Sri Hrushikesh Varma Bhupathiraju
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Sri Hrushikesh Varma Bhupathiraju has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Sara Rampazzi
University of Florida, Gainesville, USA
5 shared publications - Takeshi Sugawara
The University of Electro-Communications, Tokyo, Japan
3 shared publications - Jennifer Sheldon
University of Florida, Gainesville, USA
2 shared publications - Allison Lu
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
1 shared publication - Anna Crowder
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
1 shared publication - Carson Stillman
University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4462-4476
Illusion of Depth: Revealing Hidden Stereo Vision Vulnerabilities in Depth Estimation
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4462-4476
Open AccessIllusion of Depth: Revealing Hidden Stereo Vision Vulnerabilities in Depth Estimation
- Open Access
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 98-110
RepliGuard: Policy-Driven Replica Management Framework for Protecting against Acoustic Attacks
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 98-110
Open AccessRepliGuard: Policy-Driven Replica Management Framework for Protecting against Acoustic Attacks
- Open Access
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
- Vol. 10 (2) , 1-23
To Go or Not to Go: Shedding Light on Traffic Light Signal Manipulation and Defense Strategies
Connected autonomous vehicles must accurately detect, and adhere, to traffic light signals to ensure safe and efficient traffic flow. Misinterpretation of traffic lights can result in potential safety issues for drivers and pedestrians. Recent work demonstrated attacks that projected structured light patterns onto vehicle cameras, causing traffic signs and traffic light color misinterpretation. In this work, we characterize a novel vulnerability of traffic light physical structures that can be exploited by attackers to deceive recognition systems. When visible and invisible laser light is projected onto traffic lights, it is scattered by its internal reflectors. To a vehicle’s camera, the reflected light appears the same as a genuine light source, resulting in dangerous red and green traffic light status misclassifications. We evaluate our attack against three state-of-the-art traffic light recognition models and show successful misclassification up to 25 m from the target traffic light. Furthermore, the attack succeeds both in daytime and nighttime conditions both in static and moving vehicle scenarios up to 10 km/h speed. To mitigate this threat, we propose a detection system based on light texture patterns that achieve 100% TPR and 1.8% FPR in our real-world scenarios.
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
- Vol. 10 (2) , 1-23
Open AccessTo Go or Not to Go: Shedding Light on Traffic Light Signal Manipulation and Defense Strategies
Connected autonomous vehicles must accurately detect, and adhere, to traffic light signals to ensure safe and efficient traffic flow. Misinterpretation of traffic lights can result in potential safety issues for drivers and pedestrians. Recent work demonstrated attacks that projected structured light patterns onto vehicle cameras, causing traffic signs and traffic light color misinterpretation. In this work, we characterize a novel vulnerability of traffic light physical structures that can be exploited by attackers to deceive recognition systems. When visible and invisible laser light is projected onto traffic lights, it is scattered by its internal reflectors. To a vehicle’s camera, the reflected light appears the same as a genuine light source, resulting in dangerous red and green traffic light status misclassifications. We evaluate our attack against three state-of-the-art traffic light recognition models and show successful misclassification up to 25 m from the target traffic light. Furthermore, the attack succeeds both in daytime and nighttime conditions both in static and moving vehicle scenarios up to 10 km/h speed. To mitigate this threat, we propose a detection system based on light texture patterns that achieve 100% TPR and 1.8% FPR in our real-world scenarios.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 96-107
Reproducibility in Applied Security Conferences: An 11-Year Review on Artifacts and Evaluation Committees
- 29 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 96-107
Open AccessReproducibility in Applied Security Conferences: An 11-Year Review on Artifacts and Evaluation Committees
- Open Access
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 329-340
EMI-LiDAR: Uncovering Vulnerabilities of LiDAR Sensors in Autonomous Driving Setting using Electromagnetic Interference
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) using LiDAR-based object detection systems are rapidly improving and becoming an increasingly viable method of transportation. While effective at perceiving the surrounding environment, these detection systems are shown to be vulnerable to attacks using lasers which can cause obstacle misclassifications or removal. These laser attacks, however, are challenging to perform, requiring precise aiming and accuracy. Our research exposes a new threat in the form of Intentional Electro-Magnetic-Interference (IEMI), which affects the time-of-flight (TOF) circuits that make up modern LiDARs. We show that these vulnerabilities can be exploited to force the AV Perception system to misdetect, misclassify objects, and perceive non-existent obstacles. We evaluate the vulnerability in three AV perception modules (PointPillars, PointRCNN, and Apollo) and show how the classification rate drops below 50%. We also analyze the impact of the IEMI injection on two fusion models (AVOD and Frustum-ConvNet) and in real-world scenarios. Finally, we discuss potential countermeasures and propose two strategies to detect signal injection.
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 329-340
Open AccessEMI-LiDAR: Uncovering Vulnerabilities of LiDAR Sensors in Autonomous Driving Setting using Electromagnetic Interference
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) using LiDAR-based object detection systems are rapidly improving and becoming an increasingly viable method of transportation. While effective at perceiving the surrounding environment, these detection systems are shown to be vulnerable to attacks using lasers which can cause obstacle misclassifications or removal. These laser attacks, however, are challenging to perform, requiring precise aiming and accuracy. Our research exposes a new threat in the form of Intentional Electro-Magnetic-Interference (IEMI), which affects the time-of-flight (TOF) circuits that make up modern LiDARs. We show that these vulnerabilities can be exploited to force the AV Perception system to misdetect, misclassify objects, and perceive non-existent obstacles. We evaluate the vulnerability in three AV perception modules (PointPillars, PointRCNN, and Apollo) and show how the classification rate drops below 50%. We also analyze the impact of the IEMI injection on two fusion models (AVOD and Frustum-ConvNet) and in real-world scenarios. Finally, we discuss potential countermeasures and propose two strategies to detect signal injection.