Eden V. Clarke

Introduction: Given the sustained attacks on LGB+ rights, it is essential to identify how and for whom support for same-sex relationships changes over time. Methods: The present study examines distinct growth trajectories of support for the Civil Union Act (2009–2016) and same-sex marriage (2013–2023) across 11 waves of longitudinal panel data ( N = 65,407) spanning 14 years. Results: Multi-trajectory latent class growth curve analysis identified three distinct growth trajectories. The high supporter class (68.32%) reported high support for the Civil Union Act and same-sex marriage that (slowly) increased until reaching the ceiling for policy support. The moderate supporter class (17.87%) demonstrated moderate and increasing support for the Civil Union Act and same-sex marriage. Finally, the low supporter class (13.81%) displayed low but increasing support for both legislations. Class membership differed across sexual and religious identification, gender, and age. Those high in conservative ideologies including sexual prejudice, right-wing authoritarianism and hostile sexism were more likely to belong to the moderate and low (compared to high) supporter classes. The moderate and low supporters were also more likely to support—and vote for—conservative political parties. Conclusions: We reveal that support for same-sex relationships is increasingly normative and identify the subgroup of the population (most likely) responsible for the ongoing animosity toward LGB+ people. Policy Implications: Policymakers should note that threats to undermine LGB+ rights conflict with the majority of the public’s attitudes toward same-sex relationships. We recommend monitoring the low supporter class to protect LGB+ rights and prevent the adoption of anti-democratic norms.

Despite attitudes towards the LGBTQIA+ community improving in recent years, older (vs younger) cohorts still report higher rates of sexual prejudice. To date, it is unclear if this generational difference emerges due to normative ageing or the distinct social norms in which each generation was born and raised (cohort effects). This pre‐registered study clarifies the issue by utilizing cohort sequential latent growth curve modelling to examine the developmental trajectory of sexual prejudice for men and women across 11 annual waves of longitudinal panel data ( N = 63,558). Our results reveal a period effect in which older (vs younger) cohorts and men (vs women) display higher initial mean levels of sexual prejudice. But due to shared social conditions, most cohorts experience comparable curvilinear declines in sexual prejudice across time. Collectively, our results highlight the malleability of sexual prejudice across the lifespan and demonstrate the need to examine the socio‐political environment when taking a lifespan development perspective on anti‐LGBTQIA+ attitudes.

The recent rise in anti-trans rhetoric in Aotearoa and internationally, coupled with the unmet health needs of transgender, non-binary, and gender-diverse (trans) people, highlights the need to improve psychology and social work practitioner competencies supporting trans populations. Many argue for increased trans-focused education in psychology and social work training programs to reduce disparities between trans and cisgender people. However, education, while well-intended, is insufficient to address the historical—and continuing—role of psychology and social work institutions in trans people’s oppression. In this article, we offer a primer on understanding transnormativity in psychology and social work practice by discussing the contemporary shift from pathologizing trans identities towards conditional acceptance of certain “types” of gender diversity. In doing so, we make the case to go beyond “trans education” and towards cultural shifts in how practitioners think about gender in their practice to ultimately transform their relationships with trans populations.

Although relative deprivation theory argues that individual differences influence the degree to which people perceive themselves (IRD) or their group (GRD) as unfairly disadvantaged, few studies directly assess the psychological motivators underlying perceptions of injustice. We address this oversight by examining the relationships between psychological entitlement and relative deprivation using twelve annual waves of a nationwide random panel sample of adults (N = 71,587). Random intercept cross-lagged panel modelling revealed that within-person changes in psychological entitlement predicted subsequent changes in IRD and GRD. Within-person changes in IRD and GRD also predicted changes in psychological entitlement over time. These results replicated across structurally advantaged and disadvantaged groups based on ethnicity, gender, and immigrant status. We thus highlight how psychological entitlement shapes—and is shaped by—perceptions of injustice, irrespective of one’s objective societal position. We encourage future research to further explicate the role of individual differences in relative deprivation theory.

Despite the need to identify crucial barriers to equal rights for the LGBTQIA+ community, it remains unclear if prejudiced attitudes-namely, sexual prejudice and ambivalent sexism-precede declines in support for marriage equality or if one's policy position impacts prejudices. We examine these two possibilities by utilizing four annual waves (2014-2017) of longitudinal panel data to assess the temporal ordering of sexual prejudice, ambivalent sexism and support for marriage equality across heterosexual men (n = 9,036) and women (n = 15,185). Results reveal that sexual prejudice predicts within-person declines in support for marriage equality for both women and men. This association is, however, bi-directional for men. We replicate these associations across (a) ethnic majority and minority men and women and (b) non-religious and religious men and women, albeit with a few notable exceptions: Hostile sexism precedes sexual prejudice for ethnic minority men, and benevolent sexism precedes support for marriage equality among ethnic majority group men and non-religious men. Collectively, our results demonstrate that conservative gender ideologies precede hostile attitudes toward the LGB+ community over time.

