KVKevin Valakuzhy

Kevin Valakuzhy

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Kevin Valakuzhy has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • BRAID: Uncovering Malware Family Relationships in Data-Scarce Settings

    by Kevin Valakuzhy, Miuyin Yong Wong, Omar Alrawi, Angelos D. Keromytis, Manos Antonakakis, Fabian Monrose

  • Open Access

    Understanding LLMs Ability to Aid Malware Analysts in Bypassing Evasion Techniques

    by Miuyin Yong Wong, Kevin Valakuzhy, Mustaque Ahamad, Doug Blough, Fabian Monrose

    Over the past few years, the threat of malware has become increasingly evident, posing a significant risk to cybersecurity worldwide and driving extensive research efforts to prevent and mitigate these attacks. Despite numerous efforts to automate malware analysis, these systems are constantly thwarted by evasive techniques developed by malware authors. As a result, the analysis of sophisticated evasive malware falls into the hands of human malware analysts, who must undertake the time-consuming process of overcoming each evasive technique to uncover malware’s malicious behaviors. This highlights the need for approaches that aid malware analysts in this process. Although active measures, such as forced execution and symbolic analysis, can automatically circumvent some evasive checks, they suffer from limitations like path explosion and fail to provide useful insights that analysts can use in their workflow. To fill this gap, we investigate how large language models (LLMs) can address shortcomings of symbolic analysis through the first comparative analysis between the two in bypassing evasion techniques. Our study leads to three key findings: (i) we find that LLMs outperform symbolic analysis in bypassing evasive code, especially in the presence of common code patterns, such as loops, which have historically posed a challenge for symbolic analysis, (ii) we show that LLMs correctly identify methods of bypassing evasive techniques in real-world malware, and (iii) we highlight how even in LLMs failure modes, human malware analysts can benefit from the step-by-step reasoning provided by the model.


  • Open Access

    CrashTalk: Automated Generation of Precise, Human Readable, Descriptions of Software Security Bugs

    by Kedrian James, Kevin Valakuzhy, Kevin Snow, Fabian Monrose

    Understanding the cause, consequences, and severity of a security bug are critical facets of the overall bug triaging and remediation process. Unfortunately, diagnosing failures is often a laborious process that requires developers to expend significant time and effort. While solutions have been proposed to help expedite the process of pinpointing the cause of a security bug, few proposals provide an explanation along with a diagnosis to make the bug discovery and triaging process less taxing. Moreover, even in cases where descriptions are provided, they are not guided by classification models that support precise descriptions of the flaw. We present an approach that uses static and dynamic analysis techniques to automatically infer the cause and consequences of a software crash and present diagnostic information following NIST's recently released Bugs Framework taxonomy. Specifically, starting from a crash, we generate a detailed and accessible English description of the failure along with its weakness types and severity, thereby easing the burden on developers and security analysts alike. To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we compare our ability to find fault locations and generate explanations compared to that of professional software developers by using a benchmark specifically designed to assist with realistic evaluation of tools in software engineering. In addition, using 33 real-world vulnerabilities we collected, we show that our approach correctly diagnoses over 94% of the failures and, in some cases, generates weakness types that are more specific than those that were originally assigned by the submitter or National Vulnerability Database analysts. We also generate initial vulnerability scores that can be used by project managers to assist with prioritizing bug fixes. On average, the overall process takes just over a minute, which is orders of magnitude faster than what professional developers can do.