JWJian-Cai Wang

Jian-Cai Wang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Jian-Cai Wang has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Service strategy of a sharing platform in a supply chain under information asymmetry

    by Zi‐Han Gong, Jian‐Cai Wang, Yao‐Yu Wang, Dan‐Yang Xu

    Sharing platforms can operate in a B2C (business‐to‐customer) mode, a C2C (customer‐to‐customer) mode, or a hybrid. The choice of sharing mode not only influences downstream customers but also has consequences for upstream product manufacturers. Additionally, the sharing platform's ability to gather user and provider data creates information advantages over manufacturers. Motivated by this, we consider a supply chain where a manufacturer can sell products to a sharing platform, where the latter holds private information about the proportion of renters. A type‐dependent screening model is developed to study the sharing platform's service strategy and the manufacturer's contract design. Our findings indicate that, under information symmetry, when the cannibalization effect from B2C intensifies (i.e., the renter proportion and service fee are high), expanding the customer base or raising the service fee can harm the sharing platform. However, when this effect is weak, adopting a hybrid mode allows the sharing platform to benefit from broader market coverage and a higher fee. Under information asymmetry, the sharing platform is classified as either H ‐type or L ‐type based on its private information. When the level of information uncertainty is high, the manufacturer may shut down the inefficient L ‐type sharing platform. Alternatively, if the manufacturer does not shut down the L ‐type sharing platform, when the service fee is low, both types adopt the hybrid mode, and the manufacturer suffers as the sharing platform receives more commission income from the C2C mode. Interestingly, the sharing platform's profit may be non‐monotonic in the level of information uncertainty.


  • Does a Manufacturer Benefit from Selling to a Better-Forecasting Retailer in a Supply Chain with Responsive Pricing?

    by Zi-Han Gong, Jian-Cai Wang, Yao-Yu Wang

    Given that firms may have to make stocking decisions before learning real demand due to long production lead times but can adjust retail prices rapidly in response to realized demand, this paper considers a supply chain with responsive pricing, in which a manufacturer sells a product to a newsvendor-type retailer and the latter possesses imperfect forecasting capability about market demand (i.e., can observe an imperfect private demand signal). We analyze the effects of demand uncertainty and forecasting capability on pricing and stocking decisions, and further examine whether the manufacturer benefits from a retailer with strong forecasting capability. We show that, when demand uncertainty is high, the manufacturer chooses a retailer with worst or best forecasting capability, and the retailer makes a stocking decision such that there will exist leftovers with the realized demand being low (i.e., overstocking) or orders nothing. Differently, under moderate demand uncertainty, the manufacturer chooses a retailer with intermediate forecasting capability and the high-demand-signal retailer makes an overstocking decision, while the low-demand-signal retailer always sells all stocked products (i.e., understocking). When demand uncertainty is low, the manufacturer does not care about the retailer’s forecasting capability. We also find that, the improvement in forecasting capability does not always benefit the retailer when the demand uncertainty is moderate. Finally, we discuss the impacts of production cost and demand signal acquisition cost on the manufacturer’s preference.

  • Strategic Choice of Commission Formats in a Supply Chain With a Platform and Competing Manufacturers

