Yun Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Yun Zhang has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Lo
School of Computing and Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore
3 shared publications - Zhiyuan Wan
Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
3 shared publications - Difan Xie
Hangzhou High-Tech Zone (Binjiang) Institute of Blockchain and Data Security, Hangzhou, China
1 shared publication - Rui Chang
Zhejiang University
1 shared publication - Xiaohu Yang
Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
1 shared publication - Xiaoye Zheng
Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 2 (FSE) , 1249-1269
Clone Detection for Smart Contracts: How Far Are We?
In smart contract development, practitioners frequently reuse code to reduce development effort and avoid reinventing the wheel. This reused code, whether identical or similar to its original source, is referred to as a code clone. Unintentional code cloning can propagate flaws and vulnerabilities, potentially undermining the reliability and maintainability of software systems. Previous studies have identified a significant prevalence of code clones in Solidity smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain. To mitigate the risks posed by code clones, clone detection has emerged as an active field of research and practice in software engineering. Recent studies have extended existing techniques or proposed novel techniques tailored to the unique syntactic and semantic features of Solidity. Nonetheless, the evaluations of existing techniques, whether conducted by their original authors or independent researchers, involve codebases in various programming languages and utilize different versions of the corresponding tools. The resulting inconsistency makes direct comparisons of the evaluation results impractical, and hinders the ability to derive meaningful conclusions across the evaluations. There remains a lack of clarity regarding the effectiveness of these techniques in detecting smart contract clones, and whether it is feasible to combine different techniques to achieve scalable yet accurate detection of code clones in smart contracts. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study that evaluates the effectiveness and scalability of five representative clone detection techniques on 33,073 verified Solidity smart contracts, along with a benchmark we curate, in which we manually label 72,010 pairs of Solidity smart contracts with clone tags. Moreover, we explore the potential of combining different techniques to achieve optimal performance of code clone detection for smart contracts, and propose SourceREClone, a framework designed for the refined integration of different techniques, which achieves a 36.9% improvement in F1 score compared to a straightforward combination of the state of the art. Based on our findings, we discuss implications, provide recommendations for practitioners, and outline directions for future research.
- 19 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 2 (FSE) , 1249-1269
Open AccessClone Detection for Smart Contracts: How Far Are We?
In smart contract development, practitioners frequently reuse code to reduce development effort and avoid reinventing the wheel. This reused code, whether identical or similar to its original source, is referred to as a code clone. Unintentional code cloning can propagate flaws and vulnerabilities, potentially undermining the reliability and maintainability of software systems. Previous studies have identified a significant prevalence of code clones in Solidity smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain. To mitigate the risks posed by code clones, clone detection has emerged as an active field of research and practice in software engineering. Recent studies have extended existing techniques or proposed novel techniques tailored to the unique syntactic and semantic features of Solidity. Nonetheless, the evaluations of existing techniques, whether conducted by their original authors or independent researchers, involve codebases in various programming languages and utilize different versions of the corresponding tools. The resulting inconsistency makes direct comparisons of the evaluation results impractical, and hinders the ability to derive meaningful conclusions across the evaluations. There remains a lack of clarity regarding the effectiveness of these techniques in detecting smart contract clones, and whether it is feasible to combine different techniques to achieve scalable yet accurate detection of code clones in smart contracts. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study that evaluates the effectiveness and scalability of five representative clone detection techniques on 33,073 verified Solidity smart contracts, along with a benchmark we curate, in which we manually label 72,010 pairs of Solidity smart contracts with clone tags. Moreover, we explore the potential of combining different techniques to achieve optimal performance of code clone detection for smart contracts, and propose SourceREClone, a framework designed for the refined integration of different techniques, which achieves a 36.9% improvement in F1 score compared to a straightforward combination of the state of the art. Based on our findings, we discuss implications, provide recommendations for practitioners, and outline directions for future research.
- Open Access
- 21 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
- Vol. 33 (2) , 1-30
A Closer Look at the Security Risks in the Rust Ecosystem
Rust is an emerging programming language designed for the development of systems software. To facilitate the reuse of Rust code, crates.io , as a central package registry of the Rust ecosystem, hosts thousands of third-party Rust packages. The openness of crates.io enables the growth of the Rust ecosystem but comes with security risks by severe security advisories. Although Rust guarantees a software program to be safe via programming language features and strict compile-time checking, the unsafe keyword in Rust allows developers to bypass compiler safety checks for certain regions of code. Prior studies empirically investigate the memory safety and concurrency bugs in the Rust ecosystem, as well as the usage of unsafe keywords in practice. Nonetheless, the literature lacks a systematic investigation of the security risks in the Rust ecosystem. In this article, we perform a comprehensive investigation into the security risks present in the Rust ecosystem, asking “what are the characteristics of the vulnerabilities, what are the characteristics of the vulnerable packages, and how are the vulnerabilities fixed in practice?”. To facilitate the study, we first compile a dataset of 433 vulnerabilities, 300 vulnerable code repositories, and 218 vulnerability fix commits in the Rust ecosystem, spanning over 7 years. With the dataset, we characterize the types, life spans, and evolution of the disclosed vulnerabilities. We then characterize the popularity, categorization, and vulnerability density of the vulnerable Rust packages, as well as their versions and code regions affected by the disclosed vulnerabilities. Finally, we characterize the complexity of vulnerability fixes and localities of corresponding code changes, and inspect how practitioners fix vulnerabilities in Rust packages with various localities. We find that memory safety and concurrency issues account for nearly two thirds of the vulnerabilities in the Rust ecosystem. It takes over 2 years for the vulnerabilities to become publicly disclosed, and one-third of the vulnerabilities have no fixes committed before their disclosure. In terms of vulnerability density, we observe a continuous upward trend at the package level over time, but a decreasing trend at the code level since August 2020. In the vulnerable Rust packages, the vulnerable code tends to be localized at the file level, and contains statistically significantly more unsafe functions and blocks than the rest of the code. More popular packages tend to have more vulnerabilities, while the less popular packages suffer from vulnerabilities for more versions. The vulnerability fix commits tend to be localized to a limited number of lines of code. Developers tend to address vulnerable safe functions by adding safe functions or lines to them, vulnerable unsafe blocks by removing them, and vulnerable unsafe functions by modifying unsafe trait implementations. Based on our findings, we discuss implications, provide recommendations for software practitioners, and outline directions for future research.
