Santiago Torres-Arias
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Santiago Torres-Arias has a total of 54 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Marcela S. Melara
Intel Corporation, Hillsboro, OR, USA
4 shared publications Duc-Ly Vu
3 shared publications- James C. Davis
Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA
3 shared publications Karla Obermeier-Velazquez
3 shared publicationsPaul Gibert
3 shared publications- Thanh-Cong Nguyen
PackGuard
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 29-41
Context-Aware Trust Verification for Identity-Based Software Signing
Modern software release infrastructure uses identity-based software signing to associate software artifacts with a known identity. For example, registries such as npm and Docker Hub rely on Sigstore’s identity-based software signing in their artifact provenance workflows. However, existing verification procedures only provide evidence of a signer’s identity, but not the conditions under which signing occurred. As a result, compromised credentials, identity providers, or signing tools can still produce signatures that pass verification. This gap prevents software engineering tools (e.g., package registries, dependency analysis tools, deployment systems, and CI/CD verification stages) from enforcing verifiable context-aware trust policies for software signing. We present DiVerify, a framework for automated verification of software signing conditions. A DiVerify signature binds identity claims from multiple independent scope providers, signing-environment attestation from a TEE-isolated daemon, and the signing key into a single verifiable object. A machine-checkable policy language specifies the identity, authentication, and environment conditions required for accepting a signature. We formally analyze DiVerify and show that it is sound, prototype it across three deployment modes, and demonstrate overhead under 400ms, with storage overhead of less than 1.6% of average PyPI package size. Case study integrations with existing systems confirm DiVerify composes well.
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 29-41
Open AccessContext-Aware Trust Verification for Identity-Based Software Signing
Modern software release infrastructure uses identity-based software signing to associate software artifacts with a known identity. For example, registries such as npm and Docker Hub rely on Sigstore’s identity-based software signing in their artifact provenance workflows. However, existing verification procedures only provide evidence of a signer’s identity, but not the conditions under which signing occurred. As a result, compromised credentials, identity providers, or signing tools can still produce signatures that pass verification. This gap prevents software engineering tools (e.g., package registries, dependency analysis tools, deployment systems, and CI/CD verification stages) from enforcing verifiable context-aware trust policies for software signing. We present DiVerify, a framework for automated verification of software signing conditions. A DiVerify signature binds identity claims from multiple independent scope providers, signing-environment attestation from a TEE-isolated daemon, and the signing key into a single verifiable object. A machine-checkable policy language specifies the identity, authentication, and environment conditions required for accepting a signature. We formally analyze DiVerify and show that it is sound, prototype it across three deployment modes, and demonstrate overhead under 400ms, with storage overhead of less than 1.6% of average PyPI package size. Case study integrations with existing systems confirm DiVerify composes well.
- Open Access
- 7 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Panic! At The Distro: A Study of Malware Prevention in Linux Distributions
Malicious attacks on open-source software packages are a growing concern. The discovery of the XZ Utils backdoor intensified these concerns because of the potential widespread impact. This study, therefore, explores the challenges of preventing and detecting malware in Linux distribution package repositories. To do so, we ask two research questions: (1) What measures have Linux distributions implemented to counter malware, and how have maintainers experienced these efforts? (2) How effective are current malware detection tools in identifying malicious Linux packages? To answer these questions, we conduct interviews with maintainers at several major Linux distributions and introduce a Linux package malware benchmark dataset. Using this dataset, we evaluate the performance of six open-source malware detection scanners. Distribution maintainers, according to the interviews, have mostly focused on reproducible builds to date. Our interviews identified only a single Linux distribution, Wolfi OS, that performs active malware scanning. Using this new benchmark dataset, the evaluation found that the performance of existing open source malware scanners is underwhelming. Most studied tools excel at producing false positives but only infrequently detect true malware. Those that avoid high false positive rates often do so at the expense of a satisfactory true positive. Our findings provide insights into Linux distribution package repositories’ current practices for malware detection and demonstrate the current inadequacy of open source tools designed to detect malicious Linux packages.
