Ehud Lehrer
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Ehud Lehrer has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Eilon Solan
School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel
3 shared publications - Tao Wang
International School of Economics and Management Capital University of Economics and Business 100070 Beijing China
2 shared publications - Avraham D. Tabbach
Tel Aviv University
1 shared publication - David Lagziel
Department of Economics Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Israel
1 shared publication - Dov Samet
Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
1 shared publication - Gil Bar Castellon Koltun
School of Mathematical Sciences Tel Aviv University 6997800 Tel Aviv Israel
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
The Maxmin Value of Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side and Tail-Measurable Payoffs
We study two-player zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff function is tail measurable (and not necessarily the long-run average payoff). We show that the maxmin value equals the concavification of the value function of the non-revealing game. In addition, we provide an example demonstrating that, under tail-measurable payoffs, the value of the game may fail to exist.
Open AccessThe Maxmin Value of Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side and Tail-Measurable Payoffs
We study two-player zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff function is tail measurable (and not necessarily the long-run average payoff). We show that the maxmin value equals the concavification of the value function of the non-revealing game. In addition, we provide an example demonstrating that, under tail-measurable payoffs, the value of the game may fail to exist.
- 16 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 81 (3) , 907-935
Learning and stochastic dominance with applications to subjective valuation of options
- 16 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 81 (3) , 907-935
Learning and stochastic dominance with applications to subjective valuation of options
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 204 (1) , 1-19
Interpersonal independence of knowledge and belief
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 204 (1) , 1-19
Interpersonal independence of knowledge and belief
- Open Access
Choosing a consultant in a dynamic investment problem
Consider a dynamic decision-making scenario where at every stage the investor has to choose between investing in one of two projects or gathering more information. At each stage, the investor may seek counsel from one of several consultants, who, for a fixed cost, provide partial information about the realized state. We explore the optimal strategy and its dependence on the belief and the consultation cost. Our analysis reveals that if one of the consultants discloses the state with a nonzero probability, this consultant will be used in any optimal strategy, provided the consultation cost is sufficiently small.
Open AccessChoosing a consultant in a dynamic investment problem
Consider a dynamic decision-making scenario where at every stage the investor has to choose between investing in one of two projects or gathering more information. At each stage, the investor may seek counsel from one of several consultants, who, for a fixed cost, provide partial information about the realized state. We explore the optimal strategy and its dependence on the belief and the consultation cost. Our analysis reveals that if one of the consultants discloses the state with a nonzero probability, this consultant will be used in any optimal strategy, provided the consultation cost is sufficiently small.
- 1 February 2024
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 16 (1) , 210-223
Weighted Utility and Optimism/Pessimism: A Decision-Theoretic Foundation of Various Stochastic Dominance Orders
- 1 February 2024
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 16 (1) , 210-223
Weighted Utility and Optimism/Pessimism: A Decision-Theoretic Foundation of Various Stochastic Dominance Orders
- Open Access
Bayesian Dissuasion with Bandit Exploration
We investigate a two-period Bayesian persuasion game, where the receiver faces a decision, akin to a one-armed bandit problem: to undertake an action, gaining noisy information and a corresponding positive or negative payoff, or to refrain. The sender's objective is to dissuade the receiver from taking action by furnishing information about the payoff. Our findings describe the optimal strategy for the amount and timing of information disclosure. In scenarios where the sender possesses knowledge of the receiver's first-period action or observes a noisy public signal correlated with it, the optimal strategy entails revealing information in the second period. If this alone proves to be insufficient to dissuade the receiver from acting, supplementary information is provided in the first period. In scenarios where information must be provided without conditioning on the receiver's first-period action, the optimal strategy entails revealing information exclusively in the first period.
Open AccessBayesian Dissuasion with Bandit Exploration
We investigate a two-period Bayesian persuasion game, where the receiver faces a decision, akin to a one-armed bandit problem: to undertake an action, gaining noisy information and a corresponding positive or negative payoff, or to refrain. The sender's objective is to dissuade the receiver from taking action by furnishing information about the payoff. Our findings describe the optimal strategy for the amount and timing of information disclosure. In scenarios where the sender possesses knowledge of the receiver's first-period action or observes a noisy public signal correlated with it, the optimal strategy entails revealing information in the second period. If this alone proves to be insufficient to dissuade the receiver from acting, supplementary information is provided in the first period. In scenarios where information must be provided without conditioning on the receiver's first-period action, the optimal strategy entails revealing information exclusively in the first period.
- 25 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 77 (4) , 999-1024
Performance cycles
- 25 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 77 (4) , 999-1024
Performance cycles