Emilie Dargaud
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Emilie Dargaud has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Armel Jacques
CEMOI, Université de La Réunion, Faculté de Droit et d’Economie, 15, avenue René Cassin, 97715 Saint-Denis messag cedex 9, Saint-Denis, Réunion, France
6 shared publications Andrea Mantovani
3 shared publications- Carlo Reggiani
University of Manchester, Manchester, England
3 shared publications Armel Jacques
CEMOI TEPP-CNRS (FR2042), Université de La Réunion, Faculté de Droit et d’Economie , 15, Avenue René Cassin, 97715 Saint-Denis Messag Cedex 9 , Saint-Denis Cedex , France
1 shared publicationMaxime Menuet
GREDEG Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS Nice France
1 shared publication- Maxime Menuet
Univ. Orleans, LEO FA45067 Orleans France
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Slow down investigations to self-report
The introduction of a leniency program may encourage multi-product firms involved in price cartels on several markets to adopt a decentralized organization. This slows down antitrust investigations. The discovery of another cartel in the course of an investigation into a first cartel is thus postponed. This delay gives firms more time to apply for leniency for other cartels not yet discovered. A decentralized organization thus enables a greater reduction in fines to be obtained when firms wish to benefit from the leniency program. It does, however, have the disadvantage of introducing intra-firm competition and reducing collusion prices. A leniency program can therefore have a marginal deterrent effect by modifying firms' internal organization, thereby reducing collusion prices. A larger fine reduction can reinforce this marginal deterrent effect. However, it can also produce an anti-competitive effect by enabling the formation of new cartels.
Open AccessSlow down investigations to self-report
The introduction of a leniency program may encourage multi-product firms involved in price cartels on several markets to adopt a decentralized organization. This slows down antitrust investigations. The discovery of another cartel in the course of an investigation into a first cartel is thus postponed. This delay gives firms more time to apply for leniency for other cartels not yet discovered. A decentralized organization thus enables a greater reduction in fines to be obtained when firms wish to benefit from the leniency program. It does, however, have the disadvantage of introducing intra-firm competition and reducing collusion prices. A leniency program can therefore have a marginal deterrent effect by modifying firms' internal organization, thereby reducing collusion prices. A larger fine reduction can reinforce this marginal deterrent effect. However, it can also produce an anti-competitive effect by enabling the formation of new cartels.
- 18 September 2023
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 45 (1) , 315-325
Collusion and predation under Cournot competition
This paper studies how predation strategies can affect the sustainability of collusion in a duopoly. Collusion may be sustained at equilibrium for intermediate discount factors. In such instances, predation implies that punishment strategies will yield low subgame perfect payoffs, thereby making collusion easier to sustain. For low discount factors, collusion is not sustainable because of the high incentives to deviate to Cournot–Nash strategies. Moreover, for high discount factors, it is always optimal to predate a colluding firm, thus contrasting with much of the earlier literature showing that collusion is only achievable by sufficiently patient firms.
- 18 September 2023
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 45 (1) , 315-325
Collusion and predation under Cournot competition
This paper studies how predation strategies can affect the sustainability of collusion in a duopoly. Collusion may be sustained at equilibrium for intermediate discount factors. In such instances, predation implies that punishment strategies will yield low subgame perfect payoffs, thereby making collusion easier to sustain. For low discount factors, collusion is not sustainable because of the high incentives to deviate to Cournot–Nash strategies. Moreover, for high discount factors, it is always optimal to predate a colluding firm, thus contrasting with much of the earlier literature showing that collusion is only achievable by sufficiently patient firms.
- 12 September 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Law & Economics
- Vol. 19 (3) , 351-392
Intermittent Collusive Agreements: Antitrust Policy and Business Cycles
In this article we study collusive strategies and the optimal level of fines when firms face random demand fluctuations. Collusive firms can choose to alternate collusive periods with more competitive periods: such an intermittent strategy can be implemented particularly if demand variability is high. Firms then set competitive prices during recessions to cancel the risk of cartel detection and keep the ability to cartelize for the future. If the maximum fine is too low to fully deter cartels, the antitrust authority can influence the choice of collusive agreement by varying the level of fines according to demand states. If the demand is highly variable, the antitrust authority may induce firms to collude in all demand states (by decreasing the fine during recessions), in order to detect and break up cartels more easily. On the other hand, if the demand variability is low the optimal policy may be to reduce the fine when demand is high.
- 12 September 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Law & Economics
- Vol. 19 (3) , 351-392
Intermittent Collusive Agreements: Antitrust Policy and Business Cycles
In this article we study collusive strategies and the optimal level of fines when firms face random demand fluctuations. Collusive firms can choose to alternate collusive periods with more competitive periods: such an intermittent strategy can be implemented particularly if demand variability is high. Firms then set competitive prices during recessions to cancel the risk of cartel detection and keep the ability to cartelize for the future. If the maximum fine is too low to fully deter cartels, the antitrust authority can influence the choice of collusive agreement by varying the level of fines according to demand states. If the demand is highly variable, the antitrust authority may induce firms to collude in all demand states (by decreasing the fine during recessions), in order to detect and break up cartels more easily. On the other hand, if the demand variability is low the optimal policy may be to reduce the fine when demand is high.
