JSJennifer Sheldon

Jennifer Sheldon

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Jennifer Sheldon has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    RepliGuard: Policy-Driven Replica Management Framework for Protecting against Acoustic Attacks

    by Jennifer Sheldon, Yungwoo Ko, Sri Hrushikesh Varma Bhupathiraju, Sara Osmanovic, Weidong Zhu, Md Jahidul Islam, Sara Rampazzi

  • Open Access

    Deep Note: Can Acoustic Interference Damage the Availability of Hard Disk Storage in Underwater Data Centers?

    by Jennifer Sheldon, Weidong Zhu, Adnan Abdullah, Kevin Butler, Jahidul Islam, Sara Rampazzi

    The growing worldwide attention toward large-scale subsea data centers has garnered substantial interest from commercial entities which have built and deployed underwater prototypes since 2015. These data centers utilize hard disk drives (HDDs) as a cost-effective method of data storage. However, researchers have demonstrated that acoustic waves can affect the availability and integrity of HDDs and applications that rely on them. These studies are all conducted in air on commercial laptops, hence their applicability and implications in submerged environments remain unexplored. In this position paper, we investigate potential vulnerabilities of storage devices deployed in underwater data centers and subsea storage platforms against targeted acoustic attacks. Based on our initial investigation of a simplified scenario, a victim HDD deployed in an enclosed submerged container is especially vulnerable to those acoustic attacks, which at frequencies ranging from 300 Hz 1300 Hz can result in up to 100% throughput loss and application crashes. Based on these findings, we argue that further study is necessary to assess underwater storage system security and develop effective defenses against overlooked acoustic attacks.


  • Open Access

    EMI-LiDAR: Uncovering Vulnerabilities of LiDAR Sensors in Autonomous Driving Setting using Electromagnetic Interference

    by Sri Hrushikesh Varma Bhupathiraju, Jennifer Sheldon, Luke A. Bauer, Vincent Bindschaedler, Takeshi Sugawara, Sara Rampazzi

    Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) using LiDAR-based object detection systems are rapidly improving and becoming an increasingly viable method of transportation. While effective at perceiving the surrounding environment, these detection systems are shown to be vulnerable to attacks using lasers which can cause obstacle misclassifications or removal. These laser attacks, however, are challenging to perform, requiring precise aiming and accuracy. Our research exposes a new threat in the form of Intentional Electro-Magnetic-Interference (IEMI), which affects the time-of-flight (TOF) circuits that make up modern LiDARs. We show that these vulnerabilities can be exploited to force the AV Perception system to misdetect, misclassify objects, and perceive non-existent obstacles. We evaluate the vulnerability in three AV perception modules (PointPillars, PointRCNN, and Apollo) and show how the classification rate drops below 50%. We also analyze the impact of the IEMI injection on two fusion models (AVOD and Frustum-ConvNet) and in real-world scenarios. Finally, we discuss potential countermeasures and propose two strategies to detect signal injection.