DEDavid Encaoua

David Encaoua

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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David Encaoua has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

    • 24 May 2013
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Optimal Licensing of Uncertain Patents in the Shadow of Litigation

    by Rabah Amir, David Encaoua, Yassine Lefouili

    The paper investigates the choice of a licensing mechanism by the holder of a patent whose validity may be challenged. Focusing first on weak patents, i.e. patents that have a high probability of being invalidated by a court if challenged, we show that the patent holder finds it optimal to use a per-unit royalty contract if the strategic effect of an increase in a potential licensees unit cost on the equilibrium industry profit is positive. The latter condition ensures the superiority of the per-unit royalty mechanism independently of whether the patent holder is an industry insider or outsider, and is shown to hold in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous (resp. differentiated) products under general assumptions on the demands faced by firms. We then examine the optimal licensing of patents that are uncertain but not necessarily weak. As a byproduct of our analysis, we contribute to the oligopoly literature by offering some new insights of independent interest regarding the effects of cost variations on Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.

    • 1 February 2011
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Per-Unit Royalty vs Fixed Fee: The Case of Weak Patents

    by Rabah Amir, David Encaoua, Yassine Lefouili

    This paper explores a licensor's choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a fixed fee when her innovation is covered by a weak patent, i.e. a patent that is likely to be invali- dated by a court if challenged. Using a general model where the nature of competition is not specied, we show that the patent holder prefers to use a per-unit royalty scheme if the strategic e¤ect of an increase in a potential licensee's unit cost on the aggregate equi- librium prot is positive. To show the mildness of the latter condition, we establish that it holds in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) oligopoly with homegenous (resp. heterogenous) products under very general assumptions on the demands faced by rms. As a byproduct of our analysis, we contribute to the oligopoly literature by o¤ering some new insights of independent interest regarding the e¤ects of cost variations on Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.

  • LICENSING ‘WEAK’ PATENTS*

    by David Encaoua, Yassine Lefouili