Minority stress theory suggests that shifts toward egalitarianism should reduce well-being disparities between heterosexual people and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and other sexual minorities (LGB+ people). However, few studies have examined well-being trends in these groups over periods of social change. We addressed this issue directly using a large nationwide random sample of New Zealand adults over thirteen years (from 2009 to 2022; N_total = 72,790; LGB+ n = 7,677). In doing so, we tracked people's well-being both before and in the years following major legal changes that increased LGB+ rights. Multigroup latent growth curve models revealed stable well-being differences between LGB+ and heterosexual participants across five domains of well-being, with little evidence of disparities reducing over time. Differences were most pronounced between younger LGB+ and heterosexual groups, with young LGB+ women and men reporting the lowest psychological and social well-being, respectively. These results highlight the need to further examine the impact of minority stress, as well as intersectional identities, on well-being among LGB+ populations.

Although many Western democracies have made important strides toward egalitarianism in recent years, members of the LGB+ community continue to endure sustained animus. Yet, little empirical work has examined the ideologies that promote sexual prejudice in the twenty-first century. We address this oversight by positing that hostile sexism temporally precedes increases in sexual prejudice for both men and women. Accordingly, we used nine annual waves (2014–2023) of longitudinal panel data from a nationwide random sample of New Zealand adults to examine the within-person cross-lagged associations between ambivalent sexism and sexual prejudice across heterosexual men ( n  = 22,751) and women ( n  = 38,004). As hypothesized, hostile sexism (but not benevolent sexism) predicted within-person increases in sexual prejudice for both heterosexual men and heterosexual women over time. These results replicated across ethnic majority men and women, ethnic minority men (but not women), and LGB+ men (but not women), as well as when adjusting for participants’ age. Together, these results demonstrate that the pernicious effects of hostile sexism extend beyond women's rights, and highlight the importance of addressing sexism to foster broader egalitarian ideals over time. Additional online materials for this article are available on PWQ's website at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/03616843241275579 .

Protestors recently repurposed the abortion rights’ mantra, “my body, my choice,” to oppose COVID-19 mandates. But do those who oppose public health mandates fully support the right to choose? We answer this question by using exploratory analyses to identify the unique response patterns underlying support for abortion and COVID-19 mandates in random samples from the United States (Study 1; N = 2,331) and New Zealand (Study 2; N = 33,310). Latent profile analyses revealed a small subgroup in both countries (12.6% and 3.4% of the respective samples) who opposed mandates. Yet contrary to the “my body, my choice” rhetoric seen at anti-mandate protests, they also opposed abortion. Across both studies, those in the Anti-Mandate profile tended to be more religious, conservative, and distrustful of institutions. In Study 2, they were also low on cognitive consistency and high on conspiracy belief. Finally, the Anti-Mandate profile was opposed to free speech critical of both the United States and religion (Study 1), high on sexual prejudice (both studies), unsupportive of progressive protests (but supportive of reactionary protests; Study 2), and likely to vote for conservative parties (both studies). These results reveal the mobilization potential of the anti-mandate movement, uncover important contradictions within its members, and illustrate the nuanced ways in which opposition to gender policies (i.e., reproductive rights) coalesce with reactionary protests.

Protestors recently repurposed the abortion rights’ mantra, “my body, my choice,” to oppose COVID-19 mandates. But do those who oppose public health mandates fully support the right to choose? We answer this question by using exploratory analyses to identify the unique response patterns underlying support for abortion and COVID-19 mandates in random samples from the United States (Study 1; N = 2,331) and New Zealand (Study 2; N = 33,310). Latent profile analyses revealed a small subgroup in both countries (12.6% and 3.4% of the respective samples) who opposed mandates. Yet contrary to the “my body, my choice” rhetoric seen at anti-mandate protests, they also opposed abortion. Across both studies, those in the Anti-Mandate profile tended to be more religious, conservative, and distrustful of institutions. In Study 2, they were also low on cognitive consistency and high on conspiracy belief. Finally, the Anti-Mandate profile was opposed to free speech critical of both the United States and religion (Study 1), high on sexual prejudice (both studies), unsupportive of progressive protests (but supportive of reactionary protests; Study 2), and likely to vote for conservative parties (both studies). These results reveal the mobilization potential of the anti-mandate movement, uncover important contradictions within its members, and illustrate the nuanced ways in which opposition to gender policies (i.e., reproductive rights) coalesce with reactionary protests.