Tony Zirui Yang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Tony Zirui Yang has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andrew R. Stone
University of Mississippi
1 shared publication - Deniz Aksoy
Washington University in Saint Louis
1 shared publication Hongshen Zhu
University of Pennsylvania, Center for Study of Contemporary China
1 shared publication- Hongshen Zhu
Department of Government and International Affairs, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
1 shared publication - Jeremy Siow
University of Oxford
1 shared publication - Minh D. Trinh
The University of Texas at Austin
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 March 2026
- Vol. 90 (1) , 218-237
Ideological Cues, Partisanship, and Prejudice Against LGBTQ Judges
How does the gender and sexual identity of a prospective judge shape public support for their nomination? We build upon recent scholarship on instrumental inclusivity and argue that, after accounting for nominee ideology, Americans of all partisan stripes will penalize LGBTQ nominees. Using a conjoint experiment, we randomly vary a prospective Biden US Supreme Court nominee’s gender and sexual identity. Crucially, we also randomize the nominee’s ideology, enabling us to disentangle LGBTQ identity from the ideological signal it sends and differentiate between genuine and instrumental support for LGBTQ nominees. Contrary to recent findings suggesting that Democrats reward minority judges, we find that respondents from both parties penalize LGBTQ nominees. The magnitude of these effects—roughly 14 percentage points for transgender nominees and 8 percentage points for gay or lesbian nominees—is considerable and second only to shared partisanship. Our study underscores that ideological alignment does not necessarily foster genuine inclusivity for LGBTQ individuals and highlights the persistent challenges of representation for marginalized groups in an era of polarized judicial nominations.
- 3 March 2026
- Vol. 90 (1) , 218-237
Open AccessIdeological Cues, Partisanship, and Prejudice Against LGBTQ Judges
How does the gender and sexual identity of a prospective judge shape public support for their nomination? We build upon recent scholarship on instrumental inclusivity and argue that, after accounting for nominee ideology, Americans of all partisan stripes will penalize LGBTQ nominees. Using a conjoint experiment, we randomly vary a prospective Biden US Supreme Court nominee’s gender and sexual identity. Crucially, we also randomize the nominee’s ideology, enabling us to disentangle LGBTQ identity from the ideological signal it sends and differentiate between genuine and instrumental support for LGBTQ nominees. Contrary to recent findings suggesting that Democrats reward minority judges, we find that respondents from both parties penalize LGBTQ nominees. The magnitude of these effects—roughly 14 percentage points for transgender nominees and 8 percentage points for gay or lesbian nominees—is considerable and second only to shared partisanship. Our study underscores that ideological alignment does not necessarily foster genuine inclusivity for LGBTQ individuals and highlights the persistent challenges of representation for marginalized groups in an era of polarized judicial nominations.
- Open Access
- 4 August 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Transnational Propaganda and Ethnic Polarization: Experimental Evidence from Malaysia
Authoritarian regimes increasingly engage in transnational information campaigns to expand their political and cultural influence beyond national borders. We argue that such operations can exacerbate ethnic polarization in target countries, specifically between diaspora communities and ethnic majority populations. Drawing on Social Identity Theory, we theorize that transnational propaganda exacerbates affective polarization by reducing intergroup social and political tolerance, while also increasing polarization in foreign policy preferences in racially diverse settings. To test these expectations, we conduct a preregistered survey experiment in Malaysia and examine whether China's transnational propaganda affects intergroup and foreign policy attitudes among ethnic Chinese and Malays. The results show that China's propaganda decreases Malays’ social tolerance toward Chinese Malaysians while strengthening Chinese Malaysians' -- but not Malays' -- agreement with China's foreign policy positions in the region. These findings highlight how transnational propaganda can undermine social cohesion and create divergent policy preferences within multicultural societies.
