Jennifer Sheldon
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Jennifer Sheldon has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Sara Rampazzi
University of Florida, Gainesville, USA
3 shared publications - Jahidul Islam
University of Florida
2 shared publications - Sri Hrushikesh Varma Bhupathiraju
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
2 shared publications - Weidong Zhu
KFSCIS, Florida International University, Miami, Florida, USA
2 shared publications - Adnan Abdullah
University of Florida
1 shared publication - Kevin Butler
University of Florida, Gainesville, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 98-110
RepliGuard: Policy-Driven Replica Management Framework for Protecting against Acoustic Attacks
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 98-110
Open AccessRepliGuard: Policy-Driven Replica Management Framework for Protecting against Acoustic Attacks
- Open Access
- 9 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 51-57
Deep Note: Can Acoustic Interference Damage the Availability of Hard Disk Storage in Underwater Data Centers?
The growing worldwide attention toward large-scale subsea data centers has garnered substantial interest from commercial entities which have built and deployed underwater prototypes since 2015. These data centers utilize hard disk drives (HDDs) as a cost-effective method of data storage. However, researchers have demonstrated that acoustic waves can affect the availability and integrity of HDDs and applications that rely on them. These studies are all conducted in air on commercial laptops, hence their applicability and implications in submerged environments remain unexplored. In this position paper, we investigate potential vulnerabilities of storage devices deployed in underwater data centers and subsea storage platforms against targeted acoustic attacks. Based on our initial investigation of a simplified scenario, a victim HDD deployed in an enclosed submerged container is especially vulnerable to those acoustic attacks, which at frequencies ranging from 300 Hz 1300 Hz can result in up to 100% throughput loss and application crashes. Based on these findings, we argue that further study is necessary to assess underwater storage system security and develop effective defenses against overlooked acoustic attacks.
- 9 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 51-57
Open AccessDeep Note: Can Acoustic Interference Damage the Availability of Hard Disk Storage in Underwater Data Centers?
The growing worldwide attention toward large-scale subsea data centers has garnered substantial interest from commercial entities which have built and deployed underwater prototypes since 2015. These data centers utilize hard disk drives (HDDs) as a cost-effective method of data storage. However, researchers have demonstrated that acoustic waves can affect the availability and integrity of HDDs and applications that rely on them. These studies are all conducted in air on commercial laptops, hence their applicability and implications in submerged environments remain unexplored. In this position paper, we investigate potential vulnerabilities of storage devices deployed in underwater data centers and subsea storage platforms against targeted acoustic attacks. Based on our initial investigation of a simplified scenario, a victim HDD deployed in an enclosed submerged container is especially vulnerable to those acoustic attacks, which at frequencies ranging from 300 Hz 1300 Hz can result in up to 100% throughput loss and application crashes. Based on these findings, we argue that further study is necessary to assess underwater storage system security and develop effective defenses against overlooked acoustic attacks.
- Open Access
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 329-340
EMI-LiDAR: Uncovering Vulnerabilities of LiDAR Sensors in Autonomous Driving Setting using Electromagnetic Interference
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) using LiDAR-based object detection systems are rapidly improving and becoming an increasingly viable method of transportation. While effective at perceiving the surrounding environment, these detection systems are shown to be vulnerable to attacks using lasers which can cause obstacle misclassifications or removal. These laser attacks, however, are challenging to perform, requiring precise aiming and accuracy. Our research exposes a new threat in the form of Intentional Electro-Magnetic-Interference (IEMI), which affects the time-of-flight (TOF) circuits that make up modern LiDARs. We show that these vulnerabilities can be exploited to force the AV Perception system to misdetect, misclassify objects, and perceive non-existent obstacles. We evaluate the vulnerability in three AV perception modules (PointPillars, PointRCNN, and Apollo) and show how the classification rate drops below 50%. We also analyze the impact of the IEMI injection on two fusion models (AVOD and Frustum-ConvNet) and in real-world scenarios. Finally, we discuss potential countermeasures and propose two strategies to detect signal injection.
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 329-340
Open AccessEMI-LiDAR: Uncovering Vulnerabilities of LiDAR Sensors in Autonomous Driving Setting using Electromagnetic Interference
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) using LiDAR-based object detection systems are rapidly improving and becoming an increasingly viable method of transportation. While effective at perceiving the surrounding environment, these detection systems are shown to be vulnerable to attacks using lasers which can cause obstacle misclassifications or removal. These laser attacks, however, are challenging to perform, requiring precise aiming and accuracy. Our research exposes a new threat in the form of Intentional Electro-Magnetic-Interference (IEMI), which affects the time-of-flight (TOF) circuits that make up modern LiDARs. We show that these vulnerabilities can be exploited to force the AV Perception system to misdetect, misclassify objects, and perceive non-existent obstacles. We evaluate the vulnerability in three AV perception modules (PointPillars, PointRCNN, and Apollo) and show how the classification rate drops below 50%. We also analyze the impact of the IEMI injection on two fusion models (AVOD and Frustum-ConvNet) and in real-world scenarios. Finally, we discuss potential countermeasures and propose two strategies to detect signal injection.