- Open Access
Collusion and Predation Under Cournot Competition
This paper studies how predation strategies can affect the sustainability of collusion. We demonstrate that in the presence of few competitors collusion may be sustained at equilibrium for intermediate discount factors. In such instances predation implies that punishment strategies will yield low subgame perfect payoffs, thereby making collusion easier to sustain. For low discount factors collusion is not sustainable because of the high incentives to deviate to Cournot-Nash strategies. Moreover, for high discount factors it is always optimal to predate colluding firms, thus contrasting with much of the earlier literature showing that collusion is only achievable by sufficiently patient firms.
Open AccessCollusion and Predation Under Cournot Competition
This paper studies how predation strategies can affect the sustainability of collusion. We demonstrate that in the presence of few competitors collusion may be sustained at equilibrium for intermediate discount factors. In such instances predation implies that punishment strategies will yield low subgame perfect payoffs, thereby making collusion easier to sustain. For low discount factors collusion is not sustainable because of the high incentives to deviate to Cournot-Nash strategies. Moreover, for high discount factors it is always optimal to predate colluding firms, thus contrasting with much of the earlier literature showing that collusion is only achievable by sufficiently patient firms.
- Open Access
Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization
When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, the introduction of leniency programs may induce firms to compartmentalize their activities. Doing so results in slowdown antitrust investigations and decentralized firm can easily request leniency for a second cartel after the detection of an other. We study how variation of fine reduction may produce procompetitive but also procollusive effects.
Open AccessSlowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization
When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, the introduction of leniency programs may induce firms to compartmentalize their activities. Doing so results in slowdown antitrust investigations and decentralized firm can easily request leniency for a second cartel after the detection of an other. We study how variation of fine reduction may produce procompetitive but also procollusive effects.
- 25 January 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Law & Economics
Leniency Programs and Cartel Organization of Multiproduct Firms
When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, they may compartmentalize these agreements by having different individuals manage them so as to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Leniency programs can overcome this strategy but may also lead to procollusive effects for centralized firms. The introduction of US amnesty plus programs can have different competitive effects, and leniency programs may modify firms’ choice of internal structure.
- 25 January 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Law & Economics
Leniency Programs and Cartel Organization of Multiproduct Firms
When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, they may compartmentalize these agreements by having different individuals manage them so as to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Leniency programs can overcome this strategy but may also lead to procollusive effects for centralized firms. The introduction of US amnesty plus programs can have different competitive effects, and leniency programs may modify firms’ choice of internal structure.
- Open Access
Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization
When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, the introduction of leniency programs may induce firms to compartmentalize their activities. Doing so results in slowdown antitrust investigations and decentralized firm can easily request leniency for a second cartel after the detection of an other. We study how variation of fine reduction may produce procompetitive but also procollusive effects.
Open AccessSlowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization
When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, the introduction of leniency programs may induce firms to compartmentalize their activities. Doing so results in slowdown antitrust investigations and decentralized firm can easily request leniency for a second cartel after the detection of an other. We study how variation of fine reduction may produce procompetitive but also procollusive effects.
- 20 June 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Competition Law & Economics
- Vol. 12 (2) , 375-399
CARTEL PUNISHMENT AND THE DISTORTIVE EFFECTS OF FINES
The fight against cartels is a priority for antitrust authorities worldwide but the goal is pursued in many different ways. Several types of fines can be levied on firms that are caught colluding but one common trait is that fines are usually distortive. In this article we focus on the economic effects of distortive fines. To this end, we compare a fine based on the cartel profit as opposed to one based on the cartel damage. We study the effects of the two fines and show that a potential trade-off between ex ante deterrence and ex post consumer surplus may occur. We show that such a trade-off is of particular relevance when antitrust authorities face exogenous fine caps, as it is often the case in practice. The results are robust to a number of extensions, including the relevant case of fines designed to punish managerial firms involved in cartel activities.
- 20 June 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Competition Law & Economics
- Vol. 12 (2) , 375-399
CARTEL PUNISHMENT AND THE DISTORTIVE EFFECTS OF FINES
The fight against cartels is a priority for antitrust authorities worldwide but the goal is pursued in many different ways. Several types of fines can be levied on firms that are caught colluding but one common trait is that fines are usually distortive. In this article we focus on the economic effects of distortive fines. To this end, we compare a fine based on the cartel profit as opposed to one based on the cartel damage. We study the effects of the two fines and show that a potential trade-off between ex ante deterrence and ex post consumer surplus may occur. We show that such a trade-off is of particular relevance when antitrust authorities face exogenous fine caps, as it is often the case in practice. The results are robust to a number of extensions, including the relevant case of fines designed to punish managerial firms involved in cartel activities.
- Open Access
Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs
When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements on different markets, they may wish to compartmentalize their agreements managing them with different individuals in order to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Sometimes the leniency programs are effcient to defeat this strategy and to induce CEO to launch internal investigations and report the obtained hard evidence to the antitrust authority. However these programs may have pro-collusive effects for centralized firms.
Open AccessEndogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs
When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements on different markets, they may wish to compartmentalize their agreements managing them with different individuals in order to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Sometimes the leniency programs are effcient to defeat this strategy and to induce CEO to launch internal investigations and report the obtained hard evidence to the antitrust authority. However these programs may have pro-collusive effects for centralized firms.
- 5 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 114 (2) , 153-176
Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy
- 5 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 114 (2) , 153-176
Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy