Ilaria Canavotto
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ilaria Canavotto has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alessandro Giordani
Catholic University of Milan
3 shared publications Alexandru Baltag
University of Amsterdam
1 shared publication- Eric Pacuit
University of Maryland, College Park, USA
1 shared publication - Francesco Berto
University of St Andrews
1 shared publication - John F. Horty
Philosophy Department and Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
1 shared publication - John Horty
Philosophy Department and Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 September 2026
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 461-472
Simplifying Structured Arguments in Hierarchical Case-Based Reasoning
We often treat earlier decisions as constraining later ones, even when the arguments justifying them differ in structure. When, and in what way, do more complex arguments constrain, or defeat, simpler ones? Building on a hierarchical model of precedent-based reasoning from AI and Law, I compare two strategies for modeling these constraints—the flattening strategy and the derived-priority strategy—and show that the former fails in two systematic respects. Based on this analysis, I formulate two rules that implement the latter.
- 10 September 2026
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 461-472
Open AccessSimplifying Structured Arguments in Hierarchical Case-Based Reasoning
We often treat earlier decisions as constraining later ones, even when the arguments justifying them differ in structure. When, and in what way, do more complex arguments constrain, or defeat, simpler ones? Building on a hierarchical model of precedent-based reasoning from AI and Law, I compare two strategies for modeling these constraints—the flattening strategy and the derived-priority strategy—and show that the former fails in two systematic respects. Based on this analysis, I formulate two rules that implement the latter.
- 16 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Artificial Intelligence and Law
- Vol. 33 (1) , 167-170
Correction to: Reasoning with inconsistent precedents
- 16 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Artificial Intelligence and Law
- Vol. 33 (1) , 167-170
Correction to: Reasoning with inconsistent precedents
- 14 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Artificial Intelligence and Law
- Vol. 33 (1) , 137-166
Reasoning with inconsistent precedents
- 14 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Artificial Intelligence and Law
- Vol. 33 (1) , 137-166
Reasoning with inconsistent precedents
- Open Access
- 7 December 2023
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 13-22
The Importance of Intermediate Factors
Bench-Capon argues that intermediate factors have no role to play in precedential constraint. We offer a constrasting perspective.
- 7 December 2023
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 13-22
Open AccessThe Importance of Intermediate Factors
Bench-Capon argues that intermediate factors have no role to play in precedential constraint. We offer a constrasting perspective.
- Open Access
- 19 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 52-61
Reasoning with hierarchies of open-textured predicates
- 19 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 52-61
Open AccessReasoning with hierarchies of open-textured predicates
- Open Access
- 5 December 2022
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 23-32
Precedential Constraint Derived from Inconsistent Case Bases
I explore a factor-based model of precedential constraint that, unlike existing models, does not rely on the assumption that the background set of precedent cases is consistent. The model I consider is a generalization of the reason model of precedential constraint that was suggested by Horty. I show that, within this framework, inconsistent case bases behave in a sensible and interesting way, both from a logical and a more practical perspective.
- 5 December 2022
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 23-32
Open AccessPrecedential Constraint Derived from Inconsistent Case Bases
I explore a factor-based model of precedential constraint that, unlike existing models, does not rely on the assumption that the background set of precedent cases is consistent. The model I consider is a generalization of the reason model of precedential constraint that was suggested by Horty. I show that, within this framework, inconsistent case bases behave in a sensible and interesting way, both from a logical and a more practical perspective.
