Bingle Stegmann Kruger
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Bingle Stegmann Kruger has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Benjamin Kraner
University of Zürich
1 shared publication - Burak Öz
Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany and Flashbots, Munich, Germany
1 shared publication - Claudio Juan Tessone
University of Zürich
1 shared publication - Florian Matthes
Technical University of Munich
1 shared publication - Nicolò Vallarano
Department of Informatics, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-8
Time Moves Faster When There is Nothing You Anticipate: The Role of Time in MEV Rewards
We present a novel analysis of a competitive dynamic present on Ethereum known as "waiting games", where validators can use their distinct monopoly position in their assigned slots to delay block proposals in order to optimize returns through Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) payments, a type of incentive outside the Proof-of-Stake incentive scheme. However, this strategy risks block exclusion due to missed slots or potential orphaning. Our analysis reveals evidence that, although there are substantial incentives to undertaking the risks, validators are not capitalizing on waiting games, leaving potential profits unrealized. Moreover, we present an agent-based model to test the eventual consensus disruption caused by waiting games under different settings, arguing that such disruption only occurs with significant delay strategies. Ultimately, this research provides in-depth insights into Ethereum's waiting games, illuminating the trade-offs and potential profit opportunities for validators in this evolving blockchain landscape.
- 27 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-8
Open AccessTime Moves Faster When There is Nothing You Anticipate: The Role of Time in MEV Rewards
We present a novel analysis of a competitive dynamic present on Ethereum known as "waiting games", where validators can use their distinct monopoly position in their assigned slots to delay block proposals in order to optimize returns through Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) payments, a type of incentive outside the Proof-of-Stake incentive scheme. However, this strategy risks block exclusion due to missed slots or potential orphaning. Our analysis reveals evidence that, although there are substantial incentives to undertaking the risks, validators are not capitalizing on waiting games, leaving potential profits unrealized. Moreover, we present an agent-based model to test the eventual consensus disruption caused by waiting games under different settings, arguing that such disruption only occurs with significant delay strategies. Ultimately, this research provides in-depth insights into Ethereum's waiting games, illuminating the trade-offs and potential profit opportunities for validators in this evolving blockchain landscape.