- 7 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPanic! At The Distro: A Study of Malware Prevention in Linux Distributions
Malicious attacks on open-source software packages are a growing concern. The discovery of the XZ Utils backdoor intensified these concerns because of the potential widespread impact. This study, therefore, explores the challenges of preventing and detecting malware in Linux distribution package repositories. To do so, we ask two research questions: (1) What measures have Linux distributions implemented to counter malware, and how have maintainers experienced these efforts? (2) How effective are current malware detection tools in identifying malicious Linux packages? To answer these questions, we conduct interviews with maintainers at several major Linux distributions and introduce a Linux package malware benchmark dataset. Using this dataset, we evaluate the performance of six open-source malware detection scanners. Distribution maintainers, according to the interviews, have mostly focused on reproducible builds to date. Our interviews identified only a single Linux distribution, Wolfi OS, that performs active malware scanning. Using this new benchmark dataset, the evaluation found that the performance of existing open source malware scanners is underwhelming. Most studied tools excel at producing false positives but only infrequently detect true malware. Those that avoid high false positive rates often do so at the expense of a satisfactory true positive. Our findings provide insights into Linux distribution package repositories’ current practices for malware detection and demonstrate the current inadequacy of open source tools designed to detect malicious Linux packages.
- Open Access
- 23 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Panic! At The Distro: A Study of Malware Prevention in LinuxDistributions
Malicious attacks on open-source software packages are a growing concern. The discoveryof the XZ Utils backdoor intensified these concerns because of the potential widespreadimpact. This study, therefore, explores the challenges of preventing and detecting mal-ware in Linux distribution package repositories. To do so, we ask two research questions:(1) What measures have Linux distributions implemented to counter malware, and howhave maintainers experienced these efforts? (2) How effective are current malware detec-tion tools in identifying malicious Linux packages? To answer these questions, we conductinterviews with maintainers at several major Linux distributions and introduce a Linuxpackage malware benchmark dataset. Using this dataset, we evaluate the performance ofsix open-source malware detection scanners. Distribution maintainers, according to theinterviews, have mostly focused on reproducible builds to date. Our interviews identifiedonly a single Linux distribution, Wolfi OS, that performs active malware scanning. Usingthis new benchmark dataset, the evaluation found that the performance of existing opensource malware scanners is underwhelming. Most studied tools excel at producing falsepositives but only infrequently detect true malware. Those that avoid high false positiverates often do so at the expense of a satisfactory true positive. Our findings provideinsights into Linux distribution package repositories’ current practices for malware de-tection and demonstrate the current inadequacy of open source tools designed to detectmalicious Linux packages.
- 23 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPanic! At The Distro: A Study of Malware Prevention in LinuxDistributions
Malicious attacks on open-source software packages are a growing concern. The discoveryof the XZ Utils backdoor intensified these concerns because of the potential widespreadimpact. This study, therefore, explores the challenges of preventing and detecting mal-ware in Linux distribution package repositories. To do so, we ask two research questions:(1) What measures have Linux distributions implemented to counter malware, and howhave maintainers experienced these efforts? (2) How effective are current malware detec-tion tools in identifying malicious Linux packages? To answer these questions, we conductinterviews with maintainers at several major Linux distributions and introduce a Linuxpackage malware benchmark dataset. Using this dataset, we evaluate the performance ofsix open-source malware detection scanners. Distribution maintainers, according to theinterviews, have mostly focused on reproducible builds to date. Our interviews identifiedonly a single Linux distribution, Wolfi OS, that performs active malware scanning. Usingthis new benchmark dataset, the evaluation found that the performance of existing opensource malware scanners is underwhelming. Most studied tools excel at producing falsepositives but only infrequently detect true malware. Those that avoid high false positiverates often do so at the expense of a satisfactory true positive. Our findings provideinsights into Linux distribution package repositories’ current practices for malware de-tection and demonstrate the current inadequacy of open source tools designed to detectmalicious Linux packages.
