Robert Henderson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Robert Henderson has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Dylan Bumford
UCLA, Los Angeles, USA
1 shared publication - Elin McCready
Aoyama Gakuin University
1 shared publication - Lucas Champollion
Department of Linguistics New York University New York New York USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 December 2021
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- p. 703-719
Dogwhistles: Persona and Ideology
A dogwhistle is a piece of language that sends one message to an out- group while at the same time sending a second (often taboo, controversial, or in- flammatory) message to an ingroup. We propose an analysis of dogwhistles in the setting of social meaning games that treats them as signaling the persona of the speaker, and in some circumstances enabling an enrichment of the conventional meaning of the expression through the connections of social personas and ideolo- gies, which we model formally. We show that this account improves over pitfalls encountered in other accounts (Henderson & McCready 2019b; Khoo 2017; Stanley 2015), which includes in some of our own previous work. We further show how this formal framework allows, not just a account of dogwhistles, but opens up a way to analyze a variety of sociopragmatic phenomena like unconscious bias and epistemic hypervigilance.
- 31 December 2021
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- p. 703-719
Open AccessDogwhistles: Persona and Ideology
A dogwhistle is a piece of language that sends one message to an out- group while at the same time sending a second (often taboo, controversial, or in- flammatory) message to an ingroup. We propose an analysis of dogwhistles in the setting of social meaning games that treats them as signaling the persona of the speaker, and in some circumstances enabling an enrichment of the conventional meaning of the expression through the connections of social personas and ideolo- gies, which we model formally. We show that this account improves over pitfalls encountered in other accounts (Henderson & McCready 2019b; Khoo 2017; Stanley 2015), which includes in some of our own previous work. We further show how this formal framework allows, not just a account of dogwhistles, but opens up a way to analyze a variety of sociopragmatic phenomena like unconscious bias and epistemic hypervigilance.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2019
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-51
Donkeys under discussion
Donkey sentences have existential and universal readings, but they are not often perceived as ambiguous. We extend the pragmatic theory of non-maximality in plural definites by Križ (2016) to explain how hearers use Questions under Discussion to fix the interpretation of donkey sentences in context. We propose that the denotations of such sentences involve truth-value gaps — in certain scenarios the sentences are neither true nor false — and demonstrate that Križ’s pragmatic theory fills these gaps to generate the standard judgments of the literature. Building on Muskens’s (1996) Compositional Discourse Representation Theory and on ideas from supervaluation semantics, we define a general schema for dynamic quantification that delivers the required truth-value gaps. Given the independently motivated pragmatic theory of Križ 2016, we argue that mixed readings of donkey sentences require neither plural information states, contra Brasoveanu 2008, 2010, nor error states, contra Champollion 2016, nor singular donkey pronouns with plural referents, contra Krifka 1996, Yoon 1996. We also show that the pragmatic account improves over alternatives like Kanazawa 1994 that attribute the readings of donkey sentences to the monotonicity properties of the embedding quantifier. EARLY ACCESS
- 15 November 2019
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-51
Open AccessDonkeys under discussion
Donkey sentences have existential and universal readings, but they are not often perceived as ambiguous. We extend the pragmatic theory of non-maximality in plural definites by Križ (2016) to explain how hearers use Questions under Discussion to fix the interpretation of donkey sentences in context. We propose that the denotations of such sentences involve truth-value gaps — in certain scenarios the sentences are neither true nor false — and demonstrate that Križ’s pragmatic theory fills these gaps to generate the standard judgments of the literature. Building on Muskens’s (1996) Compositional Discourse Representation Theory and on ideas from supervaluation semantics, we define a general schema for dynamic quantification that delivers the required truth-value gaps. Given the independently motivated pragmatic theory of Križ 2016, we argue that mixed readings of donkey sentences require neither plural information states, contra Brasoveanu 2008, 2010, nor error states, contra Champollion 2016, nor singular donkey pronouns with plural referents, contra Krifka 1996, Yoon 1996. We also show that the pragmatic account improves over alternatives like Kanazawa 1994 that attribute the readings of donkey sentences to the monotonicity properties of the embedding quantifier. EARLY ACCESS