Carlo Reggiani
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Carlo Reggiani has a total of 34 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Leonardo Madio
University of Padova, Padua, Italy
5 shared publications Andrea Mantovani
4 shared publications- Andrea Mantovani
TBS Business School, Toulouse, France
3 shared publications Emilie Dargaud
French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Institute of Economic Theory and Analysis (GATE); Université de la Réunion; University of Lyon 2
3 shared publications- Emilie Dargaud
GATE University of Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, UMR 5824 Ecully France
3 shared publications Flavio Delbono
Department of Economics, University of Bologna , Bologna 40126
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 5 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Vol. 69 (1) , 20
Regulating physicians’ prices in the presence of health platforms
- 5 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Vol. 69 (1) , 20
Regulating physicians’ prices in the presence of health platforms
- Open Access
- 24 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Are You 18? Age Verification and Adult-only Consumption in the US
Several U.S. states now require age verification for accessing online pornography. We compile domain-state-week traffic for major adult platforms across fifteen states and estimate the causal impact of age verification laws using a difference-indifferences design with staggered adoption. In treated states, platforms that implemented ageverification gates experienced large declines in observed visit (e.g., xHamster), while large free-access sites that remained ungated during the sample period (e.g., XNXX, XVideos) gained 35-40%, consistent with substantial cross-platform substitution. By contrast, registration-and payment-based platforms (e.g., OnlyFans, Stripchat) exhibit smaller changes, consistent with lower marginal frictions when users are already authenticated. Overall, the evidence suggests that age-verification laws can reallocate observed traffic across major platforms in our sample while reducing visits to adopting and blocked domains.
- 24 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAre You 18? Age Verification and Adult-only Consumption in the US
Several U.S. states now require age verification for accessing online pornography. We compile domain-state-week traffic for major adult platforms across fifteen states and estimate the causal impact of age verification laws using a difference-indifferences design with staggered adoption. In treated states, platforms that implemented ageverification gates experienced large declines in observed visit (e.g., xHamster), while large free-access sites that remained ungated during the sample period (e.g., XNXX, XVideos) gained 35-40%, consistent with substantial cross-platform substitution. By contrast, registration-and payment-based platforms (e.g., OnlyFans, Stripchat) exhibit smaller changes, consistent with lower marginal frictions when users are already authenticated. Overall, the evidence suggests that age-verification laws can reallocate observed traffic across major platforms in our sample while reducing visits to adopting and blocked domains.
- 10 March 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Economic Papers
- Vol. 77 (3) , 905-917
The degeneration of workers’ cooperatives under endogenous membership in mixed oligopoly
We propose a new model of mixed oligopoly where a workers’ cooperative firm competes with a number of profit-maximizing companies. Building upon a large empirical evidence, we innovate as compared to the traditional literature on the objective function of the cooperative; moreover, its membership is treated as endogenous in the Cournot–Nash equilibrium. We show which factors may be responsible for the degeneration of the workers’ cooperative firm, which occurs when the number of its members shrinks with respect to the overall employees.
- 10 March 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Economic Papers
- Vol. 77 (3) , 905-917
The degeneration of workers’ cooperatives under endogenous membership in mixed oligopoly
We propose a new model of mixed oligopoly where a workers’ cooperative firm competes with a number of profit-maximizing companies. Building upon a large empirical evidence, we innovate as compared to the traditional literature on the objective function of the cooperative; moreover, its membership is treated as endogenous in the Cournot–Nash equilibrium. We show which factors may be responsible for the degeneration of the workers’ cooperative firm, which occurs when the number of its members shrinks with respect to the overall employees.
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Tourism Management Perspectives
- Vol. 54
Platform-enabled innovation adoption in the tourism sector: A case study on Booking.com
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Tourism Management Perspectives
- Vol. 54
Platform-enabled innovation adoption in the tourism sector: A case study on Booking.com
- Open Access
- 12 September 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Economic Papers
- Vol. 74 (3) , 820-839
Data brokers co-opetition
Data brokers share consumer data with rivals and, at the same time, compete with them for selling. We propose a ‘co-opetition’ game of data brokers and characterize their optimal strategies. When data are ‘sub-additive’ with the merged value net of the merging cost being lower than the sum of the values of individual datasets, data brokers are more likely to share their data and sell them jointly. When data are ‘super-additive’, with the merged value being greater than the sum of the individual datasets, competition emerges more often. Finally, data sharing is more likely when data brokers are more efficient at merging datasets than data buyers.
- 12 September 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Economic Papers
- Vol. 74 (3) , 820-839
Open AccessData brokers co-opetition
Data brokers share consumer data with rivals and, at the same time, compete with them for selling. We propose a ‘co-opetition’ game of data brokers and characterize their optimal strategies. When data are ‘sub-additive’ with the merged value net of the merging cost being lower than the sum of the values of individual datasets, data brokers are more likely to share their data and sell them jointly. When data are ‘super-additive’, with the merged value being greater than the sum of the individual datasets, competition emerges more often. Finally, data sharing is more likely when data brokers are more efficient at merging datasets than data buyers.