- Open Access
- 15 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Vol. 51 (2) , 297-345
Choice-Driven Counterfactuals
In this paper, we investigate the semantics and logic ofchoice-driven counterfactuals, that is, of counterfactuals whose evaluation relies on auxiliary premises about how agents are expected to act,i.e., about theirdefault choice behavior. To do this, we merge one of the most prominent logics of agency in the philosophical literature, namely stit logic (Belnap et al. 2001; Horty 2001), with the well-known logic of counterfactuals due to Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973). A key component of our semantics for counterfactuals is to distinguish betweendeviantandnon-deviantactions at a moment, where an action available to an agent at a moment is deviant when its performance does not agree with the agent’s default choice behavior at that moment. After developing and axiomatizing a stit logic with action types, instants, and deviant actions, we study the philosophical implications and logical properties of two candidate semantics for choice-driven counterfactuals, one calledrewind modelsinspired by Lewis (Nous13(4), 455–476 1979) and the other calledindependence modelsmotivated by well-known counterexamples to Lewis’s proposal Slote (Philos. Rev.87(1), 3–27 1978). In the last part of the paper we consider how to evaluate choice-driven counterfactuals at moments arrived at by some agents performing a deviant action.
- 15 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Vol. 51 (2) , 297-345
Open AccessChoice-Driven Counterfactuals
In this paper, we investigate the semantics and logic ofchoice-driven counterfactuals, that is, of counterfactuals whose evaluation relies on auxiliary premises about how agents are expected to act,i.e., about theirdefault choice behavior. To do this, we merge one of the most prominent logics of agency in the philosophical literature, namely stit logic (Belnap et al. 2001; Horty 2001), with the well-known logic of counterfactuals due to Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973). A key component of our semantics for counterfactuals is to distinguish betweendeviantandnon-deviantactions at a moment, where an action available to an agent at a moment is deviant when its performance does not agree with the agent’s default choice behavior at that moment. After developing and axiomatizing a stit logic with action types, instants, and deviant actions, we study the philosophical implications and logical properties of two candidate semantics for choice-driven counterfactuals, one calledrewind modelsinspired by Lewis (Nous13(4), 455–476 1979) and the other calledindependence modelsmotivated by well-known counterexamples to Lewis’s proposal Slote (Philos. Rev.87(1), 3–27 1978). In the last part of the paper we consider how to evaluate choice-driven counterfactuals at moments arrived at by some agents performing a deviant action.
- 20 November 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 149-176
Causal Agency and Responsibility: A Refinement of STIT Logic
- 20 November 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 149-176
Causal Agency and Responsibility: A Refinement of STIT Logic
- Open Access
- 16 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 87 (5) , 2343-2373
An Extensional Mereology for Structured Entities
In this paper, we present an extensional system of mereology suitable to account for the intuitive distinction between heaplike and non-heaplike entities. Since the need to capture this distinction has been a key motivation for non-extensional mereologies, we first assess the main non-extensional systems advanced in the last years and highlight some mereological and metaphysical difficulties they involve. We then advance a novel program, according to which the distinction between heaplike and non-heaplike entities can be accounted for by bringing together the parthood relation characterized by classical extensional mereology and an Aristotelian extensional notion of potential parthood. Thus, while rejecting the thesis of mereological monism, our proposal is consistent with the thesis of mereological extensionalism. We show that within this framework it is possible to characterize the above-mentioned distinction, to define the relation of material constitution, and to capture three fundamental standpoints in metaphysics.
- 16 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 87 (5) , 2343-2373
Open AccessAn Extensional Mereology for Structured Entities
In this paper, we present an extensional system of mereology suitable to account for the intuitive distinction between heaplike and non-heaplike entities. Since the need to capture this distinction has been a key motivation for non-extensional mereologies, we first assess the main non-extensional systems advanced in the last years and highlight some mereological and metaphysical difficulties they involve. We then advance a novel program, according to which the distinction between heaplike and non-heaplike entities can be accounted for by bringing together the parthood relation characterized by classical extensional mereology and an Aristotelian extensional notion of potential parthood. Thus, while rejecting the thesis of mereological monism, our proposal is consistent with the thesis of mereological extensionalism. We show that within this framework it is possible to characterize the above-mentioned distinction, to define the relation of material constitution, and to capture three fundamental standpoints in metaphysics.
- 29 June 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 15 (2) , 362-387
VOLUNTARY IMAGINATION: A FINE-GRAINED ANALYSIS
- 29 June 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 15 (2) , 362-387
VOLUNTARY IMAGINATION: A FINE-GRAINED ANALYSIS