literally, using KKR and Apollo as case studies, and argues that any safe harbor permitting private assets into 401(k) plans must prohibit IRR as a performance metric. The paper further argues for six specific revisions: requiring cash-flow-based PME analysis with ex ante benchmark selection; mandating total-cost fee disclosure comparable to a mutual fund expense ratio; strengthening NAV safeguards for products where NAV is used for subscriptions, redemptions, or fee calculations; requiring stress-based liquidity evaluation; and clarifying that adviser reliance does not by itself establish fiduciary prudence. The paper concludes that clear exante standards would reduce litigation more durably than broad process deference, because they would prevent the product-design failures that generate disputes in the first place.

  • Open Access

    Leveraged Buy-Out Algebra

    by Ludovic Phalippou

    Develops a closed form formula for expected returns of an LBO. Shows how growth, leverage, valuation levels, and exit multiples interact.

  • The Trillion Dollar Bonus of Private Capital Fund Managers

    by Ludovic Phalippou

    Carried interest (carry) is the main performance-based component of compensation for private capital fund managers. Using fund-level cash flows and fee terms for more than 12,000 funds, we estimate which funds are in the carry and the total amount earned. Aggregate carry exceeds one trillion dollars and accounts for 18% of investor profits, about equal the contractual value-weighted rate of 19%. The difference reflects the role of hurdle rates and the relatively smooth distribution of fund outcomes. Carry is strongly related to both performance and fund size, and past carry is a stronger predictor of future performance than past returns. This paper was accepted by Lukas Schmid, finance.


  • How Deadly Is Financial Leverage? Evidence from Care Homes During the COVID-19 Crisis

    by Peter Morris, Ludovic Phalippou, Betty Wu

    Once information about leasing and corporate structure is incorporated into the way financial leverage is calculated, highly leveraged care homes are found to have a death rate twice as high as that of non-leveraged care homes before the government provided financial support (i.e., during the first wave). Highly leveraged care homes cut costs more aggressively and experienced the largest drop in cash reserves. Care homes controlled by private equity firms no longer display higher COVID-19 death rates once their significantly higher leverage is controlled for. Our results illustrate the importance of accurately measuring financial flexibility and the negative externalities caused by high leverage. This paper was accepted by Bo Becker, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02923 .


  • Open Access

    Private Equity Continuation Vehicles: A Model of Strategic Asset Transfers

    by Victoria Ivashina, Simon Mayer, Ludovic Phalippou

    We develop a framework that formalizes the conflicts of interest arising in continuation vehicles (CVs), in which general partners (GPs) transfer portfolio companies from a legacy fund to a new vehicle they continue to manage. While CVs can enhance efficiency by extending the holding period of high-potential firms, they also create opportunities for rent extraction, as GPs can exploit their informational advantage and intermediary position between legacy and new limited partners (LPs). CV formation involves two informational frictions: adverse selection, whereby low-quality assets are transferred at inflated prices at the expense of new LPs, and inverse selection, whereby high-quality assets are transferred at undervalued prices at the expense of exiting legacy LPs. Which friction dominates depends on the GP's alignment with the buy or sell side, shaped by the relative size of its legacy-fund and CV stakes. We characterize the optimal contract: Carry earned on CV deals is reinvested, legacy-fund compensation is steeper than CV compensation, and single-asset CVs arise optimally. Using proprietary data on CV transactions, we also provide systematic evidence on contractual features in CVs.

  • Open Access

    The cost of mass gatherings during a pandemic

    by Ludovic Phalippou, Dayin Zhang


  • Open Access

    Limited Partners versus Unlimited Machines; Artificial Intelligence and the Performance of Private Equity Funds

    by Reiner Braun, Borja Fernández Tamayo, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Ludovic Phalippou, Natalia Sigrist

    We assemble a proprietary dataset of 395 private equity (PE) fund prospectuses to analyze fund performance and fundraising success. We analyze both quantitative and qualitative information contained in these documents using econometric methods and machine learning techniques. PE fund performance is unrelated to quantitative information, such as prior performance, and measures of document readability. Measures of fundraising success, in contrast, are correlated to most fund characteristics but are not related to future performance. Meanwhile, machine learning tools can use qualitative information to predict future fund performance: the performance spread between the funds within the top and bottom terciles of predicted probability of success is about 25%. Our findings support the view that in opaque and non-standardized markets, investors fail to incorporate qualitative information in their asset manager selection process, but do incorporate salient quantitative information.


  • Open Access

    The Cost of Mass Gatherings During a Pandemic

    by Ludovic Phalippou, Dayin Zhang

    In June 2020, the U.S., unlike other regions of the world, faced a surge in cases of COVID-19. Immediately prior to this wave of cases, the largest mass protests in U.S. history took place. We show that when holding other factors constant, COVID-19 cases increased most in places where more demonstrations occurred. We exploit variation in rainfall during the protest period as an exogenous source of variation in attendance. We find that good weather coincides with both more people protesting and more subsequent COVID-19 cases and deaths. Mass gatherings during a pandemic thus lead to more contraction and fatalities of COVID-19, and we quantify these effects.