Dayin Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Dayin Zhang has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jon Kroah
2 shared publicationsLu Han
2 shared publications- Ludovic Phalippou
University of Oxford Said Business School, PES, Oxford OX11HP, United Kingdom
2 shared publications Panle Jia Barwick
2 shared publicationsDevin M. Shanthikumar
University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business
1 shared publicationIvy Ruyun Feng
University of Wisconsin Madison-Wisconsin School of Business
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Market Power in Mortgage Pricing: the Role of Referral Lending
Despite intense competition among mortgage lenders, borrowers continue to face elevated rate spreads and substantial price dispersion. We argue that realtor–loan-officer referral networks are a key source of lender market power: by steering homebuyers toward a limited set of loan officers, these networks restrict effective borrower choice even in otherwise competitive markets. Using a novel dataset linking 78,706 realtors to 101,316 loan officers in 41 states, we document that such networks are both pervasive and highly concentrated: 85% of realtors direct over 40% of their clients to fewer than four loan officers. Strikingly, the lender concentration among realtors persists and even increases in markets with more lenders, suggesting that referrals constrain choices regardless of market structure. IV estimates indicate that borrowers working with referred loan officers pay 18.4 basis points higher interest rates, equivalent to $2,585 in upfront costs for the average loan of \$306k. The referral premium is nearly three times as high for Hispanic borrowers as for White borrowers, and is systematically higher for Black borrowers and financially constrained households. On average, referral lending raises rate spreads by 36.1% and explains half of the (residual) standard deviation of rate spreads after controlling for lender, market, and time fixed effects. We identify two mechanisms: referrals reduce borrowers' search intensity for lenders, and referred loan officers exercise pricing power relative to other officers within the same lending institution. Efficiency arguments (faster processing) and mediation of denial risks don't fully justify the referral premium. Our findings reveal referral networks as a hidden source of market power, imposing substantial financial costs and raising equity concerns for borrowers.
- 24 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMarket Power in Mortgage Pricing: the Role of Referral Lending
Despite intense competition among mortgage lenders, borrowers continue to face elevated rate spreads and substantial price dispersion. We argue that realtor–loan-officer referral networks are a key source of lender market power: by steering homebuyers toward a limited set of loan officers, these networks restrict effective borrower choice even in otherwise competitive markets. Using a novel dataset linking 78,706 realtors to 101,316 loan officers in 41 states, we document that such networks are both pervasive and highly concentrated: 85% of realtors direct over 40% of their clients to fewer than four loan officers. Strikingly, the lender concentration among realtors persists and even increases in markets with more lenders, suggesting that referrals constrain choices regardless of market structure. IV estimates indicate that borrowers working with referred loan officers pay 18.4 basis points higher interest rates, equivalent to $2,585 in upfront costs for the average loan of \$306k. The referral premium is nearly three times as high for Hispanic borrowers as for White borrowers, and is systematically higher for Black borrowers and financially constrained households. On average, referral lending raises rate spreads by 36.1% and explains half of the (residual) standard deviation of rate spreads after controlling for lender, market, and time fixed effects. We identify two mechanisms: referrals reduce borrowers' search intensity for lenders, and referred loan officers exercise pricing power relative to other officers within the same lending institution. Efficiency arguments (faster processing) and mediation of denial risks don't fully justify the referral premium. Our findings reveal referral networks as a hidden source of market power, imposing substantial financial costs and raising equity concerns for borrowers.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Market Power in Mortgage Pricing: the Role of Referral Lending
Despite intense competition among mortgage lenders, borrowers face substantial price dispersion. We argue that realtor–loan officer referral networks are a key source of lender market power: by steering homebuyers toward a small set of loan officers, these networks restrict effective borrower choice even in competitive markets. Using a novel dataset linking 81,306 realtors to 102,860 loan officers across 41 states, we document that such networks are pervasive and highly concentrated — 85% of realtors direct over 40% of their clients to fewer than four loan officers — and that this concentration persists and even increases in markets with more lenders. IV estimates indicate that borrowers using referred loan officers pay 18.6 basis points higher mortgage rates, equivalent to $2,609 in upfront costs on the average loan of $306K. Referral lending raises rate spreads by 36.5% and accounts for half of the residual cross-sectional variation in spreads. The premium is nearly three times as large for Hispanic borrowers as for White borrowers, and is systematically higher for Black borrowers and financially constrained households. We identify two channels: referrals reduce borrowers' search intensity across lenders, and referred loan officers exercise pricing power relative to colleagues within the same institution. Efficiency gains from faster processing and reduced denial risk do not offset the additional costs.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMarket Power in Mortgage Pricing: the Role of Referral Lending