    by Yao-Yu Wang, Jingjing Zhao, Jian-Cai Wang, Fujun Lai

    Recently, an increasing number of platforms have begun to serve as marketplaces, which allow upstream manufacturers to directly connect with consumers. In this prevalent selling mode, a platform commonly charges manufacturers commissions through the revenue-sharing format or fixed-rent format. By building game-theoretical models, this study investigates the performance differences between the two commission formats and explores the optimal commission strategy of the platform facing competing manufacturers. Our results show that compared to the fixed-rent format, the revenue-sharing format, which leads to lower required per-unit commissions, lower prices, and higher demand, can weaken the platform's dominance. In addition, the competition between upstream manufacturers plays a critical role in the choice of the commission format by the platform. Specifically, when the competition intensity is low, as the commission rate increases, the platform's preference evolves from a pure fixed-rent strategy to a hybrid strategy and then to a pure revenue-sharing strategy. As upstream competition intensifies, the platform's preference for the revenue-sharing format begins to wane. That is, when the competition intensity is moderate, a hybrid strategy is preferred by the platform even if the commission rate is sufficiently high. Moreover, when upstream competition is fierce, the platform should adopt the pure fixed-rent strategy, regardless of the commission rate. Furthermore, we also find that the dominant strategy of both manufacturers is to adopt the revenue-sharing format. However, neither of them can achieve the highest profit in the equilibrium outcome. If a manufacturer wants to win the competition, she must make efforts to induce her competitor to adopt the fixed-rent format while maintaining her own dominant commission choice.


  • Uniform vs. retailer-specific pricing: How a supplier responds to the dominant retailers’ markup pricing strategy

    by Yao-Yu Wang, Yue Tan, Jian-Cai Wang, Fujun Lai

    This paper investigates how dominant retailers should choose appropriate markup pricing strategies (a fixed-dollar markup, or a percentage markup), and how their supplier responds by choosing wholesale pricing strategies (a retailer-specific wholesale pricing, or a uniform wholesale pricing). Our results show that, all other things being equal, the uniform wholesale pricing strategy weakens the position of the retailers in the supply chain and thus is more favorable for the supplier. Specifically, when both retailers choose the same markup scheme, it is better for the supplier to choose the uniform wholesale pricing strategy since it can lead a higher profit for himself. The uniform wholesale pricing strategy also benefits the whole channel and the end-consumers, but hurts the dominant retailers. When the two retailers choose different markup schemes, the best choice for the supplier will still be the uniform wholesale pricing scheme if the level of downstream competition is sufficiently high; otherwise, the supplier would prefer the retailer-specific wholesale pricing scheme. The preference of the retailer using fixed-dollar markup pricing is just the opposite as compared to that of the supplier, while the retailer using percentage markup pricing always prefers retailer-specific wholesale pricing. Besides, the uniform wholesale pricing is beneficial to the whole channel. After anticipating the supplier’s reactions, both retailers are better off choosing percentage markup pricing no matter which wholesale pricing strategy the supplier chooses and what the level of competition is. Therefore, the final equilibrium would be the case where the dominant retailers choose the percentage-markup variant and the supplier always responds by adopting the uniform pricing scheme no matter what the level of bcompetition is. This equilibrium enhances the supply chain efficiency and benefits the end-consumers since it leads to the highest channel profits and the lowest retailing prices. Moreover, under this equilibrium, the supplier gets better while the retailers get worse as the level of competition increases.


  • Impact of power structure on supply chain performance and consumer surplus

    by Jian‐Cai Wang, Yao‐Yu Wang, Fujun Lai

    In this study, we consider a game theory based framework to model power in a supply chain with price‐dependent stochastic demand and to investigate how power structures (dominant retailer, dominant manufacturer, or balanced power) and demand models (expected demand and demand shock) affect supply chain efficiency, members’ profits, and consumer surplus. We analyze all of the problems in this framework and characterize their equilibrium outcomes. In comparison, we demonstrate that a firm often benefits from its power except that a power manufacturer might suffer in a supply chain with isoelastic demand and additive shock. A balanced power structure is often conducive to the whole supply chain, but this structure might not perform very well in a supply chain with isoelastic demand and additive shock. Power structures and demand models act on consumers in much the same manner that they do on supply chain efficiency. In other words, consumers often prefer a balanced power structure and thereby do not profit from power retailers. Additionally, we find that the retail price can play a pivotal role in determining supply chain efficiency and consumer surplus. Specifically, the lower the retail price, the higher the supply chain efficiency and consumer surplus. In contrast, the service level has a less preeminent influence on both of them.