- 4 August 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessTransnational Propaganda and Ethnic Polarization: Experimental Evidence from Malaysia
Authoritarian regimes increasingly engage in transnational information campaigns to expand their political and cultural influence beyond national borders. We argue that such operations can exacerbate ethnic polarization in target countries, specifically between diaspora communities and ethnic majority populations. Drawing on Social Identity Theory, we theorize that transnational propaganda exacerbates affective polarization by reducing intergroup social and political tolerance, while also increasing polarization in foreign policy preferences in racially diverse settings. To test these expectations, we conduct a preregistered survey experiment in Malaysia and examine whether China's transnational propaganda affects intergroup and foreign policy attitudes among ethnic Chinese and Malays. The results show that China's propaganda decreases Malays’ social tolerance toward Chinese Malaysians while strengthening Chinese Malaysians' -- but not Malays' -- agreement with China's foreign policy positions in the region. These findings highlight how transnational propaganda can undermine social cohesion and create divergent policy preferences within multicultural societies.
- Open Access
- 19 June 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 14 (3) , 1-9
Twisted tongue: limits of China’s propaganda during crises and policy changes
Extensive research showcases that authoritarian propaganda can cultivate support and deter protest during “normal” times. This study examines authoritarian propaganda’s efficacy during crises and policy changes when the regime needs it most. We posit that various propaganda strategies, including “hard” and “soft” rhetoric, have significant limitations during crises. Hard propaganda’s heavy-handed slogans could signal regime strength but may also legitimize “rightful resistance” against local authorities, limiting its protest-deterrence effects. Soft propaganda may lose persuasiveness due to presenting contradictory arguments during policy changes. We leverage the turbulent period of China’s COVID policy reversal to conduct an original survey experiment in December 2022. Our findings reveal that pro-reopening hard propaganda weakens its protest-deterrence effects by reinforcing belief in protest righteousness. Moreover, inconsistent soft propaganda lowers public evaluations of China’s COVID response, diminishing its persuasive effects. Our study highlights significant limitations of authoritarian propaganda during crises and policy changes.
- 19 June 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 14 (3) , 1-9
Open AccessTwisted tongue: limits of China’s propaganda during crises and policy changes
Extensive research showcases that authoritarian propaganda can cultivate support and deter protest during “normal” times. This study examines authoritarian propaganda’s efficacy during crises and policy changes when the regime needs it most. We posit that various propaganda strategies, including “hard” and “soft” rhetoric, have significant limitations during crises. Hard propaganda’s heavy-handed slogans could signal regime strength but may also legitimize “rightful resistance” against local authorities, limiting its protest-deterrence effects. Soft propaganda may lose persuasiveness due to presenting contradictory arguments during policy changes. We leverage the turbulent period of China’s COVID policy reversal to conduct an original survey experiment in December 2022. Our findings reveal that pro-reopening hard propaganda weakens its protest-deterrence effects by reinforcing belief in protest righteousness. Moreover, inconsistent soft propaganda lowers public evaluations of China’s COVID response, diminishing its persuasive effects. Our study highlights significant limitations of authoritarian propaganda during crises and policy changes.
- 27 November 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 58 (12) , 2594-2620
Participatory Censorship in Authoritarian Regimes
Contrary to the conventional top-down view of government censorship, this study argues that ordinary citizens in authoritarian regimes frequently participate in censorship by reporting online content. I hypothesize that such participation in censorship partially explains the high level of public support for censorship found in existing surveys. Using an original survey in China, I demonstrate that participation in censorship is indeed prevalent, with over half of the respondents self-report having previously flagged online content, and that such participation is positively correlated with support for the censorship apparatus. To causally test the hypothesis, I conduct a pre-registered experiment using custom-engineered, simulated social media pages to manipulate reporting behavior. The results show that respondents encouraged to report simulated posts display significantly higher support for the censorship apparatus. This study highlights the role of ordinary citizens in facilitating authoritarian control and explains why repressive apparatus like censorship can be popular with the population.
