Mahsa Ghavami
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Mahsa Ghavami has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hamed Kebriaei
School of ECE, College of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2 shared publications - Mohammad Haeri
Advanced Control Systems Lab, Department of Electrical Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
2 shared publications - Babak Ghaffarzadeh Bakhshayesh
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
1 shared publication - Farid Sheikholeslam
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan, Iran
1 shared publication - Giacomo Como
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy
1 shared publication - Jafar Ghaisari
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan, Iran
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 December 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
- Vol. 25 (6) , 5258-5270
Decentralized Pricing Mechanism for Traffic and Charging Station Management of EVs in Smart Cities
Due to the increasing popularity of Electric Vehicles (EVs) and infrastructural limitations, it is vital to manage traffic and Charging Stations (CSs) crowdedness. In Bakhshayesh and Kebriaei (2022), the problem of choosing the route and CSs of EVs is modeled as a non-cooperative game of selfish EVs with probabilistic decision strategies. In this paper, we have proposed a linear pricing policy that ensures global efficiency of the obtained Nash strategies of EVs in Bakhshayesh and Kebriaei (2022) for the Smart City Coordinator (SCC). We model the problem as a hierarchical game with a SCC as the leader and EVs as the followers. The leader aims to design optimal price functions of CSs and Traffic Coordinator (TC) and impose them on the EVs to maximize the social profits of CSs and TC. In response, the followers play a non-cooperative game with coupling constraints to optimally decide on their route and charging destination. Thus, we have a Stackelberg Game (SG) between SCC and EVs and also a Nash game among the EVs in the lower level. Compared to the conventional Nash-based pricing policies, our proposed functional SG formulation enables the possibility of simultaneous and global-optimum management of traffic and CSs’ crowdedness. Moreover, we have proposed a two-level decentralized algorithm that preserves the privacy of EVs and have considered a decentralized computation for equilibrium seeking of followers based on the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) method. Finally, we carry out simulation studies on the transportation network of Sioux Falls City to compare and evaluate the proposed method.
- 1 December 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
- Vol. 25 (6) , 5258-5270
Decentralized Pricing Mechanism for Traffic and Charging Station Management of EVs in Smart Cities
Due to the increasing popularity of Electric Vehicles (EVs) and infrastructural limitations, it is vital to manage traffic and Charging Stations (CSs) crowdedness. In Bakhshayesh and Kebriaei (2022), the problem of choosing the route and CSs of EVs is modeled as a non-cooperative game of selfish EVs with probabilistic decision strategies. In this paper, we have proposed a linear pricing policy that ensures global efficiency of the obtained Nash strategies of EVs in Bakhshayesh and Kebriaei (2022) for the Smart City Coordinator (SCC). We model the problem as a hierarchical game with a SCC as the leader and EVs as the followers. The leader aims to design optimal price functions of CSs and Traffic Coordinator (TC) and impose them on the EVs to maximize the social profits of CSs and TC. In response, the followers play a non-cooperative game with coupling constraints to optimally decide on their route and charging destination. Thus, we have a Stackelberg Game (SG) between SCC and EVs and also a Nash game among the EVs in the lower level. Compared to the conventional Nash-based pricing policies, our proposed functional SG formulation enables the possibility of simultaneous and global-optimum management of traffic and CSs’ crowdedness. Moreover, we have proposed a two-level decentralized algorithm that preserves the privacy of EVs and have considered a decentralized computation for equilibrium seeking of followers based on the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) method. Finally, we carry out simulation studies on the transportation network of Sioux Falls City to compare and evaluate the proposed method.
- 24 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Control Systems Letters
- Vol. 7, 3435-3440
A Consensus-Based Generalized Multi-Population Aggregative Game With Application to Charging Coordination of Electric Vehicles
This paper introduces a consensus-based generalized multi-population aggregative game coordination approach with application to electric vehicles charging under transmission line constraints. The algorithm enables agents to seek an equilibrium solution while considering the limited infrastructure capacities that impose coupling constraints among the users. The Nash-seeking algorithm consists of two interrelated iterations. In the upper layer, population coordinators collaborate for a distributed estimation of the coupling aggregate term in the agents’ cost function and the associated Lagrange multiplier of the coupling constraint, transmitting the latest updated values to their population’s agents. In the lower layer, each agent updates its best response based on the most recent information received and communicates it back to its population coordinator. For the case when the agents’ best response mappings are non-expansive, we prove the algorithm’s convergence to the generalized Nash equilibrium point of the game. Simulation results demonstrate the algorithm’s effectiveness in achieving equilibrium in the presence of a coupling constraint.
- 24 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Control Systems Letters
- Vol. 7, 3435-3440
A Consensus-Based Generalized Multi-Population Aggregative Game With Application to Charging Coordination of Electric Vehicles
This paper introduces a consensus-based generalized multi-population aggregative game coordination approach with application to electric vehicles charging under transmission line constraints. The algorithm enables agents to seek an equilibrium solution while considering the limited infrastructure capacities that impose coupling constraints among the users. The Nash-seeking algorithm consists of two interrelated iterations. In the upper layer, population coordinators collaborate for a distributed estimation of the coupling aggregate term in the agents’ cost function and the associated Lagrange multiplier of the coupling constraint, transmitting the latest updated values to their population’s agents. In the lower layer, each agent updates its best response based on the most recent information received and communicates it back to its population coordinator. For the case when the agents’ best response mappings are non-expansive, we prove the algorithm’s convergence to the generalized Nash equilibrium point of the game. Simulation results demonstrate the algorithm’s effectiveness in achieving equilibrium in the presence of a coupling constraint.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 637-644
Control Design Method for Obtaining Special Performances in Discrete-Time Linear Switched Systems with Time-Varying Delay Based on the Average Dwell-Time Approach
This paper devotes to propose control design methods imposing general quadratic and bounded peak to peak gain performances on discrete-time linear switched positive systems with time-varying delay. General quadratic constraints are limitations that are modeled as a quadratic matrix to make a relationship between exogenous input and output signals. Moreover, the problem of bounding outputs peak amplitude for bounded disturbance inputs is named bounded peak to peak gain performance. Sufficient conditions are derived for the existence of a set of state feedback controllers guaranteeing the closed-loop switched system with time-varying delay in states not only is positive and globally uniform exponential stable but also has two stated performances for switching signals with an average dwell-time, which is greater than a positive certain constant. By using the Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional theorem, these conditions are formulated in terms of linear matrix inequalities. The quadruple tank system model is employed to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 637-644
Control Design Method for Obtaining Special Performances in Discrete-Time Linear Switched Systems with Time-Varying Delay Based on the Average Dwell-Time Approach
This paper devotes to propose control design methods imposing general quadratic and bounded peak to peak gain performances on discrete-time linear switched positive systems with time-varying delay. General quadratic constraints are limitations that are modeled as a quadratic matrix to make a relationship between exogenous input and output signals. Moreover, the problem of bounding outputs peak amplitude for bounded disturbance inputs is named bounded peak to peak gain performance. Sufficient conditions are derived for the existence of a set of state feedback controllers guaranteeing the closed-loop switched system with time-varying delay in states not only is positive and globally uniform exponential stable but also has two stated performances for switching signals with an average dwell-time, which is greater than a positive certain constant. By using the Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional theorem, these conditions are formulated in terms of linear matrix inequalities. The quadruple tank system model is employed to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.