Marcela S. Melara
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Marcela S. Melara has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Santiago Torres-Arias
Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA
4 shared publications - Aditya Sirish A Yelgundhalli
New York University, New York, NY, USA and Bloomberg, New York, NY, USA
1 shared publication - Behnaz Hassanshahi
Oracle Labs, Brisbane, Australia
1 shared publication - Chad Kimes
Independent, Cary, North Carolina, USA
1 shared publication - Cory Cornelius
Intel Corporation
1 shared publication - Dawn Song
University of California, Berkeley
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 24 (5) , 28-37
IDEAS: C-to-Rust Translation Using Improved Large Language Model Decoding and Automated Equivalence Testing
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 24 (5) , 28-37
IDEAS: C-to-Rust Translation Using Improved Large Language Model Decoding and Automated Equivalence Testing
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4898-4899
SCORED '25: Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4898-4899
Open AccessSCORED '25: Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4917-4918
SCORED '24: Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses
Recent attacks on the software supply chain have shed light on the fragility and importance of ensuring the security and integrity of this vital ecosystem. Addressing the technical and social challenges to building trustworthy software for deployment in sensitive and/or large-scale enterprise or governmental settings requires innovative solutions and an interdisciplinary approach. The Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses (SCORED) is the leading venue for bringing together industry practitioners, academics, and policymakers to present and discuss security vulnerabilities, novel defenses against attacks, project demos, adoption requirements and best practices in the software supply chain. The complete SCORED '24 workshop proceedings are available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3689944
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4917-4918
Open AccessSCORED '24: Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses
Recent attacks on the software supply chain have shed light on the fragility and importance of ensuring the security and integrity of this vital ecosystem. Addressing the technical and social challenges to building trustworthy software for deployment in sensitive and/or large-scale enterprise or governmental settings requires innovative solutions and an interdisciplinary approach. The Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses (SCORED) is the leading venue for bringing together industry practitioners, academics, and policymakers to present and discuss security vulnerabilities, novel defenses against attacks, project demos, adoption requirements and best practices in the software supply chain. The complete SCORED '24 workshop proceedings are available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3689944
- Open Access
- 19 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 43-44
Auditing the CI/CD Platform: Reproducible Builds vs. Hardware-Attested Build Environments, Which is Right for You?
Recent software supply chain attacks, such as the SolarWinds hack and xz-utils backdoor, demonstrate the widespread impact of tampering with a package's build environment to subvert the final software product. To detect compromises in the systems and services that underlie the supply chain with higher confidence, software vendors today may choose between a few promising approaches: Reproducible Builds, or hardware-attested build environments, a proposed combination of CNCF in-toto, OpenSSF Supplychain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA) and trusted hardware. At first glance, Reproducible Builds and hardware-attested build environments address the same challenge of auditing the build platform for tampering. The former establishes practices for achieving consistent build process results, making divergences detectable, while the latter captures verifiable evidence about properties of the compute environment that executed a build, making changes to that environment detectable. Yet, despite relying largely on existing techniques, neither approach has seen broad adoption by CI/CD platforms or enterprise software vendors. To understand these trends, we seek to answer two central questions: (1) What security problems does each approach address? (2) What are the practical adoption requirements of each approach? In this security-in-practice talk, we examine the similarities and differences between Reproducible Builds and hardware-attested build environments, and discuss challenges of implementation in practice. We will address a very common question about the tradeoffs between adopting only one or both approaches, and conclude with adoption recommendations for several types of software development settings.
- 19 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 43-44
Open AccessAuditing the CI/CD Platform: Reproducible Builds vs. Hardware-Attested Build Environments, Which is Right for You?
Recent software supply chain attacks, such as the SolarWinds hack and xz-utils backdoor, demonstrate the widespread impact of tampering with a package's build environment to subvert the final software product. To detect compromises in the systems and services that underlie the supply chain with higher confidence, software vendors today may choose between a few promising approaches: Reproducible Builds, or hardware-attested build environments, a proposed combination of CNCF in-toto, OpenSSF Supplychain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA) and trusted hardware. At first glance, Reproducible Builds and hardware-attested build environments address the same challenge of auditing the build platform for tampering. The former establishes practices for achieving consistent build process results, making divergences detectable, while the latter captures verifiable evidence about properties of the compute environment that executed a build, making changes to that environment detectable. Yet, despite relying largely on existing techniques, neither approach has seen broad adoption by CI/CD platforms or enterprise software vendors. To understand these trends, we seek to answer two central questions: (1) What security problems does each approach address? (2) What are the practical adoption requirements of each approach? In this security-in-practice talk, we examine the similarities and differences between Reproducible Builds and hardware-attested build environments, and discuss challenges of implementation in practice. We will address a very common question about the tradeoffs between adopting only one or both approaches, and conclude with adoption recommendations for several types of software development settings.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3671-3672
SCORED '23: Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses
Recent attacks on the software supply chain have shed light on the fragility and importance of ensuring the security and integrity of this vital ecosystem. Addressing the technical and social challenges to building trustworthy software for deployment in sensitive and/or large-scale enterprise or governmental settings requires innovative solutions and an interdisciplinary approach. The Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses (SCORED) is a venue that brings together industry practitioners, academics, and policymakers to present and discuss security vulnerabilities, novel defenses against attacks, project demos, adoption requirements and best practices in the software supply chain. The complete SCORED'23 workshop proceedings are available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/proceedings/10.1145/3576915
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3671-3672
Open AccessSCORED '23: Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses
Recent attacks on the software supply chain have shed light on the fragility and importance of ensuring the security and integrity of this vital ecosystem. Addressing the technical and social challenges to building trustworthy software for deployment in sensitive and/or large-scale enterprise or governmental settings requires innovative solutions and an interdisciplinary approach. The Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses (SCORED) is a venue that brings together industry practitioners, academics, and policymakers to present and discuss security vulnerabilities, novel defenses against attacks, project demos, adoption requirements and best practices in the software supply chain. The complete SCORED'23 workshop proceedings are available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/proceedings/10.1145/3576915
- 13 November 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 21 (6) , 55-58
A Viewpoint on Software Supply Chain Security: Are We Getting Lost in Translation?
Many of the adoption challenges in securing the software supply chain are largely caused by the language we use to describe risk and defenses and other sociocultural gaps. We shed light on the impacts of these gaps and opportunities to overcome them.
- 13 November 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 21 (6) , 55-58
A Viewpoint on Software Supply Chain Security: Are We Getting Lost in Translation?
Many of the adoption challenges in securing the software supply chain are largely caused by the language we use to describe risk and defenses and other sociocultural gaps. We shed light on the impacts of these gaps and opportunities to overcome them.