Stefan Savage
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Stefan Savage has a total of 50 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Geoffrey M. Voelker
UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA
13 shared publications - Enze Liu
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
6 shared publications - Ariana Mirian
University of California, San Diego, USA
4 shared publications - Elisa Luo
UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA
4 shared publications - Alex C. Snoeren
University of California, San Diego, San Diego, CA, USA
3 shared publications - Deian Stefan
UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7088-7102
Large-Scale Measurement and Real-World Mitigation of Web Browser Fingerprinting in the Wild
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7088-7102
Open AccessLarge-Scale Measurement and Real-World Mitigation of Web Browser Fingerprinting in the Wild
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 114-134
The Case of the Missing Cases: Inferring Sealed U.S. Federal Cases
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 114-134
Open AccessThe Case of the Missing Cases: Inferring Sealed U.S. Federal Cases
- Open Access
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1072-1073
Poster: When Blocks Go Missing: The Timeliness and Trustworthiness of Blockchain RPC Providers
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1072-1073
Open AccessPoster: When Blocks Go Missing: The Timeliness and Trustworthiness of Blockchain RPC Providers
- Open Access
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 993-1001
Canvassing the Fingerprinters: Characterizing Canvas Fingerprinting Use Across the Web
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 993-1001
Open AccessCanvassing the Fingerprinters: Characterizing Canvas Fingerprinting Use Across the Web
- Open Access
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 78-99
Somesite I Used To Crawl: Awareness, Agency and Efficacy in Protecting Content Creators From AI Crawlers
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 78-99
Open AccessSomesite I Used To Crawl: Awareness, Agency and Efficacy in Protecting Content Creators From AI Crawlers
- Open Access
- 12 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 786-801
TickTock: Verified Isolation in a Production Embedded OS
- 12 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 786-801
Open AccessTickTock: Verified Isolation in a Production Embedded OS
- Open Access
- 25 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 39-54
An Empirical Analysis on the Use and Reporting of National Security Letters
- 25 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 39-54
Open AccessAn Empirical Analysis on the Use and Reporting of National Security Letters
- Open Access
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 704-712
Give and Take: An End-To-End Investigation of Giveaway Scam Conversion Rates
The Internet's combination of low communication cost, global reach, and functional anonymity has allowed fraudulent scam volumes to reach new heights. Designing effective interventions requires first understanding the context: how scammers reach potential victims, the earnings they make, and any potential bottlenecks for durable interventions. In this short paper, we focus on these questions in the context of cryptocurrency giveaway scams, where victims are tricked into irreversibly transferring funds to scammers under the pretense of even greater returns. Combining data from Twitter (also known as X), YouTube and Twitch livestreams, landing pages, and cryptocurrency blockchains, we measure how giveaway scams operate at scale. We find that 1 in 1000 scam tweets, and 4 in 100,000 livestream views, net a victim, and that scammers managed to extract nearly $4.62 million from just hundreds of victims during our measurement window.
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 704-712
Open AccessGive and Take: An End-To-End Investigation of Giveaway Scam Conversion Rates
The Internet's combination of low communication cost, global reach, and functional anonymity has allowed fraudulent scam volumes to reach new heights. Designing effective interventions requires first understanding the context: how scammers reach potential victims, the earnings they make, and any potential bottlenecks for durable interventions. In this short paper, we focus on these questions in the context of cryptocurrency giveaway scams, where victims are tricked into irreversibly transferring funds to scammers under the pretense of even greater returns. Combining data from Twitter (also known as X), YouTube and Twitch livestreams, landing pages, and cryptocurrency blockchains, we measure how giveaway scams operate at scale. We find that 1 in 1000 scam tweets, and 4 in 100,000 livestream views, net a victim, and that scammers managed to extract nearly $4.62 million from just hundreds of victims during our measurement window.
- Open Access
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1702-1711
Unfiltered: Measuring Cloud-based Email Filtering Bypasses
Email service has increasingly been outsourced to cloud-based providers and so too has the task of filtering such messages for potential threats. Thus, customers will commonly direct that their incoming email is first sent to a third-party email filtering service (e.g., Proofpoint or Barracuda) and only the "clean" messages are then sent on to their email hosting provider (e.g., Gmail or Microsoft Exchange Online). However, this loosely coupled approach can, in theory, be bypassed if the email hosting provider is not configured to only accept messages that arrive from the email filtering service. In this paper we demonstrate that such bypasses are commonly possible. We document a multi-step methodology to infer if an organization has correctly configured its email hosting provider to guard against such scenarios. Then, using an empirical measurement of edu and com domains as a case study, we show that 80% of such organizations making use of popular cloud-based email filtering services can be bypassed in this manner. We also discuss reasons that lead to such misconfigurations and outline challenges in hardening the binding between email filtering and hosting providers.
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1702-1711
Open AccessUnfiltered: Measuring Cloud-based Email Filtering Bypasses
Email service has increasingly been outsourced to cloud-based providers and so too has the task of filtering such messages for potential threats. Thus, customers will commonly direct that their incoming email is first sent to a third-party email filtering service (e.g., Proofpoint or Barracuda) and only the "clean" messages are then sent on to their email hosting provider (e.g., Gmail or Microsoft Exchange Online). However, this loosely coupled approach can, in theory, be bypassed if the email hosting provider is not configured to only accept messages that arrive from the email filtering service. In this paper we demonstrate that such bypasses are commonly possible. We document a multi-step methodology to infer if an organization has correctly configured its email hosting provider to guard against such scenarios. Then, using an empirical measurement of edu and com domains as a case study, we show that 80% of such organizations making use of popular cloud-based email filtering services can be bypassed in this manner. We also discuss reasons that lead to such misconfigurations and outline challenges in hardening the binding between email filtering and hosting providers.
- Open Access
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 150-162
An Empirical Analysis of Enterprise-Wide Mandatory Password Updates
Enterprise-scale mandatory password changes are disruptive, complex endeavors that require the entire workforce to prioritize a goal that is often secondary to most users. While ample literature exists around user perceptions and struggles, there are few “best practices” from the perspective of the enterprise—either to achieve the end goal or to minimize IT costs. In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of an enterprise-scale mandatory password change, covering almost 10,000 faculty and staff at an academic institution. Using a combination of user notifications logs, password update records, and help desk ticket information, we construct an empirical model of user response over time. In particular, we characterize the elements of the campaign that relate to ideal and non-ideal outcomes, including unnecessary user actions and IT help desk overhead. We aim to provide insight into successes and challenges that can generalize to other organizations implementing similar initiatives.
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 150-162
Open AccessAn Empirical Analysis of Enterprise-Wide Mandatory Password Updates
Enterprise-scale mandatory password changes are disruptive, complex endeavors that require the entire workforce to prioritize a goal that is often secondary to most users. While ample literature exists around user perceptions and struggles, there are few “best practices” from the perspective of the enterprise—either to achieve the end goal or to minimize IT costs. In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of an enterprise-scale mandatory password change, covering almost 10,000 faculty and staff at an academic institution. Using a combination of user notifications logs, password update records, and help desk ticket information, we construct an empirical model of user response over time. In particular, we characterize the elements of the campaign that relate to ideal and non-ideal outcomes, including unnecessary user actions and IT help desk overhead. We aim to provide insight into successes and challenges that can generalize to other organizations implementing similar initiatives.