David Encaoua
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
David Encaoua has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yassine Lefouili
Toulouse School of Economics University of Toulouse Capitole
2 shared publications - Rabah Amir
Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA
1 shared publication - Rabah Amir
Department of Economics, University of Iowa, Iowa City, USA
1 shared publication - Yassine Lefouili
CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain and Paris School of Economics, Voie du Roman Pays 34, B‐1348, Louvain‐la‐Neuve, Belgium. e‐mail
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Optimal Licensing of Uncertain Patents in the Shadow of Litigation
The paper investigates the choice of a licensing mechanism by the holder of a patent whose validity may be challenged. Focusing first on weak patents, i.e. patents that have a high probability of being invalidated by a court if challenged, we show that the patent holder finds it optimal to use a per-unit royalty contract if the strategic effect of an increase in a potential licensees unit cost on the equilibrium industry profit is positive. The latter condition ensures the superiority of the per-unit royalty mechanism independently of whether the patent holder is an industry insider or outsider, and is shown to hold in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous (resp. differentiated) products under general assumptions on the demands faced by firms. We then examine the optimal licensing of patents that are uncertain but not necessarily weak. As a byproduct of our analysis, we contribute to the oligopoly literature by offering some new insights of independent interest regarding the effects of cost variations on Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.
Open AccessOptimal Licensing of Uncertain Patents in the Shadow of Litigation
The paper investigates the choice of a licensing mechanism by the holder of a patent whose validity may be challenged. Focusing first on weak patents, i.e. patents that have a high probability of being invalidated by a court if challenged, we show that the patent holder finds it optimal to use a per-unit royalty contract if the strategic effect of an increase in a potential licensees unit cost on the equilibrium industry profit is positive. The latter condition ensures the superiority of the per-unit royalty mechanism independently of whether the patent holder is an industry insider or outsider, and is shown to hold in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous (resp. differentiated) products under general assumptions on the demands faced by firms. We then examine the optimal licensing of patents that are uncertain but not necessarily weak. As a byproduct of our analysis, we contribute to the oligopoly literature by offering some new insights of independent interest regarding the effects of cost variations on Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.
- Open Access
Per-Unit Royalty vs Fixed Fee: The Case of Weak Patents
This paper explores a licensor's choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a fixed fee when her innovation is covered by a weak patent, i.e. a patent that is likely to be invali- dated by a court if challenged. Using a general model where the nature of competition is not specied, we show that the patent holder prefers to use a per-unit royalty scheme if the strategic e¤ect of an increase in a potential licensee's unit cost on the aggregate equi- librium prot is positive. To show the mildness of the latter condition, we establish that it holds in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) oligopoly with homegenous (resp. heterogenous) products under very general assumptions on the demands faced by rms. As a byproduct of our analysis, we contribute to the oligopoly literature by o¤ering some new insights of independent interest regarding the e¤ects of cost variations on Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.
Open AccessPer-Unit Royalty vs Fixed Fee: The Case of Weak Patents
This paper explores a licensor's choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a fixed fee when her innovation is covered by a weak patent, i.e. a patent that is likely to be invali- dated by a court if challenged. Using a general model where the nature of competition is not specied, we show that the patent holder prefers to use a per-unit royalty scheme if the strategic e¤ect of an increase in a potential licensee's unit cost on the aggregate equi- librium prot is positive. To show the mildness of the latter condition, we establish that it holds in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) oligopoly with homegenous (resp. heterogenous) products under very general assumptions on the demands faced by rms. As a byproduct of our analysis, we contribute to the oligopoly literature by o¤ering some new insights of independent interest regarding the e¤ects of cost variations on Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.
- 27 August 2009
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 57 (3) , 492-525
LICENSING ‘WEAK’ PATENTS*
- 27 August 2009
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 57 (3) , 492-525
LICENSING ‘WEAK’ PATENTS*