Han Fu
Research Subjects
Han Fu has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Wenpei Li
State Grid Hubei Electric Power Research Institute, Wuhan 430062, China
3 shared publications - Zhixiong Liu
State Key Laboratory of Power Grid Environment Protection, School of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
3 shared publications - Bin Yang
State Grid Wuhan Power Supply Company, Wuhan 430070, China
2 shared publications - Shun Wu
Department of Electrical Engineering, Wuhan Electric Power Technical College, Wuhan 430074, China
2 shared publications - Long Qiu
State Grid Wuhan Power Supply Company, Wuhan 430070, China
1 shared publication - Yongheng Ai
State Grid Wuhan Electric Power Supply Company, Wuhan 430013, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
RETRACTED: Li et al. A Kalman Filter-Based Distributed Cyber-Attack Mitigation Strategy for Distributed Generator Units in Meshed DC Microgrids. Energies 2023, 16, 7959
The journal retracts the article titled “A Kalman Filter-Based Distributed Cyber-Attack Mitigation Strategy for Distributed Generator Units in Meshed DC Microgrids”
Open AccessRETRACTED: Li et al. A Kalman Filter-Based Distributed Cyber-Attack Mitigation Strategy for Distributed Generator Units in Meshed DC Microgrids. Energies 2023, 16, 7959
The journal retracts the article titled “A Kalman Filter-Based Distributed Cyber-Attack Mitigation Strategy for Distributed Generator Units in Meshed DC Microgrids”
- Open Access
RETRACTED: A Kalman Filter-Based Distributed Cyber-Attack Mitigation Strategy for Distributed Generator Units in Meshed DC Microgrids
To ensure fast dynamics and the stability of multiple distributed generator units (DGUs) in DC microgrids, communication links among the controllers of DGUs are generally adopted. However, those communication channels are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. To alleviate this hassle, a Kalman Filter (KF)-based distributed cyber-attack mitigation strategy, which is highly involved in both primary and secondary control, is proposed in this paper. The KF, as a robust state estimator, is utilized to accurately estimate the authentic terminal voltages and currents of the DGUs. Based on the discrepancies between the estimated and measured parameters of the systems under cyber-attacks, the proposed control can adaptively compensate the attack signals via an adaptive proportional integral (API) controller and a fractional API (FAPI) controller in cyber-attack-mitigation layers. The main advantage of using the proposed control scheme compared to conventional schemes is the fast dynamic response. The simulation results verify this merit by comparing the adopted KF and comparing it with conventional artificial neural networks (ANN), while the experimental results validate that effectiveness of the proposed control and showcase the superiority of the FAPI control in terms of its perfect compensation for different types of cyber-attacks.
Open AccessRETRACTED: A Kalman Filter-Based Distributed Cyber-Attack Mitigation Strategy for Distributed Generator Units in Meshed DC Microgrids
To ensure fast dynamics and the stability of multiple distributed generator units (DGUs) in DC microgrids, communication links among the controllers of DGUs are generally adopted. However, those communication channels are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. To alleviate this hassle, a Kalman Filter (KF)-based distributed cyber-attack mitigation strategy, which is highly involved in both primary and secondary control, is proposed in this paper. The KF, as a robust state estimator, is utilized to accurately estimate the authentic terminal voltages and currents of the DGUs. Based on the discrepancies between the estimated and measured parameters of the systems under cyber-attacks, the proposed control can adaptively compensate the attack signals via an adaptive proportional integral (API) controller and a fractional API (FAPI) controller in cyber-attack-mitigation layers. The main advantage of using the proposed control scheme compared to conventional schemes is the fast dynamic response. The simulation results verify this merit by comparing the adopted KF and comparing it with conventional artificial neural networks (ANN), while the experimental results validate that effectiveness of the proposed control and showcase the superiority of the FAPI control in terms of its perfect compensation for different types of cyber-attacks.
- Open Access
A Communication Encryption-Based Distributed Cooperative Control for Distributed Generators in Microgrids under FDI Attacks
To alleviate the hassle of false data injection (FDI) attacks on distributed generators (DGs) in microgrids, a communication encryption-based distributed cooperative control is proposed in this paper. Compared to the conventional distributed control strategies, the proposed control scheme is simpler with much less complex evaluation mechanism by upgrading the secondary control to a second-order control based on the finite-time control theory while combining an encryption strategy. The proposed algorithm provides constant injections to eliminate the impact of FDI attacks based on a robust communication system. The effectiveness and high efficiency of the proposed control scheme is validated in an IEEE 34 Node Test Feeder system with six DGs as a microgrid cyber-physical system (CPS) under different FDI attacks.
Open AccessA Communication Encryption-Based Distributed Cooperative Control for Distributed Generators in Microgrids under FDI Attacks
To alleviate the hassle of false data injection (FDI) attacks on distributed generators (DGs) in microgrids, a communication encryption-based distributed cooperative control is proposed in this paper. Compared to the conventional distributed control strategies, the proposed control scheme is simpler with much less complex evaluation mechanism by upgrading the secondary control to a second-order control based on the finite-time control theory while combining an encryption strategy. The proposed algorithm provides constant injections to eliminate the impact of FDI attacks based on a robust communication system. The effectiveness and high efficiency of the proposed control scheme is validated in an IEEE 34 Node Test Feeder system with six DGs as a microgrid cyber-physical system (CPS) under different FDI attacks.