- 21 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
- Vol. 33 (2) , 1-30
Open AccessA Closer Look at the Security Risks in the Rust Ecosystem
Rust is an emerging programming language designed for the development of systems software. To facilitate the reuse of Rust code, crates.io , as a central package registry of the Rust ecosystem, hosts thousands of third-party Rust packages. The openness of crates.io enables the growth of the Rust ecosystem but comes with security risks by severe security advisories. Although Rust guarantees a software program to be safe via programming language features and strict compile-time checking, the unsafe keyword in Rust allows developers to bypass compiler safety checks for certain regions of code. Prior studies empirically investigate the memory safety and concurrency bugs in the Rust ecosystem, as well as the usage of unsafe keywords in practice. Nonetheless, the literature lacks a systematic investigation of the security risks in the Rust ecosystem. In this article, we perform a comprehensive investigation into the security risks present in the Rust ecosystem, asking “what are the characteristics of the vulnerabilities, what are the characteristics of the vulnerable packages, and how are the vulnerabilities fixed in practice?”. To facilitate the study, we first compile a dataset of 433 vulnerabilities, 300 vulnerable code repositories, and 218 vulnerability fix commits in the Rust ecosystem, spanning over 7 years. With the dataset, we characterize the types, life spans, and evolution of the disclosed vulnerabilities. We then characterize the popularity, categorization, and vulnerability density of the vulnerable Rust packages, as well as their versions and code regions affected by the disclosed vulnerabilities. Finally, we characterize the complexity of vulnerability fixes and localities of corresponding code changes, and inspect how practitioners fix vulnerabilities in Rust packages with various localities. We find that memory safety and concurrency issues account for nearly two thirds of the vulnerabilities in the Rust ecosystem. It takes over 2 years for the vulnerabilities to become publicly disclosed, and one-third of the vulnerabilities have no fixes committed before their disclosure. In terms of vulnerability density, we observe a continuous upward trend at the package level over time, but a decreasing trend at the code level since August 2020. In the vulnerable Rust packages, the vulnerable code tends to be localized at the file level, and contains statistically significantly more unsafe functions and blocks than the rest of the code. More popular packages tend to have more vulnerabilities, while the less popular packages suffer from vulnerabilities for more versions. The vulnerability fix commits tend to be localized to a limited number of lines of code. Developers tend to address vulnerable safe functions by adding safe functions or lines to them, vulnerable unsafe blocks by removing them, and vulnerable unsafe functions by modifying unsafe trait implementations. Based on our findings, we discuss implications, provide recommendations for software practitioners, and outline directions for future research.
- Open Access
- 30 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1457-1469
Software Architecture in Practice: Challenges and Opportunities
Software architecture has been an active research field for nearly four decades, in which previous studies make significant progress such as creating methods and techniques and building tools to support software architecture practice. Despite past efforts, we have little understanding of how practitioners perform software architecture related activities, and what challenges they face. Through interviews with 32 practitioners from 21 organizations across three continents, we identified challenges that practitioners face in software architecture practice during software development and maintenance. We reported on common software architecture activities at software requirements, design, construction and testing, and maintenance stages, as well as corresponding challenges. Our study uncovers that most of these challenges center around management, documentation, tooling and process, and collects recommendations to address these challenges.
- 30 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1457-1469
Open AccessSoftware Architecture in Practice: Challenges and Opportunities
Software architecture has been an active research field for nearly four decades, in which previous studies make significant progress such as creating methods and techniques and building tools to support software architecture practice. Despite past efforts, we have little understanding of how practitioners perform software architecture related activities, and what challenges they face. Through interviews with 32 practitioners from 21 organizations across three continents, we identified challenges that practitioners face in software architecture practice during software development and maintenance. We reported on common software architecture activities at software requirements, design, construction and testing, and maintenance stages, as well as corresponding challenges. Our study uncovers that most of these challenges center around management, documentation, tooling and process, and collects recommendations to address these challenges.