- 27 November 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 58 (12) , 2594-2620
Participatory Censorship in Authoritarian Regimes
Contrary to the conventional top-down view of government censorship, this study argues that ordinary citizens in authoritarian regimes frequently participate in censorship by reporting online content. I hypothesize that such participation in censorship partially explains the high level of public support for censorship found in existing surveys. Using an original survey in China, I demonstrate that participation in censorship is indeed prevalent, with over half of the respondents self-report having previously flagged online content, and that such participation is positively correlated with support for the censorship apparatus. To causally test the hypothesis, I conduct a pre-registered experiment using custom-engineered, simulated social media pages to manipulate reporting behavior. The results show that respondents encouraged to report simulated posts display significantly higher support for the censorship apparatus. This study highlights the role of ordinary citizens in facilitating authoritarian control and explains why repressive apparatus like censorship can be popular with the population.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 29 April 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 78 (2) , 341-360
Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Chinese Public Support for War
This study examines how the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent Western responses influence Chinese public opinion on the use of force. Using two original, preregistered online survey experiments, first in June 2022 and then in June 2023, we show that the Russian invasion is associated with a modest but statistically significant increase in Chinese support for using military force in international affairs in general and against Taiwan in particular. However, information on Western military measures aiding Ukraine curbs the modest impact of the invasion. Such information is especially effective in reducing support for an outright military invasion of Taiwan. Causal mediation analyses reveal that the Russian invasion influences public opinion by inducing optimism regarding military success and pessimism regarding peaceful resolution of the conflict. These findings suggest that foreign military aggression and subsequent international countermeasures can sway domestic public opinion on using military force.
- 29 April 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 78 (2) , 341-360
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessRussian Invasion of Ukraine and Chinese Public Support for War
This study examines how the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent Western responses influence Chinese public opinion on the use of force. Using two original, preregistered online survey experiments, first in June 2022 and then in June 2023, we show that the Russian invasion is associated with a modest but statistically significant increase in Chinese support for using military force in international affairs in general and against Taiwan in particular. However, information on Western military measures aiding Ukraine curbs the modest impact of the invasion. Such information is especially effective in reducing support for an outright military invasion of Taiwan. Causal mediation analyses reveal that the Russian invasion influences public opinion by inducing optimism regarding military success and pessimism regarding peaceful resolution of the conflict. These findings suggest that foreign military aggression and subsequent international countermeasures can sway domestic public opinion on using military force.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Doublespeak: Limits of China's Hard and Soft Propaganda During Political Crises
This research note examines authoritarian propaganda strategies’ effectiveness during political crises and policy changes. Although extensive research showcases the efficacy of propaganda, limited attention has been given to its shortcomings. We posit that various propaganda strategies, including “hard” and “soft” rhetoric, have significant limitations during political crises. Hard propaganda’s heavy-handed slogans could signal regime strength but may also legitimize “rightful resistance” against local authorities, limiting its protest-deterrence effects. Soft propaganda may lose persuasiveness due to presenting contradictory arguments during policy changes. We leverage China’s COVID policy reversal and political turmoil to conduct an original, pre-registered survey experiment in December 2022. Our findings reveal that pro-reopening hard propaganda weakens its protest-deterrence effects by reinforcing belief in protest righteousness. Moreover, inconsistent soft propaganda lowers public evaluations of China’s COVID response, diminishing its persuasive effects. Our study highlights significant limitations of authoritarian propaganda, particularly during political crises when they are most needed.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDoublespeak: Limits of China's Hard and Soft Propaganda During Political Crises
This research note examines authoritarian propaganda strategies’ effectiveness during political crises and policy changes. Although extensive research showcases the efficacy of propaganda, limited attention has been given to its shortcomings. We posit that various propaganda strategies, including “hard” and “soft” rhetoric, have significant limitations during political crises. Hard propaganda’s heavy-handed slogans could signal regime strength but may also legitimize “rightful resistance” against local authorities, limiting its protest-deterrence effects. Soft propaganda may lose persuasiveness due to presenting contradictory arguments during policy changes. We leverage China’s COVID policy reversal and political turmoil to conduct an original, pre-registered survey experiment in December 2022. Our findings reveal that pro-reopening hard propaganda weakens its protest-deterrence effects by reinforcing belief in protest righteousness. Moreover, inconsistent soft propaganda lowers public evaluations of China’s COVID response, diminishing its persuasive effects. Our study highlights significant limitations of authoritarian propaganda, particularly during political crises when they are most needed.