- 24 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 129-167
Non-localised Spatial Competition: The “Spokes Model”
- 24 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 129-167
Non-localised Spatial Competition: The “Spokes Model”
- Open Access
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Data Brokers Co-Opetition
Data brokers share consumer data with rivals and, at the same time, compete with them for selling. We propose a “co-opetition” game of data brokers and characterise their optimal strategies. When data are “sub-additive” with the merged value net of the merging cost being lower than the sum of the values of individual datasets, data brokers are more likely to share their data and sell them jointly. When data are “super-additive”, with the merged value being greater than the sum of the individual datasets, competition emerges more often. Finally, data sharing is more likely when data brokers are more efficient at merging datasets than data buyers.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessData Brokers Co-Opetition
Data brokers share consumer data with rivals and, at the same time, compete with them for selling. We propose a “co-opetition” game of data brokers and characterise their optimal strategies. When data are “sub-additive” with the merged value net of the merging cost being lower than the sum of the values of individual datasets, data brokers are more likely to share their data and sell them jointly. When data are “super-additive”, with the merged value being greater than the sum of the individual datasets, competition emerges more often. Finally, data sharing is more likely when data brokers are more efficient at merging datasets than data buyers.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Exclusive Data, Price Manipulation and Market Leadership
The unprecedented access of firms to consumer level data not only facilitates more precisely targeted individual pricing but also alters firms' strategic incentives. We show that exclusive access to a list of consumers can provide incentives for a firm to endogenously assume the price leader's role, and so to strategically manipulate its rival's price. Prices and profits are non-monotonic in the length of the consumer list. For an intermediate size, price leadership entails a semi-collusive outcome, characterized by supra-competitive prices and low consumer surplus. In contrast, for short or long lists of consumers, exclusive data availability intensifies market competition.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessExclusive Data, Price Manipulation and Market Leadership
The unprecedented access of firms to consumer level data not only facilitates more precisely targeted individual pricing but also alters firms' strategic incentives. We show that exclusive access to a list of consumers can provide incentives for a firm to endogenously assume the price leader's role, and so to strategically manipulate its rival's price. Prices and profits are non-monotonic in the length of the consumer list. For an intermediate size, price leadership entails a semi-collusive outcome, characterized by supra-competitive prices and low consumer surplus. In contrast, for short or long lists of consumers, exclusive data availability intensifies market competition.
- Open Access
- 10 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Social Information and Consumer Heterogeneity
We study the incentives of a social network to control two types of information circulating on its platform, namely display advertising by two quality-differentiated firms and "social information" (purchasing decisions shared among consumers). Consumers' choices are influenced by both of these communication channels, whereas the network gets revenue only through advertising. We characterize the equilibrium level of network diffusion of social information and the firms' expenditure on advertising. We show that depending on consumers' heterogeneous response to advertising, social information can compete with or complement display advertising. Moreover, in every equilibrium each consumer almost surely purchases the superior product with a strictly higher probability, and that receiving social information almost surely further increases such probability. Finally, social information almost surely raises social welfare, thereby establishing the existence of a welfare-maximizing equilibrium.
- 10 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSocial Information and Consumer Heterogeneity
We study the incentives of a social network to control two types of information circulating on its platform, namely display advertising by two quality-differentiated firms and "social information" (purchasing decisions shared among consumers). Consumers' choices are influenced by both of these communication channels, whereas the network gets revenue only through advertising. We characterize the equilibrium level of network diffusion of social information and the firms' expenditure on advertising. We show that depending on consumers' heterogeneous response to advertising, social information can compete with or complement display advertising. Moreover, in every equilibrium each consumer almost surely purchases the superior product with a strictly higher probability, and that receiving social information almost surely further increases such probability. Finally, social information almost surely raises social welfare, thereby establishing the existence of a welfare-maximizing equilibrium.
- 13 April 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice
- Vol. 9 (10) , 650-654
On the Economic Effects of Price Parity Clauses - What Do We Know Three Years Later?
Price parity clauses, also known as most favoured nations (MFN) provisions, are contractual terms used by online platforms to prevent client sellers from offering their products or services at cheaper prices on alternative sales channels. They are widespread in industries such as entertainment, insurance, energy supply, digital goods, and payment systems. Competition authorities around the world are increasingly concerned about the anticompetitive effects of these clauses, especially in markets dominated by few players. In the past years, EU national competition authorities (NCAs) have reached important decisions on parity clauses adopted by leading online travel agencies (OTAs) such as Booking.com and Expedia. Tourist accommodation in 2014 was booked online for 55% of the...
- 13 April 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice
- Vol. 9 (10) , 650-654
On the Economic Effects of Price Parity Clauses - What Do We Know Three Years Later?
Price parity clauses, also known as most favoured nations (MFN) provisions, are contractual terms used by online platforms to prevent client sellers from offering their products or services at cheaper prices on alternative sales channels. They are widespread in industries such as entertainment, insurance, energy supply, digital goods, and payment systems. Competition authorities around the world are increasingly concerned about the anticompetitive effects of these clauses, especially in markets dominated by few players. In the past years, EU national competition authorities (NCAs) have reached important decisions on parity clauses adopted by leading online travel agencies (OTAs) such as Booking.com and Expedia. Tourist accommodation in 2014 was booked online for 55% of the...