Simone Sommer Degn
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Simone Sommer Degn has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andreas Albertsen
Aarhus University
1 shared publication - Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
CEPDISC, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
1 shared publication Lasse Laustsen
Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
1 shared publication- Søren Flinch Midtgaard
Department of Political Science and Centre for the Experimental‐Philosophical Study of Discrimination (CEPDISC) Aarhus University Aarhus C Denmark
1 shared publication - Søren Serritzlew
Department of Political Science Aarhus University Aarhus Denmark
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 43 (2) , 549-569
Yes, Friendship and Love Can Be Bought and Sold
Can friendship and love be bought and sold? I argue yes, contrary to philosophical consensus. The prevailing view rests on the common error of over‐reliance on idealized conceptions of friendship and love that bear little resemblance to actual relationships. Realistic approaches offer more recognizable standards for friendship and love, and support the view that commercial personal relations are possible. I reconstruct and respond to three main objections to my argument: the Involuntariness Objection and the Transformation Objection fail on theoretical grounds; mutual care can be willed, and market mediation need not determine how parties value one another. The Bizarre Objection – that actual cases are too peculiar to count as friendship and love – fails on analysis of four cases (virtual companionship, healthcare companions, Victorian lady's companions, and sex work companionship). The cases demonstrate that actual commercial relationships exhibit the core features of realistic friendship and love. The article finds that the gap between paid and unpaid personal relationships is narrower than commonly assumed. The existence of the market in personal relations raises many questions for future research.
- 15 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 43 (2) , 549-569
Open AccessYes, Friendship and Love Can Be Bought and Sold
Can friendship and love be bought and sold? I argue yes, contrary to philosophical consensus. The prevailing view rests on the common error of over‐reliance on idealized conceptions of friendship and love that bear little resemblance to actual relationships. Realistic approaches offer more recognizable standards for friendship and love, and support the view that commercial personal relations are possible. I reconstruct and respond to three main objections to my argument: the Involuntariness Objection and the Transformation Objection fail on theoretical grounds; mutual care can be willed, and market mediation need not determine how parties value one another. The Bizarre Objection – that actual cases are too peculiar to count as friendship and love – fails on analysis of four cases (virtual companionship, healthcare companions, Victorian lady's companions, and sex work companionship). The cases demonstrate that actual commercial relationships exhibit the core features of realistic friendship and love. The article finds that the gap between paid and unpaid personal relationships is narrower than commonly assumed. The existence of the market in personal relations raises many questions for future research.
- Open Access
- 26 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (4) , 172
Whorephobia on Dating Platforms: Ethical Platform Governance
Dating platforms generally prohibit commercial sex on their platforms and warn users that they will be deplatformed if they engage in the sex market on them. Sex workers, however, report experiencing deplatforming even when they are seeking personal, non-commercial relationships on dating platforms, which raises complaints of whorephobia. The article offers a conceptual analysis of whorephobia and proposes revisions to the concept. It argues that deplatforming sex workers qua daters constitutes wrongful discrimination on three influential accounts which raises the need for justification of the practice. Potential justifications for excluding sex workers are considered but found unpersuasive. The article finds one exception, namely, that dating platforms are morally justified in prohibiting sex work on their platforms due to an incompatibility between sex work and the dating sphere. Ultimately, morality seems to require that dating platforms permit sex workers qua daters. The paper concludes by proposing promising platform governance solutions for ethically responsible platform moderation.
- 26 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (4) , 172
Open AccessWhorephobia on Dating Platforms: Ethical Platform Governance
Dating platforms generally prohibit commercial sex on their platforms and warn users that they will be deplatformed if they engage in the sex market on them. Sex workers, however, report experiencing deplatforming even when they are seeking personal, non-commercial relationships on dating platforms, which raises complaints of whorephobia. The article offers a conceptual analysis of whorephobia and proposes revisions to the concept. It argues that deplatforming sex workers qua daters constitutes wrongful discrimination on three influential accounts which raises the need for justification of the practice. Potential justifications for excluding sex workers are considered but found unpersuasive. The article finds one exception, namely, that dating platforms are morally justified in prohibiting sex work on their platforms due to an incompatibility between sex work and the dating sphere. Ultimately, morality seems to require that dating platforms permit sex workers qua daters. The paper concludes by proposing promising platform governance solutions for ethically responsible platform moderation.
- Open Access
Do we have a duty not to discriminate when we date?
Many believe that we have a duty not to discriminate when we act in certain ‘public’ capacities, for example when it is our job to select among various candidates for a job. In contrast, they deny that we have duties of a similar kind in our private lives, for example in our romantic lives. In this paper, we challenge this well‐entrenched asymmetry. We do so primarily by canvassing and rebutting central arguments to the effect that acting discriminatorily, for example when we date, is something we have a right to, including arguments from: (1) freedom of association, (2) legitimate self‐interest, (3) power and (4) love versus duties. In this way, we challenge a common permissive view regarding private discrimination.
Open AccessDo we have a duty not to discriminate when we date?
Many believe that we have a duty not to discriminate when we act in certain ‘public’ capacities, for example when it is our job to select among various candidates for a job. In contrast, they deny that we have duties of a similar kind in our private lives, for example in our romantic lives. In this paper, we challenge this well‐entrenched asymmetry. We do so primarily by canvassing and rebutting central arguments to the effect that acting discriminatorily, for example when we date, is something we have a right to, including arguments from: (1) freedom of association, (2) legitimate self‐interest, (3) power and (4) love versus duties. In this way, we challenge a common permissive view regarding private discrimination.
- Open Access
- 22 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- p. 1-26
Can minorities discriminate against majorities? An analysis of academic and ordinary usage
- 22 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- p. 1-26
Open AccessCan minorities discriminate against majorities? An analysis of academic and ordinary usage
- Open Access
- 2 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 37 (6) , 1378-1406
What is the folk concept of discrimination? Discriminators and comparators
- 2 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 37 (6) , 1378-1406
Open AccessWhat is the folk concept of discrimination? Discriminators and comparators
- 15 May 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Moral Philosophy and Politics
- Vol. 11 (2) , 297-317
The Deliberative Duty and Other Individual Antidiscrimination Duties in the Dating Sphere
What does morality require of individuals in their dating and sex life? In this article I challenge recent outlines of antidiscrimination duties in the dating sphere and present a plausible alternative: the deliberative duty. This duty avoids the risks and limitations of earlier outlines: it is time-sensitive regarding the malleability of intimate preferences, it avoids being too demanding on the duty-bearer and minimizes the risk of generating mere dutiful attraction behavior towards right-holders. In addition, it is better suited for universal action guidance in the dating sphere than earlier outlines of individual antidiscrimination duties.
- 15 May 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Moral Philosophy and Politics
- Vol. 11 (2) , 297-317
The Deliberative Duty and Other Individual Antidiscrimination Duties in the Dating Sphere
What does morality require of individuals in their dating and sex life? In this article I challenge recent outlines of antidiscrimination duties in the dating sphere and present a plausible alternative: the deliberative duty. This duty avoids the risks and limitations of earlier outlines: it is time-sensitive regarding the malleability of intimate preferences, it avoids being too demanding on the duty-bearer and minimizes the risk of generating mere dutiful attraction behavior towards right-holders. In addition, it is better suited for universal action guidance in the dating sphere than earlier outlines of individual antidiscrimination duties.