Steven Wirsz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Steven Wirsz has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Adam Doupé
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
2 shared publications - Ruoyu Wang
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
2 shared publications - Tiffany Bao
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
2 shared publications - Yan Shoshitaishvili
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
2 shared publications - Adam Oest
Arizona State University, United States of America
1 shared publication - Arvind S Raj
Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3719-3733
Fuzz to the Future: Uncovering Occluded Future Vulnerabilities via Robust Fuzzing
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3719-3733
Open AccessFuzz to the Future: Uncovering Occluded Future Vulnerabilities via Robust Fuzzing
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 638-653
Deep Dive into Client-Side Anti-Phishing: A Longitudinal Study Bridging Academia and Industry
Client-side anti-phishing methods are crucial for safeguarding individuals against phishing attacks, offering a proactive approach beyond traditional blocklisting strategies. This study expands the scope to include a comprehensive evaluation of client-side anti-phishing techniques within the Chrome browser, alongside an in-depth analysis of academic research in the field of phishing over the past five years. Our findings highlight the inherent limitations of current client-side anti-phishing measures, which demonstrated a detection rate of only 14% for phishing websites and blocked merely 10% of login-based phishing sites within the first hour, resulting in a substantial false negative rate. Additionally, our analysis reveals that attackers can readily circumvent these defenses by altering the content of phishing websites. The study also critically assesses recent academic contributions to understand their alignment and potential integration with client-side anti-phishing frameworks. Based on these insights, we propose targeted recommendations to enhance the efficacy and responsiveness of the client-side anti-phishing ecosystem, addressing the challenges of low detection coverage, slow response times, and high rates of false negatives.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 638-653
Open AccessDeep Dive into Client-Side Anti-Phishing: A Longitudinal Study Bridging Academia and Industry
Client-side anti-phishing methods are crucial for safeguarding individuals against phishing attacks, offering a proactive approach beyond traditional blocklisting strategies. This study expands the scope to include a comprehensive evaluation of client-side anti-phishing techniques within the Chrome browser, alongside an in-depth analysis of academic research in the field of phishing over the past five years. Our findings highlight the inherent limitations of current client-side anti-phishing measures, which demonstrated a detection rate of only 14% for phishing websites and blocked merely 10% of login-based phishing sites within the first hour, resulting in a substantial false negative rate. Additionally, our analysis reveals that attackers can readily circumvent these defenses by altering the content of phishing websites. The study also critically assesses recent academic contributions to understand their alignment and potential integration with client-side anti-phishing frameworks. Based on these insights, we propose targeted recommendations to enhance the efficacy and responsiveness of the client-side anti-phishing ecosystem, addressing the challenges of low detection coverage, slow response times, and high rates of false negatives.