Dov Samet
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Dov Samet has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Schmeidler
Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
1 shared publication - Ehud Lehrer
School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University
1 shared publication - Ehud Lehrer
Economics Department Durham University DH1 3LB Durham UK
1 shared publication - Ziv Hellman
Department of Mathematics and the Centre for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 55 (1) , 28
Interim agreements
Processes of bargaining are studied in which the players reach interim agreements that serve as status quo points for further bargaining. This is modeled in Nash’s setup of bargaining problems, where the solution is a time parameterized path of interim agreements rather than a single point. We characterize path solutions for linear problems that satisfy the axioms of restarting and covariance , and show that if a Pareto efficient agreement is not reached immediately, then it is never reached in finite time. Adding the axioms of individual rationality , relevance , and monotonicity , we characterize the family of continuous Raiffa solutions and show that these solutions converge to a Pareto efficient agreement but never reach it in finite time. Finally, if a deadline is added to the bargaining problem, and the speed of bargaining is proportionally inverse to the deadline, then a Pareto efficient agreement is reached exactly at the deadline.
- 22 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 55 (1) , 28
Open AccessInterim agreements
Processes of bargaining are studied in which the players reach interim agreements that serve as status quo points for further bargaining. This is modeled in Nash’s setup of bargaining problems, where the solution is a time parameterized path of interim agreements rather than a single point. We characterize path solutions for linear problems that satisfy the axioms of restarting and covariance , and show that if a Pareto efficient agreement is not reached immediately, then it is never reached in finite time. Adding the axioms of individual rationality , relevance , and monotonicity , we characterize the family of continuous Raiffa solutions and show that these solutions converge to a Pareto efficient agreement but never reach it in finite time. Finally, if a deadline is added to the bargaining problem, and the speed of bargaining is proportionally inverse to the deadline, then a Pareto efficient agreement is reached exactly at the deadline.
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 204 (1) , 1-19
Interpersonal independence of knowledge and belief
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 204 (1) , 1-19
Interpersonal independence of knowledge and belief
- 7 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 94 (1) , 1-33
Desirability relations in Savage’s model of decision making
- 7 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 94 (1) , 1-33
Desirability relations in Savage’s model of decision making
- 27 April 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Mathematical Monthly
- Vol. 128 (5) , 435-445
An Extension of Ceva’s Theorem to n-Simplices
Ceva’s theorem, which concerns triangles, is a central result of post-Euclidean plane geometry. The three-dimensional generalization of a triangle is a tetrahedron, and the n-dimensional generalization of these is an n-simplex. We extend Ceva’s theorem to n-simplices and in doing so illustrate the considerations and choices that can be made in generalizing from plane geometry to high-dimensional geometries.
- 27 April 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Mathematical Monthly
- Vol. 128 (5) , 435-445
An Extension of Ceva’s Theorem to n-Simplices
Ceva’s theorem, which concerns triangles, is a central result of post-Euclidean plane geometry. The three-dimensional generalization of a triangle is a tetrahedron, and the n-dimensional generalization of these is an n-simplex. We extend Ceva’s theorem to n-simplices and in doing so illustrate the considerations and choices that can be made in generalizing from plane geometry to high-dimensional geometries.
- 14 December 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 45 (1-2) , 375-387
On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information
- 14 December 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 45 (1-2) , 375-387
On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information
- 1 March 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 74 (2) , 517-525
How common are common priors?
- 1 March 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 74 (2) , 517-525
How common are common priors?
- Open Access
- 9 May 2011
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 6 (2) , 269-287
Agreeing to agree
Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$ \emph{do} coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty \emph{finite} event $F$ with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at $F$ that the agents cannot tell whether or not $E$ occurred. Second, this still holds true at $F$, when $F$ itself becomes common knowledge- 9 May 2011
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 6 (2) , 269-287
Open AccessAgreeing to agree
Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$ \emph{do} coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty \emph{finite} event $F$ with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at $F$ that the agents cannot tell whether or not $E$ occurred. Second, this still holds true at $F$, when $F$ itself becomes common knowledge - 18 February 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 172 (1) , 145-155
S5 knowledge without partitions
- 18 February 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 172 (1) , 145-155
S5 knowledge without partitions