- Open Access
- 23 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Panic! At The Distro: A Study of Malware Prevention in LinuxDistributions
Malicious attacks on open-source software packages are a growing concern. The discoveryof the XZ Utils backdoor intensified these concerns because of the potential widespreadimpact. This study, therefore, explores the challenges of preventing and detecting mal-ware in Linux distribution package repositories. To do so, we ask two research questions:(1) What measures have Linux distributions implemented to counter malware, and howhave maintainers experienced these efforts? (2) How effective are current malware detec-tion tools in identifying malicious Linux packages? To answer these questions, we conductinterviews with maintainers at several major Linux distributions and introduce a Linuxpackage malware benchmark dataset. Using this dataset, we evaluate the performance ofsix open-source malware detection scanners. Distribution maintainers, according to theinterviews, have mostly focused on reproducible builds to date. Our interviews identifiedonly a single Linux distribution, Wolfi OS, that performs active malware scanning. Usingthis new benchmark dataset, the evaluation found that the performance of existing opensource malware scanners is underwhelming. Most studied tools excel at producing falsepositives but only infrequently detect true malware. Those that avoid high false positiverates often do so at the expense of a satisfactory true positive. Our findings provideinsights into Linux distribution package repositories’ current practices for malware de-tection and demonstrate the current inadequacy of open source tools designed to detectmalicious Linux packages.
- 23 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPanic! At The Distro: A Study of Malware Prevention in LinuxDistributions
Malicious attacks on open-source software packages are a growing concern. The discoveryof the XZ Utils backdoor intensified these concerns because of the potential widespreadimpact. This study, therefore, explores the challenges of preventing and detecting mal-ware in Linux distribution package repositories. To do so, we ask two research questions:(1) What measures have Linux distributions implemented to counter malware, and howhave maintainers experienced these efforts? (2) How effective are current malware detec-tion tools in identifying malicious Linux packages? To answer these questions, we conductinterviews with maintainers at several major Linux distributions and introduce a Linuxpackage malware benchmark dataset. Using this dataset, we evaluate the performance ofsix open-source malware detection scanners. Distribution maintainers, according to theinterviews, have mostly focused on reproducible builds to date. Our interviews identifiedonly a single Linux distribution, Wolfi OS, that performs active malware scanning. Usingthis new benchmark dataset, the evaluation found that the performance of existing opensource malware scanners is underwhelming. Most studied tools excel at producing falsepositives but only infrequently detect true malware. Those that avoid high false positiverates often do so at the expense of a satisfactory true positive. Our findings provideinsights into Linux distribution package repositories’ current practices for malware de-tection and demonstrate the current inadequacy of open source tools designed to detectmalicious Linux packages.
- Open Access
Privocracy: Online Democracy through Private Voting
In traditional access control policies, every access granted and administrative account introduces an additional vulnerability, as a corruption of a high-privilege user can compromise several sensitive files. Privocracy is an access control mechanism that minimizes the need to attribute high privileges by triggering a secure e-voting procedure to run commands that require using sensitive resources. With Privocracy an organization can distribute trust in resource access, minimizing the system vulnerabilities from single points of failure, all while maintaining the high flexibility of discretionary access control policies. The Privocracy voting mechanism achieves everlasting privacy, ensuring votes remain confidential regardless of an adversary's computational power, while addressing the dependability requirements of a practical and secure system. The procedure incorporates useful features such as vote delegation to reduce voter fatigue, rapid voting rounds to enable quick action during emergencies, and selective vote auditing for application-level accountability. Our experimental results demonstrate that Privocracy processes votes efficiently and can be deployed on commodity hardware.
