John F. Horty
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
John F. Horty has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ilaria Canavotto
Philosophy Department, University of Maryland, College Park, USA
1 shared publication Richmond H. Thomason
Intelligent Systems Program, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 52-61
Reasoning with hierarchies of open-textured predicates
- 19 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 52-61
Open AccessReasoning with hierarchies of open-textured predicates
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Bloomsbury Academic
Grant Lamond’s Account of Precedent: A Personal Encounter
ExtractJohn Horty I am grateful for comments from Ilaria Canavotto, Mark McBride and Adam Rigoni on an earlier draft of this chapter. Ever since reading Aristotle as an undergraduate, I have been intrigued by the particularist idea – which I believe to be correct – that normative generalisations cannot be formulated carefully enough to apply properly in every situation: there will always be circumstances in which the straightforward application of a normative generalisation, no matter how finely articulated, will yield the wrong result. How can we live in a world like this? Except by appealing to normative generalisations, how can we justify our own actions, or evaluate the actions of others? Questions like these have recently received sustained attention in moral philosophy due, especially, to the work of Jonathan Dancy, who argues for an extreme version of particularism according to which generalisations have no role at all to play in...
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Bloomsbury Academic
Grant Lamond’s Account of Precedent: A Personal Encounter
ExtractJohn Horty I am grateful for comments from Ilaria Canavotto, Mark McBride and Adam Rigoni on an earlier draft of this chapter. Ever since reading Aristotle as an undergraduate, I have been intrigued by the particularist idea – which I believe to be correct – that normative generalisations cannot be formulated carefully enough to apply properly in every situation: there will always be circumstances in which the straightforward application of a normative generalisation, no matter how finely articulated, will yield the wrong result. How can we live in a world like this? Except by appealing to normative generalisations, how can we justify our own actions, or evaluate the actions of others? Questions like these have recently received sustained attention in moral philosophy due, especially, to the work of Jonathan Dancy, who argues for an extreme version of particularism according to which generalisations have no role at all to play in...
- Open Access
- 25 April 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 169-191
Skepticism and floating conclusions
This chapter addresses the problem of characterizing skeptical reasoning in the face of multiple extensions, and in particular, the problems presented by the phenomenon of floating conclusions: situations in which the same conclusion is supported by different, and conflicting, defeasible arguments.
- 25 April 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 169-191
Open AccessSkepticism and floating conclusions
This chapter addresses the problem of characterizing skeptical reasoning in the face of multiple extensions, and in particular, the problems presented by the phenomenon of floating conclusions: situations in which the same conclusion is supported by different, and conflicting, defeasible arguments.
- 25 April 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 86-108
Moral conflicts
This chapter appraises the possibility of all things considered moral conflicts. The chapter considers three kinds of objections to the possibility, based on considerations from deontic logic, on conceptual considerations concerning the nature of all things considered oughts, and on an analogy between moral and physical forces.
- 25 April 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 86-108
Moral conflicts
This chapter appraises the possibility of all things considered moral conflicts. The chapter considers three kinds of objections to the possibility, based on considerations from deontic logic, on conceptual considerations concerning the nature of all things considered oughts, and on an analogy between moral and physical forces.
- 1 August 1991
- Published by SAGE Publications in Fundamenta Informaticae
- Vol. 15 (3-4) , 301-323
Conditionals and Artificial Intelligence
- 1 August 1991
- Published by SAGE Publications in Fundamenta Informaticae
- Vol. 15 (3-4) , 301-323
Conditionals and Artificial Intelligence