Neal Mangaokar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Neal Mangaokar has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Atul Prakash
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
3 shared publications - Aravind Cheruvu
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, USA
1 shared publication - Ashish Hooda
Computer Sciences, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI, USA
1 shared publication - Bimal Viswanath
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, USA
1 shared publication - Boyuan Zheng
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
1 shared publication - Elisa Tsai
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 788-804
Taming Data Challenges in ML-based Security Tasks Using Generative AI
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 788-804
Open AccessTaming Data Challenges in ML-based Security Tasks Using Generative AI
- Open Access
- 22 April 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 990-1003
Harmful Terms and Where to Find Them: Measuring and Modeling Unfavorable Financial Terms and Conditions in Shopping Websites at Scale
- 22 April 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 990-1003
Open AccessHarmful Terms and Where to Find Them: Measuring and Modeling Unfavorable Financial Terms and Conditions in Shopping Websites at Scale
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 786-800
Stateful Defenses for Machine Learning Models Are Not Yet Secure Against Black-box Attacks
Recent work has proposed stateful defense models (SDMs) as a compelling strategy to defend against a black-box attacker who only has query access to the model, as is common for online machine learning platforms. Such stateful defenses aim to defend against black-box attacks by tracking the query history and detecting and rejecting queries that are "similar" and thus preventing black-box attacks from finding useful gradients and making progress towards finding adversarial attacks within a reasonable query budget. Recent SDMs (e.g., Blacklight and PIHA) have shown remarkable success in defending against state-of-the-art black-box attacks. In this paper, we show that SDMs are highly vulnerable to a new class of adaptive black-box attacks. We propose a novel adaptive black-box attack strategy called Oracle-guided Adaptive Rejection Sampling (OARS) that involves two stages: (1) use initial query patterns to infer key properties about an SDM's defense; and, (2) leverage those extracted properties to design subsequent query patterns to evade the SDM's defense while making progress towards finding adversarial inputs. OARS is broadly applicable as an enhancement to existing black-box attacks - we show how to apply the strategy to enhance six common black-box attacks to be more effective against current class of SDMs. For example, OARS-enhanced versions of black-box attacks improved attack success rate against recent stateful defenses from almost 0% to to almost 100% for multiple datasets within reasonable query budgets.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 786-800
Open AccessStateful Defenses for Machine Learning Models Are Not Yet Secure Against Black-box Attacks
Recent work has proposed stateful defense models (SDMs) as a compelling strategy to defend against a black-box attacker who only has query access to the model, as is common for online machine learning platforms. Such stateful defenses aim to defend against black-box attacks by tracking the query history and detecting and rejecting queries that are "similar" and thus preventing black-box attacks from finding useful gradients and making progress towards finding adversarial attacks within a reasonable query budget. Recent SDMs (e.g., Blacklight and PIHA) have shown remarkable success in defending against state-of-the-art black-box attacks. In this paper, we show that SDMs are highly vulnerable to a new class of adaptive black-box attacks. We propose a novel adaptive black-box attack strategy called Oracle-guided Adaptive Rejection Sampling (OARS) that involves two stages: (1) use initial query patterns to infer key properties about an SDM's defense; and, (2) leverage those extracted properties to design subsequent query patterns to evade the SDM's defense while making progress towards finding adversarial inputs. OARS is broadly applicable as an enhancement to existing black-box attacks - we show how to apply the strategy to enhance six common black-box attacks to be more effective against current class of SDMs. For example, OARS-enhanced versions of black-box attacks improved attack success rate against recent stateful defenses from almost 0% to to almost 100% for multiple datasets within reasonable query budgets.