Despite intense competition among mortgage lenders, borrowers face substantial price dispersion. We argue that realtor–loan officer referral networks are a key source of lender market power: by steering homebuyers toward a small set of loan officers, these networks restrict effective borrower choice even in competitive markets. Using a novel dataset linking 81,306 realtors to 102,860 loan officers across 41 states, we document that such networks are pervasive and highly concentrated — 85% of realtors direct over 40% of their clients to fewer than four loan officers — and that this concentration persists and even increases in markets with more lenders. IV estimates indicate that borrowers using referred loan officers pay 18.6 basis points higher mortgage rates, equivalent to $2,609 in upfront costs on the average loan of $306K. Referral lending raises rate spreads by 36.5% and accounts for half of the residual cross-sectional variation in spreads. The premium is nearly three times as large for Hispanic borrowers as for White borrowers, and is systematically higher for Black borrowers and financially constrained households. We identify two channels: referrals reduce borrowers' search intensity across lenders, and referred loan officers exercise pricing power relative to colleagues within the same institution. Efficiency gains from faster processing and reduced denial risk do not offset the additional costs.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Mortgage Lenders' Diversity Policies and Mortgage Lending to Minorities
Research suggests that minorities continue to face lower mortgage application approval rates, and, if approved, higher interest rates. At the same time, research suggests that disparities between minority and white borrowers have narrowed in recent years. We examine the role of diversity policies in addressing mortgage lending disparities, using both within-lender analyses and an event study design. We find that diversity policies significantly reduce race-related gaps in borrowing costs, captured by effective interest rate spreads. However, they drive larger gaps in approval rates. Additional analyses provide insights into the mechanisms through which diversity policies affect loan costs and approval rates. The increase in application completion rates and the reduction in loan costs, both driven by the front office, are in part driven by better matching of borrower and loan officer race. The reduction in approval rates is in part driven by an increase in higher-risk loan applications from minority borrowers. However, the increase in risk does not fully explain the approval rate effect, suggesting an overreaction from the back office-in which the back office increases approval standards for minorities. Examination of ex post loan performance is consistent with an overreaction, with a significant decrease in ex post defaults and an increase in prepayment from minority borrowers. Together, our results suggest that diversity policies in part address racerelated disparities in lending. However, the policies also induce wider loan approval gaps. We discuss possible explanations.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMortgage Lenders' Diversity Policies and Mortgage Lending to Minorities
Research suggests that minorities continue to face lower mortgage application approval rates, and, if approved, higher interest rates. At the same time, research suggests that disparities between minority and white borrowers have narrowed in recent years. We examine the role of diversity policies in addressing mortgage lending disparities, using both within-lender analyses and an event study design. We find that diversity policies significantly reduce race-related gaps in borrowing costs, captured by effective interest rate spreads. However, they drive larger gaps in approval rates. Additional analyses provide insights into the mechanisms through which diversity policies affect loan costs and approval rates. The increase in application completion rates and the reduction in loan costs, both driven by the front office, are in part driven by better matching of borrower and loan officer race. The reduction in approval rates is in part driven by an increase in higher-risk loan applications from minority borrowers. However, the increase in risk does not fully explain the approval rate effect, suggesting an overreaction from the back office-in which the back office increases approval standards for minorities. Examination of ex post loan performance is consistent with an overreaction, with a significant decrease in ex post defaults and an increase in prepayment from minority borrowers. Together, our results suggest that diversity policies in part address racerelated disparities in lending. However, the policies also induce wider loan approval gaps. We discuss possible explanations.
- Open Access
- 26 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSM - Population Health
- Vol. 23, 101460
The cost of mass gatherings during a pandemic
- 26 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSM - Population Health
- Vol. 23, 101460
Open AccessThe cost of mass gatherings during a pandemic
- Open Access
- 23 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Cost of Mass Gatherings During a Pandemic
In June 2020, the U.S., unlike other regions of the world, faced a surge in cases of COVID-19. Immediately prior to this wave of cases, the largest mass protests in U.S. history took place. We show that when holding other factors constant, COVID-19 cases increased most in places where more demonstrations occurred. We exploit variation in rainfall during the protest period as an exogenous source of variation in attendance. We find that good weather coincides with both more people protesting and more subsequent COVID-19 cases and deaths. Mass gatherings during a pandemic thus lead to more contraction and fatalities of COVID-19, and we quantify these effects.
- 23 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Cost of Mass Gatherings During a Pandemic
In June 2020, the U.S., unlike other regions of the world, faced a surge in cases of COVID-19. Immediately prior to this wave of cases, the largest mass protests in U.S. history took place. We show that when holding other factors constant, COVID-19 cases increased most in places where more demonstrations occurred. We exploit variation in rainfall during the protest period as an exogenous source of variation in attendance. We find that good weather coincides with both more people protesting and more subsequent COVID-19 cases and deaths. Mass gatherings during a pandemic thus lead to more contraction and fatalities of COVID-19, and we quantify these effects.