JZJingjing Zhao

Jingjing Zhao

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Jingjing Zhao has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Strategic Interplay Between the Platform’s Store Brand Positioning and the Manufacturer’s Core Category Innovation

    by Jingjing Zhao

    In practice, platforms are likely to target popular or niche product markets to introduce store brands (SBs). However, existing studies on horizontal SB positioning mainly focus on product similarity or attribute differentiation and do not clarify how such positioning should be chosen when national brand manufacturers (NBMs) strategically respond through innovation. Motivated by the conflict between the NBs and SBs, as well as the upstream–downstream co-opetition induced by the platform’s dual role, we develop a game-theoretic model to analyze the interplay between the platform’s SB positioning strategy and the NBM’s core category innovation decisions to provide new insights for promoting supply chain coordination. We find that first, when consumers prefer the SB product intended for the popular market, the platform should introduce an SB targeting the popular market if the NBM is expected to either refrain from innovation or allocate innovation efforts to the popular NB product. However, this decision may change if the NBM directs innovation efforts toward the niche NB product instead. Second, when confronting the invasion of SB, the NBM should reduce the wholesale price of the affected NB product and increase innovation efforts for that product. Additionally, under the reselling mode, a “win-win” outcome can only be achieved when the NBM directs innovation efforts to the product categories affected by SB invasion. In contrast, under the agency mode, Pareto optimality can be achieved regardless of whether the NBM allocates innovation efforts to affected or unaffected product categories.


  • Strategic Choice of Commission Formats in a Supply Chain With a Platform and Competing Manufacturers

    by Yao-Yu Wang, Jingjing Zhao, Jian-Cai Wang, Fujun Lai

    Recently, an increasing number of platforms have begun to serve as marketplaces, which allow upstream manufacturers to directly connect with consumers. In this prevalent selling mode, a platform commonly charges manufacturers commissions through the revenue-sharing format or fixed-rent format. By building game-theoretical models, this study investigates the performance differences between the two commission formats and explores the optimal commission strategy of the platform facing competing manufacturers. Our results show that compared to the fixed-rent format, the revenue-sharing format, which leads to lower required per-unit commissions, lower prices, and higher demand, can weaken the platform's dominance. In addition, the competition between upstream manufacturers plays a critical role in the choice of the commission format by the platform. Specifically, when the competition intensity is low, as the commission rate increases, the platform's preference evolves from a pure fixed-rent strategy to a hybrid strategy and then to a pure revenue-sharing strategy. As upstream competition intensifies, the platform's preference for the revenue-sharing format begins to wane. That is, when the competition intensity is moderate, a hybrid strategy is preferred by the platform even if the commission rate is sufficiently high. Moreover, when upstream competition is fierce, the platform should adopt the pure fixed-rent strategy, regardless of the commission rate. Furthermore, we also find that the dominant strategy of both manufacturers is to adopt the revenue-sharing format. However, neither of them can achieve the highest profit in the equilibrium outcome. If a manufacturer wants to win the competition, she must make efforts to induce her competitor to adopt the fixed-rent format while maintaining her own dominant commission choice.