Ariana Mirian
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Ariana Mirian has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Geoffrey M. Voelker
UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA
4 shared publications - Stefan Savage
UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA
4 shared publications - Gautam Akiwate
Stanford University, Stanford, USA
2 shared publications Adrienne Porter Felt
Google Inc
1 shared publication- Alex C. Snoeren
University of California, San Diego, San Diego, CA, USA
1 shared publication - Alisha Ukani
UC San Diego, San Diego, California, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 147-163
Censys: A Map of Internet Hosts and Services
- 27 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 147-163
Open AccessCensys: A Map of Internet Hosts and Services
- Open Access
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 150-162
An Empirical Analysis of Enterprise-Wide Mandatory Password Updates
Enterprise-scale mandatory password changes are disruptive, complex endeavors that require the entire workforce to prioritize a goal that is often secondary to most users. While ample literature exists around user perceptions and struggles, there are few “best practices” from the perspective of the enterprise—either to achieve the end goal or to minimize IT costs. In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of an enterprise-scale mandatory password change, covering almost 10,000 faculty and staff at an academic institution. Using a combination of user notifications logs, password update records, and help desk ticket information, we construct an empirical model of user response over time. In particular, we characterize the elements of the campaign that relate to ideal and non-ideal outcomes, including unnecessary user actions and IT help desk overhead. We aim to provide insight into successes and challenges that can generalize to other organizations implementing similar initiatives.
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 150-162
Open AccessAn Empirical Analysis of Enterprise-Wide Mandatory Password Updates
Enterprise-scale mandatory password changes are disruptive, complex endeavors that require the entire workforce to prioritize a goal that is often secondary to most users. While ample literature exists around user perceptions and struggles, there are few “best practices” from the perspective of the enterprise—either to achieve the end goal or to minimize IT costs. In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of an enterprise-scale mandatory password change, covering almost 10,000 faculty and staff at an academic institution. Using a combination of user notifications logs, password update records, and help desk ticket information, we construct an empirical model of user response over time. In particular, we characterize the elements of the campaign that relate to ideal and non-ideal outcomes, including unnecessary user actions and IT help desk overhead. We aim to provide insight into successes and challenges that can generalize to other organizations implementing similar initiatives.
- Open Access
- 7 August 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 57-63
In the Line of Fire: Risks of DPI-triggered Data Collection
Cybersecurity companies routinely rely on telemetry from inside customer networks to collect intelligence about new online threats. However, the mechanism by which such intelligence is gathered can itself create new security risks. In this paper, we explore one such subtle situation that arises from an intelligence gathering feature present in FireEye’s widely-deployed passive deep-packet inspection appliances. In particular, FireEye’s systems will report back to the company Web requests containing particular content strings of interest. Based on these reports, the company then schedules independent requests for the same content using distributed Internet proxies. By broadly scanning the Internet using a known trigger string we are able to reverse engineer how these measurements work. We show that these side-effects provide a means to empirically establish which networks and network links are protected by such appliances. Further, we also show how to influence the associatied proxies to issue requests to any URL.
- 7 August 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 57-63
Open AccessIn the Line of Fire: Risks of DPI-triggered Data Collection
Cybersecurity companies routinely rely on telemetry from inside customer networks to collect intelligence about new online threats. However, the mechanism by which such intelligence is gathered can itself create new security risks. In this paper, we explore one such subtle situation that arises from an intelligence gathering feature present in FireEye’s widely-deployed passive deep-packet inspection appliances. In particular, FireEye’s systems will report back to the company Web requests containing particular content strings of interest. Based on these reports, the company then schedules independent requests for the same content using distributed Internet proxies. By broadly scanning the Internet using a known trigger string we are able to reverse engineer how these measurements work. We show that these side-effects provide a means to empirically establish which networks and network links are protected by such appliances. Further, we also show how to influence the associatied proxies to issue requests to any URL.
- Open Access
- 2 November 2021
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 122-136
Who's got your mail?
E-mail has long been a critical component of daily communication and the core medium for modern business correspondence. While traditionally e-mail service was provisioned and implemented independently by each Internet-connected organization, increasingly this function has been outsourced to third-party services. As with many pieces of key communications infrastructure, such centralization can bring both economies of scale and shared failure risk. In this paper, we investigate this issue empirically --- providing a large-scale measurement and analysis of modern Internet e-mail service provisioning. We develop a reliable methodology to better map domains to mail service providers. We then use this approach to document the dominant and increasing role played by a handful of mail service providers and hosting companies over the past four years. Finally, we briefly explore the extent to which nationality (and hence legal jurisdiction) plays a role in such mail provisioning decisions.
- 2 November 2021
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 122-136
Open AccessWho's got your mail?
E-mail has long been a critical component of daily communication and the core medium for modern business correspondence. While traditionally e-mail service was provisioned and implemented independently by each Internet-connected organization, increasingly this function has been outsourced to third-party services. As with many pieces of key communications infrastructure, such centralization can bring both economies of scale and shared failure risk. In this paper, we investigate this issue empirically --- providing a large-scale measurement and analysis of modern Internet e-mail service provisioning. We develop a reliable methodology to better map domains to mail service providers. We then use this approach to document the dominant and increasing role played by a handful of mail service providers and hosting companies over the past four years. Finally, we briefly explore the extent to which nationality (and hence legal jurisdiction) plays a role in such mail provisioning decisions.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Queue
- Vol. 17 (4) , 41-60
Hack for Hire
Hack-for-hire services charging $100-$400 per contract were found to produce sophisticated, persistent, and personalized attacks that were able to bypass 2FA via phishing. The demand for these services, however, appears to be limited to a niche market, as evidenced by the small number of discoverable services, an even smaller number of successful services, and the fact that these attackers target only about one in a million Google users.
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Queue
- Vol. 17 (4) , 41-60
Open AccessHack for Hire
Hack-for-hire services charging $100-$400 per contract were found to produce sophisticated, persistent, and personalized attacks that were able to bypass 2FA via phishing. The demand for these services, however, appears to be limited to a niche market, as evidenced by the small number of discoverable services, an even smaller number of successful services, and the fact that these attackers target only about one in a million Google users.
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 302-311
Web Feature Deprecation: A Case Study for Chrome
Deprecation – signaling that a function is becoming obsolete in the near future – is necessary for the web ecosystem. However, an unsuccessful deprecation can lead to pain for both developers and end-users. In this paper, we analyze web feature deprecations with the goal of improving Chrome's deprecation process by balancing the need for deprecation and minimizing user pain. We produce a taxonomy of reasons why developers want to deprecate web features and a deprecation methodology for deciding when it is safe to deprecate a web feature. We also discuss the challenges faced during the deprecation process.
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 302-311
Web Feature Deprecation: A Case Study for Chrome
Deprecation – signaling that a function is becoming obsolete in the near future – is necessary for the web ecosystem. However, an unsuccessful deprecation can lead to pain for both developers and end-users. In this paper, we analyze web feature deprecations with the goal of improving Chrome's deprecation process by balancing the need for deprecation and minimizing user pain. We produce a taxonomy of reasons why developers want to deprecate web features and a deprecation methodology for deciding when it is safe to deprecate a web feature. We also discuss the challenges faced during the deprecation process.