Open AccessPrivocracy: Online Democracy through Private Voting
In traditional access control policies, every access granted and administrative account introduces an additional vulnerability, as a corruption of a high-privilege user can compromise several sensitive files. Privocracy is an access control mechanism that minimizes the need to attribute high privileges by triggering a secure e-voting procedure to run commands that require using sensitive resources. With Privocracy an organization can distribute trust in resource access, minimizing the system vulnerabilities from single points of failure, all while maintaining the high flexibility of discretionary access control policies. The Privocracy voting mechanism achieves everlasting privacy, ensuring votes remain confidential regardless of an adversary's computational power, while addressing the dependability requirements of a practical and secure system. The procedure incorporates useful features such as vote delegation to reduce voter fatigue, rapid voting rounds to enable quick action during emergencies, and selective vote auditing for application-level accountability. Our experimental results demonstrate that Privocracy processes votes efficiently and can be deployed on commodity hardware.
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4898-4899
SCORED '25: Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4898-4899
Open AccessSCORED '25: Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses
- 14 February 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 23 (2) , 14-22
Establishing Provenance Before Coding: Traditional and Next-Generation Software Signing
The integration of third-party components leaves the software supply chain vulnerable. Cryptographic signatures enable verifying the origin of components (provenance) before they are added. This article describes traditional software signing, its challenges, and the changes introduced by next-generation software signing platforms.
- 14 February 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 23 (2) , 14-22
Establishing Provenance Before Coding: Traditional and Next-Generation Software Signing
The integration of third-party components leaves the software supply chain vulnerable. Cryptographic signatures enable verifying the origin of components (provenance) before they are added. This article describes traditional software signing, its challenges, and the changes introduced by next-generation software signing platforms.
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2296-2310
Rust for Embedded Systems: Current State and Open Problems
Embedded software is used in safety-critical systems such as medical devices and autonomous vehicles, where software defects, including security vulnerabilities, have severe consequences. Most embedded codebases are developed in unsafe languages, specifically C/C++, and are riddled with memory safety vulnerabilities. To prevent such vulnerabilities, Rust, a performant memory-safe systems language, provides an optimal choice for developing embedded software. Rust interoperability enables developing Rust applications on top of existing C codebases. Despite this, even the most resourceful organizations continue to develop embedded software in C/C++. This paper performs the first systematic study to holistically understand the current state and challenges of using Rust for embedded systems. Our study is organized across three research questions. We collected a dataset of 6,408 Rust embedded software spanning various categories and 6 Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools. We performed a systematic analysis of our dataset and surveys with 225 developers to investigate our research questions. We found that existing Rust software support is inadequate, SAST tools cannot handle certain features of Rust embedded software, resulting in failures, and the prevalence of advanced types in existing Rust software makes it challenging to engineer interoperable code. In addition, we found various challenges faced by developers in using Rust for embedded systems development.
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2296-2310
Open AccessRust for Embedded Systems: Current State and Open Problems
Embedded software is used in safety-critical systems such as medical devices and autonomous vehicles, where software defects, including security vulnerabilities, have severe consequences. Most embedded codebases are developed in unsafe languages, specifically C/C++, and are riddled with memory safety vulnerabilities. To prevent such vulnerabilities, Rust, a performant memory-safe systems language, provides an optimal choice for developing embedded software. Rust interoperability enables developing Rust applications on top of existing C codebases. Despite this, even the most resourceful organizations continue to develop embedded software in C/C++. This paper performs the first systematic study to holistically understand the current state and challenges of using Rust for embedded systems. Our study is organized across three research questions. We collected a dataset of 6,408 Rust embedded software spanning various categories and 6 Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools. We performed a systematic analysis of our dataset and surveys with 225 developers to investigate our research questions. We found that existing Rust software support is inadequate, SAST tools cannot handle certain features of Rust embedded software, resulting in failures, and the prevalence of advanced types in existing Rust software makes it challenging to engineer interoperable code. In addition, we found various challenges faced by developers in using Rust for embedded systems development.
