Yassine Lefouili
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Yassine Lefouili has a total of 43 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bruno Jullien
Toulouse School of Economics CNRS France
9 shared publications - Marc Bourreau8 shared publications
- Leonardo Madio
University of Padova, Padua, Italy
4 shared publications Bruno Jullien
3 shared publicationsChristian Helmers
Santa Clara University and Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
2 shared publications- David Encaoua
Paris School of Economics Université Paris
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
"Mergers and Investments in New Products"
>This paper examines how horizontal mergers affect firms' incentives to invest in R&D leading to the development of new products. We characterize the impact of a merger to monopoly and a 3-to-2 merger on equilibrium innovation efforts and consumer surplus, absent efficiency gains and spillovers. We show that a 3-to-2 merger directly alters the outsider's innovation incentives by shifting its best-response function upward, and we analyze how this mechanism affects merger outcomes for innovation and consumer surplus. Finally, we examine how efficiency gains and remedies modify post-merger innovation efforts.
Open Access"Mergers and Investments in New Products"
>This paper examines how horizontal mergers affect firms' incentives to invest in R&D leading to the development of new products. We characterize the impact of a merger to monopoly and a 3-to-2 merger on equilibrium innovation efforts and consumer surplus, absent efficiency gains and spillovers. We show that a 3-to-2 merger directly alters the outsider's innovation incentives by shifting its best-response function upward, and we analyze how this mechanism affects merger outcomes for innovation and consumer surplus. Finally, we examine how efficiency gains and remedies modify post-merger innovation efforts.
- 7 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 105
Mergers and investments: Where do we stand?
- 7 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 105
Mergers and investments: Where do we stand?
- Open Access
Decentralizing Cooperation through Upstream Bilateral Agreements
We consider an industry with n≥3 firms owning upstream inputs and interacting noncooperatively in a downstream market. Under general conditions, upstream bilateral agreements giving firms access to one another's input lead to industry profit maximization. This decentralization result applies to various upstream agreements including cross-licensing agreements among patent-holding manufacturers, interconnection agreements among telecommunication companies, interbank payments for ATM networks, and data-sharing agreements among competitors or complementors.
Open AccessDecentralizing Cooperation through Upstream Bilateral Agreements
We consider an industry with n≥3 firms owning upstream inputs and interacting noncooperatively in a downstream market. Under general conditions, upstream bilateral agreements giving firms access to one another's input lead to industry profit maximization. This decentralization result applies to various upstream agreements including cross-licensing agreements among patent-holding manufacturers, interconnection agreements among telecommunication companies, interbank payments for ATM networks, and data-sharing agreements among competitors or complementors.
- Open Access
Mergers and Investments: Where Do We Stand?
In this paper, we review recent studies on the impact of mergers on investments. First, we examine how mergers among competing incumbents influence firms' incentives to develop new products and undertake cost-reducing or quality-enhancing investments. Second, we analyze how an incumbent's acquisition of an innovative entrant affects the investment incentives of both parties. Third, we discuss the effects of vertical mergers on the investment decisions of both upstream and downstream firms. Finally, we outline a few directions for future research.
Open AccessMergers and Investments: Where Do We Stand?
In this paper, we review recent studies on the impact of mergers on investments. First, we examine how mergers among competing incumbents influence firms' incentives to develop new products and undertake cost-reducing or quality-enhancing investments. Second, we analyze how an incumbent's acquisition of an innovative entrant affects the investment incentives of both parties. Third, we discuss the effects of vertical mergers on the investment decisions of both upstream and downstream firms. Finally, we outline a few directions for future research.
- Open Access
Network Centrality and Device Ecosystems
Motivated by several examples, including Internet of Things patent licensing, we develop a tractable model of multi-product ecosystems, where one or more platforms provide inputs to a set of devices linked through demand-side externalities. Prices depend on each device's Katz-Bonacich centrality in a network dened by the externalities, and we show how the relevant network diers for an ecosystem monop- olist, a social planner, or a group of complementary platforms. We use the model to revisit Cournot's analysis of complementary monopolies in a platform setting, and to analyze a partial (one-sided) merger of complementary platforms.
Open AccessNetwork Centrality and Device Ecosystems
Motivated by several examples, including Internet of Things patent licensing, we develop a tractable model of multi-product ecosystems, where one or more platforms provide inputs to a set of devices linked through demand-side externalities. Prices depend on each device's Katz-Bonacich centrality in a network dened by the externalities, and we show how the relevant network diers for an ecosystem monop- olist, a social planner, or a group of complementary platforms. We use the model to revisit Cournot's analysis of complementary monopolies in a platform setting, and to analyze a partial (one-sided) merger of complementary platforms.
- Open Access
Horizontal Mergers and Incremental Innovation
We study the impact of horizontal mergers on the incentives of merging …rms to invest in incremental innovation. We provide a decomposition of this impact that clari…es the various forces at work and the di¤erences between demand-enhancing and cost-reducing innovation. Moreover, we derive su¢ cient conditions for a merger to either reduce or raise the merging …rms'incentives to innovate, and show that the comparison of the price diversion ratio and the innovation diversion ratio can help screen mergers. We also uncover a useful connection between the level of production synergies induced by a merger and its impact on innovation.
Open AccessHorizontal Mergers and Incremental Innovation
We study the impact of horizontal mergers on the incentives of merging …rms to invest in incremental innovation. We provide a decomposition of this impact that clari…es the various forces at work and the di¤erences between demand-enhancing and cost-reducing innovation. Moreover, we derive su¢ cient conditions for a merger to either reduce or raise the merging …rms'incentives to innovate, and show that the comparison of the price diversion ratio and the innovation diversion ratio can help screen mergers. We also uncover a useful connection between the level of production synergies induced by a merger and its impact on innovation.
- Open Access
- 16 April 2024
- Published by HAL
Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation
We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.
- 16 April 2024
- Published by HAL
Open AccessMergers and demand-enhancing innovation
We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.
- Open Access
- 16 April 2024
- Published by HAL
Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation
We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.
- 16 April 2024
- Published by HAL
Open AccessMergers and demand-enhancing innovation
We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.
- Open Access
- 16 April 2024
- Published by HAL
Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation
We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.
- 16 April 2024
- Published by HAL
Open AccessMergers and demand-enhancing innovation
We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.
- Open Access
- 16 April 2024
- Published by HAL
Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation
We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.
- 16 April 2024
- Published by HAL
Open AccessMergers and demand-enhancing innovation
We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.