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4917-4918
SCORED '24: Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses
Recent attacks on the software supply chain have shed light on the fragility and importance of ensuring the security and integrity of this vital ecosystem. Addressing the technical and social challenges to building trustworthy software for deployment in sensitive and/or large-scale enterprise or governmental settings requires innovative solutions and an interdisciplinary approach. The Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses (SCORED) is the leading venue for bringing together industry practitioners, academics, and policymakers to present and discuss security vulnerabilities, novel defenses against attacks, project demos, adoption requirements and best practices in the software supply chain. The complete SCORED '24 workshop proceedings are available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3689944
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4917-4918
Open AccessSCORED '24: Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses
Recent attacks on the software supply chain have shed light on the fragility and importance of ensuring the security and integrity of this vital ecosystem. Addressing the technical and social challenges to building trustworthy software for deployment in sensitive and/or large-scale enterprise or governmental settings requires innovative solutions and an interdisciplinary approach. The Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses (SCORED) is the leading venue for bringing together industry practitioners, academics, and policymakers to present and discuss security vulnerabilities, novel defenses against attacks, project demos, adoption requirements and best practices in the software supply chain. The complete SCORED '24 workshop proceedings are available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3689944
- Open Access
Signing in Four Public Software Package Registries: Quantity, Quality, and Influencing Factors
Many software applications incorporate open-source third-party packages distributed by public package registries. Guaranteeing authorship along this supply chain is a challenge. Package maintainers can guarantee package authorship through software signing. However, it is unclear how common this practice is, and whether the resulting signatures are created properly. Prior work has provided raw data on registry signing practices, but only measured single platforms, did not consider quality, did not consider time, and did not assess factors that may influence signing. We do not have up-to-date measurements of signing practices nor do we know the quality of existing signatures. Furthermore, we lack a comprehensive understanding of factors that influence signing adoption. This study addresses this gap. We provide measurements across three kinds of package registries: traditional software (Maven, PyPI), container images (DockerHub), and machine learning models (Hugging Face). For each registry, we describe the nature of the signed artifacts as well as the current quantity and quality of signatures. Then, we examine longitudinal trends in signing practices. Finally, we use a quasi-experiment to estimate the effect that various factors had on software signing practices. To summarize our findings: (1) mandating signature adoption improves the quantity of signatures; (2) providing dedicated tooling improves the quality of signing; (3) getting started is the hard part -- once a maintainer begins to sign, they tend to continue doing so; and (4) although many supply chain attacks are mitigable via signing, signing adoption is primarily affected by registry policy rather than by public knowledge of attacks, new engineering standards, etc. These findings highlight the importance of software package registry managers and signing infrastructure.
Open AccessSigning in Four Public Software Package Registries: Quantity, Quality, and Influencing Factors
Many software applications incorporate open-source third-party packages distributed by public package registries. Guaranteeing authorship along this supply chain is a challenge. Package maintainers can guarantee package authorship through software signing. However, it is unclear how common this practice is, and whether the resulting signatures are created properly. Prior work has provided raw data on registry signing practices, but only measured single platforms, did not consider quality, did not consider time, and did not assess factors that may influence signing. We do not have up-to-date measurements of signing practices nor do we know the quality of existing signatures. Furthermore, we lack a comprehensive understanding of factors that influence signing adoption. This study addresses this gap. We provide measurements across three kinds of package registries: traditional software (Maven, PyPI), container images (DockerHub), and machine learning models (Hugging Face). For each registry, we describe the nature of the signed artifacts as well as the current quantity and quality of signatures. Then, we examine longitudinal trends in signing practices. Finally, we use a quasi-experiment to estimate the effect that various factors had on software signing practices. To summarize our findings: (1) mandating signature adoption improves the quantity of signatures; (2) providing dedicated tooling improves the quality of signing; (3) getting started is the hard part -- once a maintainer begins to sign, they tend to continue doing so; and (4) although many supply chain attacks are mitigable via signing, signing adoption is primarily affected by registry policy rather than by public knowledge of attacks, new engineering standards, etc. These findings highlight the importance of software package registry managers and signing infrastructure.